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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study the macroeconomic effects of financial
and sovereign crises. Chapter I studies how the probability of bailout affects banks’ portfolio
decisions in normal times and during a sovereign debt crisis. Theoretically, an increase in
the probability of bailout implies a change in the expected “bailout rents” delivered to bank
owners, where the sign of the change depends on the sovereign risk and government’s own
borrowing costs. The model’s main predictions are that an increase in the probability of
bailout induces banks to decrease lending to firms and purchase sovereign bonds when the
government’s borrowing costs are sufficiently low, while the effect reverses during a sovereign
debt crisis. Empirically, data on Italian banks between 2007 and 2014 provides evidence
consistent with these predictions. Chapter II assesses the impact of the main unconventional
monetary measures adopted by the European Central Bank in 2011-2012 on the Italian
economy. Together with co-authors, I first estimate the direct effects on financial and credit
markets and then map these effects onto their macroeconomic implications. The results
suggest that all operations have, to varying degrees, contributed to counteract the increase
vi
in government bond yields and to improve credit supply and money market conditions. From
a macroeconomic perspective, the measures have had a large positive effect, mainly through
the credit channel, with a cumulative impact on GDP growth of 2.7 percentage points over
the period 2012-2013. Chapter III builds a dynamic partial equilibrium model in which
heterogeneous firms have access to two different sources of external financing, namely bank
loans and credit lines. Under a parameterization that corresponds to the U.S economy in
the first quarter of 2008, the model matches the empirical counterpart for aggregate levels of
debt and credit line drawdowns. I simulate the impact of the financial crisis by varying some
key parameters and studying the response of aggregate variables. I find that the model can
replicate the change in firms’ financing policy behavior observed during the financial crisis,
and in particular the interaction between access to bank lending and use of credit lines.
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1Chapter 1
Government Support and Bank Portfolio Choices:
the Impact of the Sovereign Debt Crisis
1.1 Introduction
Among other distinctive traits, banks benefit from government support. This is largely due
to the fact that bank failures have the potential to significantly damage the overall economy
and and thus, in order to avoid (or at least limit) this damage, public authorities may find
it optimal to step in to prevent bank default. Government support to banks consists of
both implicit and explicit guarantees. While the latter, for example deposit guarantees, are
generally common to all banks and thus likely to affect them in a similar way, other forms of
support that involve ad hoc direct intervention by public authorities (e.g. capital injections)
are distributed heterogeneously across the banking sector, resulting in more diverse effects.
One reason for this is that some intermediaries have a greater potential to disrupt the
financial sector and cause output losses, for instance due to their deep ties to the domestic
economy.1 Therefore, banks that are considered more systemically important are more likely
to be bailed out than their less relevant competitors.
In addition to differing across financial intermediaries, government support at the bank
1Another factor behind the heterogeneity of government implicit guarantees across banks is that the
liquidation and resolution of some financial intermediaries may involve larger operational complexities and
thus greater costs.
2level may vary significantly over time for at least two reasons. First, governments may
become more or less concerned about the potential negative impact of bank failures on
the domestic economy depending on macroeconomic conditions and prospects. The public
interventions aimed to rescue troubled banks that took place in several countries during
the recent global financial crisis exemplify the link between implicit government guarantees
and the willingness to avoid potential damages caused by bank failures. Second, bank
bailout policy and the fiscal conditions of the government are strictly connected, as the
European sovereign debt crisis that hit several countries beginning in 2010 has highlighted.
As a consequence, the deterioration of the sustainability of public debt severely affected
government support for the domestic banking sector in distressed countries.2
Importantly, when studying the effects of variation in the level of implicit government
guarantees across banks and over time, it is crucial to take into account that looking at the
probability of bank bailout may be insufficient to make robust conclusions. This is because
there are two elements associated with a bailout that affects a bank’s behavior and portfolio
decisions: the probability that it occurs and the value of bank owners’ payoffs in that case.
Indeed, one may argue that a bailed-out bank may be able to extract benefits, known as
“bailout rents”, which become smaller as the amount of resources available to the government
shrinks. For example, the share of dividends that shareholders can retain (or symmetrically
the degree of dilution of bank owners’ equity claims) when a bailout takes place is likely to
2According to the Bank for International Settlements (2011), implicit government support for large banks
has declined by up to eight notches in the euro area countries severely affected by sovereign risk concerns
since the end of 2009.
3be smaller if the conditions of public finances worsen. Among other reasons, one possible
explanation is that the political and economic costs associated with a further increase in
taxation (or cut in public spending) are large during an economic and sovereign crisis.
Therefore, the impact of implicit guarantees on protected banks’ behavior depends not
only on the probability of bailout, but also on the expected return of bank owners in the
case of bailout. As a consequence, the size of the expected “bailout rents” is likely to be a
key determinant of banks’ behavior rather than merely the probability of being rescued by
the government. Moreover, these benefits may be different during a sovereign debt crisis
than in normal times due to the government’s trade-off between tightening the fiscal stance
and making implicit transfers to banks through bailouts. As opposed to the links described
earlier, the interaction between fiscal conditions, the likelihood of government support and
size of “bailout rents” has been largely unexplored in the existing literature.
In view of these considerations, I study the effects of variation in the government bailout
policy on protected banks’ behavior and how the impact may differ according to the fiscal
conditions of the government, which in turn affect the expected value of “bailout rents”.
In particular, I am interested in addressing two questions. First, how do changes in the
probability of bailout affect the optimal composition of banks’ assets with respect to lending
to non-financial corporations and holdings of domestic government bonds? Second, are these
effects different during a sovereign debt crisis compared with normal times? To this end,
I first build a model whose mechanism speaks to these effects and then provide empirical
evidence that supports the theoretical predictions. To the best of my knowledge, this is
4the first paper that aims to determine both theoretically and empirically how the impact of
implicit government support on banks’ portfolio choices changes in response to substantial
shifts in fiscal conditions.
The theoretical framework is a three-period endowment economy in which a single large,
and thus systemically important, bank collects deposits from households to purchase gov-
ernment bonds and invest in private projects, which should be thought of as corporate loans.
Given that both assets are risky, the bank can go bankrupt and be forced to leave the market
when a sovereign default occurs or when private projects are hit by a negative productivity
shock. In the case of bank “distress” in the middle period, that is, bank owners cannot meet
their obligations towards depositors, the government, if solvent, may intervene and prevent
the bank from defaulting with a probability that depends positively on the magnitude of
the damaging effects that the bank’s failure would have on aggregate output. Crucially,
this public intervention cannot fully offset the output loss associated with bank distress and
is funded through the issuance of additional public debt. A bailout allows bank owners to
reimburse depositors and possibly to retain a share of future dividends, thus extracting some
“bailout rents”. The government may decide not to fully nationalize the bank and let bank
owners retain part of the dividends generated in the last period because their utility enters
the welfare function that the public authority aims to maximize. At the same time, the
government also takes into account the utility of households, whose endowment represents
the tax base.
Given this setup, the government faces a trade-off when deciding the composition of
5public revenues necessary to repay its debt. On the one hand the government can increase
the tax rate on households’ income, while on the other hand it can reduce “bailout rents”,
which implies letting bank owners retain a smaller share of dividends. In the former case, the
welfare of households decreases, whereas in the latter the utility of bank owners is negatively
affected. The bank’s portfolio decisions involve a trade-off as well. If repaid, corporate loans
offer a higher return compared with sovereign bonds, however, larger holdings of government
bonds lead to larger expected “bailout rents”. This is because the larger is the exposure to
government bonds, the smaller is the difference between outstanding liabilities and assets
in the case of bank distress. Since this difference corresponds exactly to the amount of
public debt that needs to be issued in order to reimburse depositors, larger bank holdings
of sovereign bonds imply that the government needs to levy less taxes on households in
order to fund a bank bailout. As a consequence, a larger bank exposure to sovereign bonds
increases the fiscal space, loosening the trade-off faced by the government in terms of the
composition of public revenues described earlier.
The key result of the model is that changes in the probability of bailout affect bank
owners’ portfolio decisions in different ways according to the state of the economy, and in
particular to the level of sovereign risk and thus government borrowing costs. To be more
precise, the model yields two main predictions. First, an increase in the probability of bailout
induces banks to decrease lending to firms and increase holdings of sovereign bonds when
sovereign default risk is low and consequently public debt servicing costs are relatively small.
Second, the effect reverses in the case that the government faces sufficiently high borrowing
6costs, implying that the tax rate necessary to repay government bondholders is relatively
large. The intuition behind these results is as follows. On the one hand, higher government
support to banks raises the probability that bank owners can retain a share of dividends
even in the case they cannot meet their obligations in the future. On the other hand, a
higher probability of bailout also implies that the output loss due to bank distress will be
greater, thus lowering the tax base and in turn making it less likely that the government opts
for an increase in the tax rate to allow bank owners to extract “bailout rents”. When the
return on government bonds is sufficiently small, the first effect dominates and an increase
in the probability of bailout involves larger expected “bailout rents”, while the opposite is
true during a sovereign crisis, which is associated with a significant increase in government
borrowing costs.
In order to empirically assess the impact of the probability of bailout on banks’ portfolio
choices and thus test the model’s predictions, I use a novel panel data set that consists of
monthly observations on bank balance sheet items, government bond purchases and lending
flows of (the largest) 20 Italian banking groups. The data are collected from the Bank
of Italy’s supervisory records and Credit Register, respectively. The overall sample period
spans from 2007 to 2014, which I divide into two subsamples: up to mid-2011 (the pre-crisis
period) and after mid-2011 (the crisis period). To quantify the level of implicit government
guarantees, I construct a measure of the probability that a bank bailout takes place from
ratings provided by Moody’s. This is possible because Moody’s assigns different ratings to
each bank: one that reflects the bank’s intrinsic soundness (the “baseline credit assessment”)
7and another that takes into account potential support by public authorities (the “deposit
rating”). The empirical approach exploits both the cross-sectional and time variation in the
level of implicit government guarantees on the Italian banking sector. Among the controls,
I include time and bank fixed effects in addition to relevant information drawn from banks’
balance sheets.
The empirical results support the predictions of the theoretical model. First, during the
pre-crisis period, banks increase their net purchases of government bonds and reduce their
net lending to non-financial firms following an increase in the probability of being bailed out.
Second, the findings for the crisis period are the opposite, since an increase in government
support is associated with a decrease in sovereign bond purchases and by an expansion
in corporate loans. Therefore, the coefficients on the probability of bailout always have
the predicted sign. Moreover, they are statistically significant at forecast horizons ranging
from 1 to 6 months. In economic terms, the estimated recomposition of banks’ portfolio
associated with changes in the probability of bailout is large. Lastly, all of these results are
robust to using an alternative measure of government support (i.e. the simple difference
between the baseline and the deposit ratings) and controlling for the possibility that banks
may anticipate changes in ratings.
This paper extends the existing literature in several ways. First, it extends the work
on the interaction between sovereign crises and government support to banks by examining
how variations in fiscal conditions can affect expected “bailout rents” and in turn banks’
responses to changes in the probability of being bailed out. As said earlier, this mechanism is
8far from being fully understood. In particular, this model highlights the fact that the sign of
changes in banks’ portfolio composition varies depending on the conditions of public finances.
Second, it sheds light on the impact of bailout policy on banks’ portfolio choices with
respect to specific assets, namely government bonds and loans to non-financial corporations.
Previous papers focus on the effect on banks’ investment decisions using synthetic measures
of risk, such as the z-score (i.e. the return on assets plus capital to asset ratio, divided by the
standard deviation of return on assets). Third, the empirical analysis on the Italian banking
sector provides significant support to the theoretical predictions by focusing on Italy, which
represents a perfect example of an economy that was severely hit by the European sovereign
debt crisis with relevant consequences for the fiscal space of its government. Finally, through
the use of a novel dataset that includes information from restricted supervisory records and
consists of observations at higher frequency compared with existing works, the analysis
in this paper allows for a deeper investigation into the response of banks to changes in
government support and fiscal conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section B reviews the existing literature. Section
C presents the model, first describing the theoretical framework and then analyzing the
equilibrium. Section D describes the empirical strategy to test the model’s predictions and
discusses the corresponding results. Section E concludes by summarizing and presenting
some possible extensions to this paper.
91.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to both the theoretical and empirical strands of the existing literature.
From a theoretical perspective, the closest analysis to the one presented here is Cooper
and Nikolov (2013), who study the impact of anticipated bailouts on banks’ incentives to
hold government bonds. Using a three-period model, they examine the response of banks’
portfolio choices to different possible bailout policies. Assuming that a bank’s default leads
to output losses as is the case in my model, they show that a discretionary government
will prefer to bailout troubled intermediaries under some circumstances. As a consequence,
an increase in sovereign exposure corresponds to a “win-win” strategy for banks, since they
profit from high ex post returns on government bond returns if an optimistic equilibrium
arises, while banks expect the government to be bailed out when the economy finds itself
in a pessimistic equilibrium. Therefore, in contrast to my paper, banks always choose to
purchase more government bonds, even during a sovereign debt crisis, a finding in contrast
with my empirical evidence.
Another close work the one by Acharya (2009), who develops a three-period model with
multiple banks to study the effect of closure policy and capital requirements on banks’
investment decisions (focusing on risk-taking), considering both individual and systemic
bank failure risk. Similar to my model, closure policy consists of bailing out the failed
bank with a dilution of bank owners’ equity claim, with greater dilution implying a less
forbearing closure policy. Although the author acknowledges that the costs of nationalizing
10
a large number of banks may be time-inconsistent because of the lack in commitment, his
model fails to formalize that case, since the public authority does not face any resource
constraint when setting its bank prudential policy.
From a broader perspective, the theoretical literature on the impact of government guar-
antees to banks examines the implications with respect to attitudes towards risk taking of
protected institutions. Two main effects have been identified so far, commonly known as the
charter value and market discipline hypotheses. According to the former, which was first
identified by Keeley (1990), government guarantees reduce banks’ costs of funding, increas-
ing their charter values. As a consequence, protected banks tend to take less risk in order
to preserve their future rents. Under the market discipline hypothesis, government support
provides protected banks with incentives for taking on more risk, since public guarantees are
not fairly priced (Merton, 1977) or investors monitor banks’ behavior less carefully (Flannery
and Sorescu, 1996). The beginning of the discussion about the relation between bailouts
and moral hazard goes back to Bagehot (1888), who argues that only temporarily illiquid
banks should be supported, while letting those that are insolvent fail.3
Regarding the empirical strand of the literature, existing papers focus on the effect of
government support on banks’ behavior. Although this literature is very vast, conclusions
are far from indisputable. With respect to the topic examined in this paper, the closest
work is Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2014) who study whether the impact of deposit
insurance on bank risk and systemic stability during crisis periods differs from that in normal
3The related literature is very large. Among others, see Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a more extensive
review.
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times. They find that generous safety nets are associated with higher bank risk and systemic
fragility in the years before the global financial crisis, while the opposite occurs after the
onset of the crisis. In other words, their results suggest that the moral hazard effect and
the charter value channel dominate in good and bad times, respectively. Contrary to my
paper, they only consider deposit insurance schemes which homogeneously apply to the
entire banking sector in a specific country, making it impossible to exploit cross-sectional
differences in government guarantees.
A critical aspect of the empirical literature on this subject is the measurement of implicit
government guarantees and thus of the probability that a bank is bailed out. Early papers
use the size of banks as a proxy for implicit government guarantees and focus on the impact
of “too-big-to-fail” expectations (see for instance Boyd and Runkle (1993), and O’Hara and
Shaw (1990)). Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2014) adopt a different approach and take
advantage of the natural experiment given by the forced removal of government guarantees
for savings banks in Germany (i.e. Landesbanken) in 2001 following a decision by the
European Court of Justice.4 By matching banks’ balance sheet information with data on
commercial loan customers, the authors find the removal of government guarantees resulted
in a significant reduction in credit risk, pointing to the existence of a moral hazard effect
from public support to banks.
More recent empirical papers follow the same approach as this paper and compute the
value of implicit guarantees from credit ratings. Brandao-Marques, Correa, and Sapriza
4In July 2001 the European Union, based on the outcome of a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice,
ordered that the guarantees must be discontinued in two steps between 2001 to 2005.
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(2013) use an international sample of rated banks and focus on the relation between govern-
ment support and risk taking by banks, as proxied by the z-score. They find that implicit
guarantees are positively associated with more risk taking, especially prior to and during
the 2008-2009 financial crisis. On the contrary, the paper by Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel
(2011) shows that government support negatively affects the willingness of protected banks
to take risk, which they compute from balance-sheet data on a large sample of banks based
in OECD countries. At the same time, the results also suggest that a higher probability
of bailout strongly increases the risk taking of competitor banks. In many respects, the
closest paper to my own is Correa et al. (2014), who examine the connection between banks
and governments in 37 countries by looking at bank stock price reactions to changes in
sovereign ratings. They find that bank stock returns are negatively affected by sovereign
rating downgrades, especially for those banks that are more likely to be bailed out by the
domestic government.
Finally, my paper is also related to the literature on the relation between sovereign risk
and banks’ asset choices. With respect to holdings of government bonds, Battistini, Pagano,
and Simonelli (2014) find that banks in the euro area peripheral countries increase their
holdings of domestic government bonds when sovereign risk increases. Acharya and Steffen
(2015) look at the sensitivity of banks’ equity returns to sovereign bond returns and find
that European banks engaged in carry trading during 2007-2013, increasing their exposure
to peripheral countries’ sovereign debt when systemic risk increased. They provide evidence
that regulatory capital arbitrage, home bias and moral suasion contribute to understanding
13
European banks’ sovereign bond exposures.
Several papers investigate the connection between credit supply and the sovereign debt
crisis. For instance, Albertazzi et al. (2014a) focus on Italian banks and find that increases
in the spread between Italian and German government bond yields are associated with a
reduction in lending to both households and firms. This result is consistent with the idea that
sovereign tensions increased risk premia that banks charge on borrowers. Using data from
the European Banking Authority (EBA) on banks’ exposure to government debt, De Marco
(2013) documents that banks more exposed to the sovereign shock tightened credit supply
by more than banks that were less exposed.5
1.3 The Model
Time is discrete and divided into three periods: t=0, 1, 2. I consider an economy whose
private sector is populated by households and bank owners, while the public sector consists
only of the government. The private sector and the government have access to an inter-
national financial market. The latter is willing and able to borrow and lend any amount
conditional on receiving an expected return equal to the gross interest rate R∗ ≥ 1, which I
assume to be constant in every period for notational simplicity.6 The possibility to access
such an international financial market together with the assumptions for preferences will
allow for the determination of equilibrium asset returns, since R∗ corresponds to the gross
5See also Popov and Van Horen (2014), Acharya et al. (2014), and Becker and Ivashina (2014).
6In the case that R∗ < 1, the results of the model still hold conditional on the risk-free rate not being
too small compared with the discount rate, as shown in the Appendix; however, I focus on the case R∗ ≥ 1
for clarity of exposition.
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risk-free rate in the domestic economy.
After describing the private sector’s preferences and choices, I illustrate those of the
government. Then, I analyze bank owners’ decisions without reference to fiscal or bailout
policy. Finally, I characterize the equilibrium taking into account government decisions and
discuss the relevant theoretical predictions to be tested empirically.
1.3.1 The private sector
The private sector consists of a continuum of identical households and a continuum of
identical bank owners. Households, whose mass is normalized to one, are risk neutral and
indifferent between consumption at any of the three dates. Each household receives a strictly
positive endowment of the consumption good ωt > 0 in every period, which is stochastic
and drawn from known probability distribution H(ω) with corresponding density h(ω). In
order to keep the analysis simple, I assume that H has support [ω, ω]. Importantly, the main
results hold even if the support has no upper bound, as long as H(ω) has a monotonically
increasing hazard function, which is a relatively weak restriction that is satisfied by many
conventional distributions.7
In the first two periods, households choose how to split their endowment between con-
sumption and savings. The latter can be used to buy financial assets originated by other
domestic agents, namely bank owners and the government, or lend to the international fi-
nancial market. Importantly, since households’ discount rate is equal to 1, they will never
7The hazard function or hazard rate is given by h(ω)
1−H(ω) . Broadly speaking, an increasing hazard rate
implies that the distribution has a single peak and its right tail is not too “thick”, as it is the case for the
normal distribution. Given that I am assuming that the support is closed, it is important to highlight that
the truncated normal distribution also has a monotonically increasing hazard function.
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choose to entirely consume their endowment in every period as long as R∗ ≥ 1.8
The private sector of the domestic economy also includes risk-neutral bank owners, of
which there is are a continuum of measure one. For ease of exposition, I will assume that
they are all shareholders of a single large bank. The main theoretical predictions of this
paper, however, hold as long as there is a finite number of non-atomistic banks.9 Contrary
to households, bankers do not receive any endowment of goods in any period; however, they
can make profits by acting as financial intermediaries. In particular, the bank can borrow
goods from households and invest them in financial assets. For the rest of the analysis, I
assume that bank owners can neither lend nor borrow internationally. I consider this sort
of hybrid open economy to simplify the theoretical framework and lessen the notational
burden; however, the main theoretical predictions hold even if bank owners can borrow
internationally.10 Throughout the analysis, the subscript t will refer to quantities of and
interest rates on financial claims maturing at time t (and originated at the previous date,
since all assets in the economy last for one period).
In its role as financial intermediary, the banking sector has access to an exclusive tech-
nology when borrowing. Specifically, the bank can collect deposits d that take the form
of non-contingent contracts with a maturity of one period. The promised gross return on
deposits maturing at time t, denoted by Rdt, is independent of the bank’s riskiness due to
8As a model of financial intermediation, the assumption that R∗ ≥ 1 is necessary to have savings and in
turn for the mechanism of the model to function. The case of R∗ < 1 is analyzed in the Appendix.
9When the banking sector includes more than one intermediary, the solution to the model should take into
account strategic behavior between banks, which would complicate the analysis without providing further
insights with respect to the main results.
10See the Appendix for more details on the robustness of the results to allowing bank owners to borrow
from the international financial market.
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the presence of a public insurance scheme.11 This implies that the government pays the
promised return on deposits if the bank cannot honor its obligations.12 Given that studying
the composition of bank liabilities is beyond the scope of this paper, I do not consider any
bank funding besides deposits. The inclusion of other types of borrowing by the bank would
have consequences associated with asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and
make the funding cost depend on the bailout policy.13
Regarding deposit pricing, I assume that households have a bias towards deposits such
that they are willing to accept a lower return than that on other types of investment.
Specifically, deposits trade at a negative premium , which is proportional to the gross
yield on other assets. Although I do not explicitly endogenize this result, the literature
has provided several explanations for why deposits could carry a negative premium. For
instance, the money-demand literature motivates a role for checking deposits as means of
payment because they can be immediately converted into cash upon necessity by definition.14
Similarly, the finance literature has motivated a desire for holding a very liquid asset to
meet households’ unexpected consumption needs.15 Here I take this fact as given because
the analysis focuses on the bank’s choices with respect to the asset side of its balance sheet.
11Usually deposit insurance aims to avoid bank runs; however, given that bank runs à la Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) do not play any role in this model, I abstract from explicitly modeling them here.
12To make the deposit guarantee resemble that in place in Italy, reimbursements to depositors of failed
banks should be funded by surviving banks ex post (For more details on “The Interbank Deposit Protection
Fund”, see www.fitd.it.) With only one bank, however, this type of insurance scheme would not make sense
in this theoretical framework.
13A large number of papers have attempted to quantify the implicit subsidy to banks using different
estimation methodologies. Among others, see Ueda and di Mauro (2013).
14About the peculiarity of cash-like instruments as a medium of exchange, see for instance Lagos and
Wright (2005).
15For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) document that the liquidity and safety at-
tributes can increase investors’ valuation of assets.
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With respect to the investment opportunities, bank owners can invest in government
bonds, whose promised return in the next period is denoted by RBt. At the same time, the
bank has access to a private investment project at t = 0, 1. This risky production technology
must be interpreted as a portfolio of loans to firms in the corporate sector. If successful, the
project generates a random output Rit in the period after it is undertaken. In the case that
the project suffers from a negative productivity shock, the bank will liquidate the investment
at value 0. The probability of being hit by a negative shock, and thus receiving a zero return
on the project, is exogenous and denoted by p.16 By assuming that it is impossible to build a
completely diversified portfolio of corporate loans, I introduce the possibility of bankruptcy
for the bank as a consequence of negative aggregate shocks to the private sector, even in the
absence of a sovereign default.17
To sum up, the bank’s problem boils down to choosing its balance sheet size and portfolio
composition at t = 0, 1. Regarding its holdings of assets, the bank can purchase government
bonds, bt, at no cost. On the contrary, varying the size of the loan portfolio, it, implies some
adjustment costs. Importantly, the portfolio adjustment is equivalent to the portfolio size at
the end of each date, since all loans mature after one period. These costs can be thought of
as costs of loan initiation, monitoring, screening, enforcement, or securitization. The effort
necessary to perform these tasks entails some non-pecuniary costs that are equal to (it)2/2
for t = 1, 2. Therefore, the bank incurs costs that are quadratic in total lending to firms.
16This probability could be controlled by the bank owners through screening, but I shall take it to be
exogenously given for simplicity.
17For instance, correlation across loans may stem from the existence of sectoral or geographical aggregate
shocks.
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The convexity of the cost function in the size of the adjustment not only restricts the size
of total lending to firms by introducing diminishing returns to scale, but also ensures that
banks have positive expected profits.
To keep the analysis simple, I assume that bank owners immediately consume all the
dividends they receive, meaning that the bank’s equity does not increase over time. Together
with the fact that bank owners have no individual wealth, this assumption implies that there
is no equity capital in the bank and no capital adequacy regulation is in place.18
The bank may default due to the presence of two sources of risk that make the return
on its portfolio uncertain. First, there is an aggregate risk because the government also
may default and fail, as discussed in the next section. Second, the bank’s investment in the
private project is subject to a productivity shock that can make the return on corporate
loans equal to zero, as discussed earlier. In order to keep the model simple, I assume that the
bank cannot insure against the aggregate risk, that is, the bank cannot survive a sovereign
default. There are at least two reasons to justify this assumption. First, it is consistent with
the methodology used by rating agencies, on which the empirical part of this paper relies.19
Second, sovereign default may lead to output costs (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), negatively
affecting the return on private projects and in turn that on the bank’s loan portfolio.
18This assumption dramatically simplifies the model, whose main results would still hold in the presence
of exogenous bank capital as long as the bank owners do not or cannot issue outside equity.
19Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s indeed impose that the rating of domestic banks cannot exceed that of
the government by more than one and two notches, respectively.
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1.3.2 The government
The public sector consists of a benevolent government that aims to maximize the disposable
income of agents in the domestic private sector. Importantly, the government is myopic
when making its decisions. This myopia implies that the public sector only consider the
impact that its choices at time t have on agents’ income in the same period. Clearly, this
assumption is a straightforward way to incorporate the fact that governments may be run
by politicians who do not fully internalize the effects of their decisions over the long term.
Although some politicians may be less short-sighted, most governments are likely to care
more about the short run due to limited-time mandates between elections.20
The government also wants to consume an exogenous amount G of the good at t = 0. I
assume that taxes can only be levied on households’ endowment in the last period, ruling
out the potential impact of taxation on savings decisions. Therefore, in order to fund its
consumption G, the government issues debt that takes the form of one-period securities with
initial price equal to 1 and promised gross yield RB1. Given that sovereign bonds issue at
t = 0 mature in the following period and taxes can only be collected in the last period, the
government needs to roll over its debt in the middle period: if unable to do so, sovereign
default occurs at t = 1.
Therefore, the amount of sovereign bonds originated at t = 1, which I denote by B2,
is at least as large as RB1G. In the same period, the government may be forced to issue
additional debt in order to fund the deposit insurance scheme or a direct bailout, if the bank
20See Acharya and Rajan (2013) for a more detailed discussion.
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cannot meet its obligations at t = 1. This event takes place when bank owners cannot pay
households the promised return on deposits, or, in other words, if the difference between the
bank’s revenues and expenses is negative, which I will refer to as a state of bank “distress.”
Upon failure, the bank exits the market and its dividends are zero. In order to repay
depositors, the assets of the failed bank are sold and the government provides the required
additional funds due to the existence of the insurance scheme described above. If the bank
is in distress at t = 1, the government may alternatively step in to prevent the bank from
defaulting and being liquidated. This direct bailout, which occurs with a probability γ
determined in equilibrium, consists of an ex post transfer from the government that allows
the failing bank to fully reimburse creditors and thus remain in the market. When bailing
out bank owners, the government also incurs some fixed cost ν ≥ 0, which is stochastic.
This can be thought of as the cost associated with designing and implementing the bailout,
which is an ad hoc intervention that may involve large operational complexities, especially
in the case of systemically important banks.
The reason the government may decide to bail out the bank is that default has disruptive
effects on the overall economy. For instance, bank failures can have damaging consequences
for the overall economy because of potential contagion to other financial institutions and
impairment in the bank credit channel.21 Moreover, the negative impact of a banking crisis
on output and other macroeconomic variables may last for a long time, as documented by
21For one specific model of how banks’ distress can negatively affect credit and output, see Gennaioli,
Martin, and Rossi (2014), while for some empirical evidence on the same issue, see for instance Dell’Ariccia,
Detragiache, and Rajan (2008).
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several studies.22 I introduce this output loss by assuming that the bank’s default reduces
the aggregate endowment received by households at t = 1, 2. This reduction is given by φ,
which is a reduced form way to capture how systemic and important the bank is for the
domestic economy and whose value becomes known to government at t = 0, before agents
make any decisions.23
By intervening directly, the government can reduce the negative impact of bank default
on the economy such that the corresponding output loss decreases by a fixed fraction ψ at
t = 1, 2. This implies that the government can partially limit the damage to output by
directly intervening and avoiding the bank’s liquidation; however, the bailout cannot fully
offset the negative consequences for the overall economy caused by bank failures. The fact
that the government cannot completely eliminate the output damages stemming from bank
distress can be thought of as a consequence of the bailout taking place ex post and thus
after financial tensions have already materialized.
When a bailout takes place, the bank owners are allowed by the government to retain a
fraction θ of future dividends, thus extracting some “bailout rents”, where θ = 1 corresponds
to a complete forbearance towards the bank, while θ = 0 represents the case of complete
nationalization of the bank.24 The government chooses the share of dividends to leave with
22See, for instance, Cerra and Saxena (2008), Furceri and Mourougane (2012) and Boyd, Kwak, and Smith
(2005).
23This assumption implies that the output loss associated with bank distress cannot be larger than the
households’ endowment at t = 1, 2. The main predictions of the model still hold if the output loss consists
of a share of the households’ endowment, but the notational burden would be heavier.
24The assumption that there is no bank equity implies that a bailout is equivalent to a full public recap-
italization in this framework, and thus gives the government the possibility of subjecting bank owners to a
“dilution” of their claims.
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bank owners ex post in the last period together with the amount of taxes to be collected to
repay public debt at t = 2, since the government can no longer roll over its debt. In order to
meet its obligations towards bondholders that amount to RB2B2, the government collects
revenues from two different sources. Primarily, it sets a tax rate τ on the endowment that
households receive at t = 2, which then represents the tax base.25 By only taxing households’
endowment in the last period, fiscal policy does not directly impact the intermediation
process; however, the tax base does depend on the functioning of the banking sector because
of the consequences of bank default. In addition to collecting revenues from households, the
government can also retain a bank owners’ dividends, if the bank is bailed out at t = 1.
Sovereign default may occur because public revenues may be smaller than the cost asso-
ciated with debt servicing, even by setting τ = 1, making it impossible for the government
to meet its obligations. I denote the probability that sovereign default takes place as αt
for t = 1, 2. In this framework, the government only defaults due to bad fundamentals and
never decides to default strategically. To simplify the model, the government refuses to
honor any of its obligations in the case of default, making the return on public bonds in this
case equal to 0. Moreover, no additional taxes are collected if sovereign default occurs.
As said earlier, the government is benevolent, meaning that it makes all decisions related
to fiscal and bailout policy, which are the tax rate, whether to rescue bank owners and the
amount of “bailout rents”, in order to maximize a welfare function, which is the sum of
25Alternatively, I could assume that the government’s capacity to tax households’ endowment is stochastic,
as in Cooper and Nikolov (2013).
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disposable income of private agents in the domestic economy. 26 In this respect, I assume
that the weight on households’ income in the welfare function is equal to 1, while that on
bank owners’ utility is given by (η−τ) with η ∈ (1, 2) measuring the political influence of the
banking sector. In other words, the government puts a larger weight on bankers’ welfare than
on households’ consumption due to better lobbying capacity.27 The fact that the welfare
weight on bank owners is decreasing in the tax rate implies that it becomes politically more
costly to let them retain some “bailout rents” as the fiscal conditions worsen, since this
would imply an increase in the tax burden on households in order to fund bank owners’
consumption.
1.3.3 Optimal bank portfolio
The agents in the economy face different problems in every period. Before proceeding with
the analysis, I summarize the timing of the model, which also is reported in Figure 1.1.
(i) At t = 0, households receive endowment ω0 and the government finds out about φ.
Financial markets open: the government issues bonds to fund public consumption G
and the bank collects deposits from savers. Given the interest rates on different assets
and the probability of bailout, agents optimally choose their portfolios.
(ii) At t = 1, households obtain an additional amount of goods ω1 before all financial
26Given linear preferences, disposable income and consumption are equivalent in the last period.
27Several papers investigate if and how banks’ sources of influence drive expectations of government
support to banks and the regulatory treatment of banks once they encounter difficulties. For instance, Igna-
towski, Korte, and Werger (2015) show that lobbying activities and political connections through proximity
to relevant legislative committees and prior regulatory or government affiliation of bank directors lower the
probability of obtaining additional discretionary regulatory measures, supporting the so called “revolving
door” argument. Agarwal et al. (2014) instead provide evidence that U.S. state regulators may not crack
down on banks as much as federal regulators because they care about the local economy.
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Figure 1.1
Timeline of the model
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Endowment ω0 is realized
Government issues debt B0
Potential output loss φ
is revealed
Bailout probability γ
is determined
Bank owners collect deposits d1
and choose assets, b1 and i1
Endowment ω1 and
bailout cost ν are realized
Asset payments are made
Bank default and bailout
may take place
Government issues debt B1
If still in the market,
bank owners choose d2, b2, and i2
Endowment ω2 is realized
Asset payments are made
Government default may occur
If solvent, the government sets:
(i) the tax rate τ
(ii) “bailout rents” θ
claims originated at t = 0 mature. Conditional on being able to do so, the government
rolls over the existing public debt and bank owners repay depositors. In the case that
bank owners cannot fully reimburse depositors and sovereign default does not take
place, the realization of ν is revealed and the government decides whether to bail out
the bank or fund the deposit insurance scheme, issuing additional debt accordingly. If
the bank is not shut down, bank owners collect deposits and optimally determine the
composition of their portfolio based on asset prices.
(iii) At t = 2, the endowment ω2 is realized and all promises issued at t = 1 mature. The
government taxes households’ income to repay sovereign debt and sets the share of
dividends to leave with bank owners if they were bailed out in the previous period.
Moving toward the characterization of the equilibrium in this economy, I begin by an-
alyzing the bank owners’ problem. As discussed earlier, the bank is subject to default risk
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at t = 1, 2. When financial liabilities issued in the previous period mature, bank owners
receive payments from assets in the bank’s portfolio and pay the promised return on its
deposits. If revenues are too small to meet the obligations towards depositors, the bank
defaults. Formally, bank owners can fully repay depositors if
Ritit +RBtbt −Rdtdt ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2. (1.1)
In the case that the above condition is not satisfied, bank owners obviously get no dividends.
Moreover, the bank’s assets are sold to repay depositors and the intermediary is forced
to exit the market, unless the government decides to step in and bail it out. Condition
(1.1) implies that the bank’s probability of default is independent of the ex post return
on corporate lending conditional on the size of the government bond portfolio being large
enough. Considering the case in which the payoff on private loans is 0, bank owners can still
avoid default if the return on holdings of public debt is large enough to repay depositors.
Given that the probability of default depends on the optimal portfolio composition, I
would need to analyze the bank’s problem in the case that failure takes place when the
return on corporate lending is positive and otherwise. However, the focus of this paper is to
study the role of bailout policy on banks’ portfolio decisions, thus it is crucial that financial
intermediaries may default while the government does not. Indeed, if bank owners find it
optimal to be subject only to sovereign default risk, portfolio decisions are not influenced by
the bailout policy, since the government cannot intervene and support the bank in distress.
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Therefore, I focus only on the case in which bank owners find it optimal to hold a govern-
ment bond portfolio which is too small to fully reimburse depositors if the private investment
return is zero. The condition necessary for this decision to be optimal in equilibrium boils
down to the negative premium on the deposit return  being small enough. Intuitively, bank
owners cannot expect to achieve positive dividends by only purchasing sovereign securities
if the interest rates on government bonds and deposits were equal.28
Conditional on not being forced to exit the market in the middle period, bank owners
choose how much to borrow from households and the composition of the bank’s portfolio
in order to maximize their expected utility, that is expected dividends, E(Π2), net of the
non-pecuniary costs, (i2)2/2. Assuming that  is small enough, the probability to be able
to fully repay depositors in the next period is (1 − α2)(1 − p) because the bank defaults
when sovereign default occurs or the private project fails to generate the promised payoff.
Therefore, the bank faces the following problem:
max
d2,i2,b2
(1− α2)(1− p) (Ri2i2 +RB2b2 −Rd2d2)− (i2)
2
2
, (1.2)
subject to i2 + b2 ≤ d2 , (1.3)
where the constraint implies that bank owners cannot lend more than they borrow, or
alternatively that the size of assets cannot exceed that of liabilities. Combining the first
order conditions for this problem, which are reported and analyzed in detail in the Appendix,
28For more details, see the Appendix.
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it is possible to show several results. First, the budget constraint always binds, meaning the
size of liabilities always matches that of assets, as expected. Second, bank owners choose
to collect as many deposits as possible. This result stems from the fact that the return on
government bonds is higher than that on deposits due to the households’ preferences. In
other words, the possibility of pursuing a carry trade induces the bank to expand its balance
sheet as much as possible.29 Finally, taking into account that bank owners weakly prefer
government bonds over lending to foreign investors, the optimal size of the investment in
the private project is:
i2 = (1− α2)(1− p)(Ri2 −RB2) , (1.4)
which implies that corporate lending is increasing in the difference between the gross in-
terest rates on loans and government bonds. Intuitively, bank owners only care about the
assets’ payoffs in the state of the world in which the bank can meet its obligations towards
depositors, that is when neither the government nor private loans default, since dividends
are zero otherwise. Therefore, only the realized rather than the expected return on different
assets matters when the bank defaults whenever corporate loans do.
Crucially, inspection of the first order conditions of the bank’s problem at t = 1 shows
that the expected dividends in the last period are independent of the bank’s choices at t = 0.
Combining equations (1.3) and (1.4), the expected dividends in the last period are
29This result is supported by empirical evidence as that found by Acharya and Steffen (2015). There
may be other reasons why banks hold government bonds. For instance, public bonds are good at providing
liquidity when bank need it the most (Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2014). Alternatively, banks hold bonds
as these assets can be used as collateral for interbank lending or repos (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011).
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E(Π2) = (1− α2)(1− p)((1− α2)(1− p)(Ri2 −RB2) + RB2d2) , (1.5)
where all the terms are independent of decisions made by bank owners at t = 1, as I will show
later. Taking this result as given for now, the bank owners’ problem at t = 0 is almost iden-
tical to that in the following period. The only, but crucial, difference consists of considering
the possibility of bailout conditional on sovereign default not taking place. Specifically, bank
owners take into account that the government may intervene with probability γ if profits
are negative in the following period, that is if inequality (1.1) is not satisfied at t = 1. In
that case, the bailout prevents the bank from being liquidated and allows bank owners to
retain a share θ of the dividends Π2 generated in the last period. Formally, at t = 0 bank
owners solve:
max
d1,i1,b1
(1− α1) ((1− p)(Ri1i1 +RB1b1 −Rd1d1 + E(Π2)) + pE(γθΠ2))− (i1)
2
2
, (1.6)
subject to i1 + b1 ≤ d1 . (1.7)
Keeping in mind bank owners’ decisions at t = 0 do not affect the expected dividends in the
last period, I can show that the first order conditions for the bank’s problem at t = 0 mirror
most of the results discussed when analyzing the problem at t = 1. To be specific, the budget
constraint always binds and bank owners borrow as much as possible from households. With
respect to corporate lending, bank owners optimally choose an amount equal to:
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i1 = (1− α1)
(
(1− p)(Ri1 −RB1) + pE(Π2)∂E(γθ)
∂i1
)
. (1.8)
Therefore, the optimal size of the corporate lending portfolio at t = 0 does not only depend
on the difference between the return on loans and government bonds. Bank owners indeed
internalize the fact that their portfolio choices may influence the expected share of dividends
they will be allowed to retain in the case they are bailed out by the government in the
following period. Before moving to characterizing the equilibrium, it is important to note
that the portfolio decision derived in this section do not take into account the possibility
that the maximum amount of deposits that can be collected may be smaller than the optimal
size of investment in the private project given by equations (1.8) and (1.4). However,
the condition that the size of corporate lending it is never constrained does not involve
any loss of generality, since it is always satisfied when bank owners are allowed to borrow
internationally.30
1.3.4 Equilibrium
This section analyzes the equilibrium of the economy considered so far. In particular, a
competitive equilibrium in this theoretical framework is a set of consumption and investment
decisions by agents in the private sector, choices by the government with respect to fiscal
and bailout policy, and expected and ex-post returns on assets such that:
(i) expected returns on assets satisfy the no-arbitrage condition;
30For more details, see the Appendix.
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(ii) given asset returns, consumption and portfolio decisions by households and bank own-
ers are optimal;
(iii) expected government choices are consistent with ex post government welfare maximiza-
tion at the time it makes its decisions;
(iv) asset markets clear.
As stated earlier, the access to an international financial market that is willing to lend
and borrow any amount at the expected return R∗, together with the risk neutrality of
households, allows for equilibrium asset prices to be pinned down. Given that all financial
claims mature after one period, all assets must have an expected return equal to the risk-free
rate for the following reasons. On the one hand, no one would want to hold an asset that
offers an expected return lower than R∗. On the other hand, borrowers would never offer a
higher expected return, since they can obtain all the goods they need from the international
market by promising an expected return equal to R∗. Therefore, the gross interest rate on
government bonds maturing at time t, RBt, is given by
RBt =
R∗
1− αt for t = 1, 2 , (1.9)
where αt denotes the probability that sovereign default occurs at time t. Given the return
on government bonds, it is possible to determine the return on deposits. This is because
the probability that depositors are repaid is the same as that of the government meeting its
obligations due to the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. This result holds even if there
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were more than one bank and the deposit insurance were funded by the banking sector itself,
as long as households believe that the scheme will not break down. In other words, it is
sufficient that surviving banks are expected to be able to fund the deposit insurance scheme,
reducing the incentives of depositors to evaluate the riskiness of their financial assets.31
Although deposits are as risky as government bonds, they do not need to offer the same
ex post return because of the households’ preferences. Given their bias towards deposits,
bank owners can borrow at a negative premium , which is proportional to the gross yield on
other assets. Together with the non-arbitrage condition, this implies that the gross interest
rate on deposits is given by (1 − )RBt at t = 1, 2. Combining this condition with that of
equation (1.9), the return on deposits in equilibrium must satisfy:
Rdt =
(1− )R∗
1− αt for t = 1, 2 . (1.10)
Therefore, households choose to invest all their savings with bank owners as long as deposits
offer an expected return which is not strictly smaller than a fraction (1− ) of that promised
by the government. It follows that bank owners need to offer a return on deposits that
is equal to that on government bonds, discounted by the liquidity premium. As for other
financial assets, banks cannot offer a lower gross interest rate otherwise they would be unable
to collect any deposits. At the same time, the assumption that there is only one bank implies
that bank owners do not face any competition with respect to collecting deposits, thus ruling
31See for example Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) for empirical evidence on how deposit insur-
ance schemes may reduce the incentives of depositors to monitor banks, diminishing the degree of market
discipline.
32
out any incentive to pay a return higher than that reported in equation (1.10).32
The only exception corresponds to the case in which the liquidity premium is large
enough that the promised return on deposits is smaller than 1, according to equation (1.10).
In that case, households would optimally consume their wealth rather than lending it to
bank owners. However, bank owners can always offer a marginally higher return which
allows them to collect deposits and still pursue a carry trade, since  > 0.33 For this
reason, I can focus on the equilibrium in which pricing equation (1.10) holds without loss of
generality.
In order to avoid making unnecessary assumptions, I do not impose any upper bound on
the return promised by private projects.34 In fact, bank owners could have some monopo-
listic or oligopolistic power over their borrowers, stemming, for instance, from informational
advantage as in Rajan (1992). On the contrary, the gross interest rate on corporate loans
must be strictly larger than that on government bonds to ensure that bank owners invest
in the private project in equilibrium. Should the promised return on corporate loans not
exceed that on sovereign bonds, a weakly negative amount of corporate lending could be the
optimal portfolio choice by bank owners, as suggested by equations (1.4) and (1.8).
On the contrary, I assume that the gross interest rate on corporate loans has a lower
32Considering a framework in which there is more than one bank, competition among intermediaries
would lead to a larger promised return on deposits. In order for the main theoretical predictions of the
model to hold, however, it is sufficient that the gross interest rate on deposits is strictly smaller than that
on government bonds, allowing banks to pursue a carry trade by purchasing sovereign bonds.
33From a different perspective,  is strictly positive but arbitrarily small, and thus one may argue that
Rdt > 1 in every period.
34Considering the case in which foreign investors can invest in the same private project that is available
to bank owners, the expected return on this investment cannot be larger than the risk-free rate, that is
(1− p)Rit ≤ R∗ for t = 1, 2.
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bound. Specifically, the return on private projects must be strictly larger than that on
government bonds. This is because the gross return on private project must compensate, at
least partially, for the risk associated with a negative productivity shock. Should Rit only
incorporate a risk premium for sovereign risk, the promised return on corporate loans would
be equal to that on sovereign bonds. In that case, a weakly negative amount of corporate
lending would be the optimal portfolio choice by bank owners, as suggested by equations
(1.4) and (1.8).
Given asset prices, I now characterize the private sector and government decisions in
equilibrium, starting from the last period and then moving backwards.
Decisions at t=2
After households receive their final endowment, the government is the only agent that
makes decisions at t = 2, conditional on not defaulting. If sovereign default occurs, the gov-
ernment simply refuses to honor its obligations and does not collect any taxes, as described
earlier. Moreover, no redistributive fiscal policy is carried out because the bank also fails in
that case, making the choice of “bailout rents” irrelevant as there are no dividends.
The government defaults when its revenues are not sufficient to repay its debt, even
by entirely taxing the endowment that households receive in the last period. As discussed
earlier, the tax base depends on the intermediation process and the bailout policy because
a bank default has damaging consequences for the overall economy that involve an output
loss, which becomes less severe if the government opts for the bailout. Formally, sovereign
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default takes place if the tax base is smaller than the value ω˜, which solves:
ω˜ − φ1Default + (ψφ+ Π2)1Bailout = RB2B2 , (1.11)
where 1Default = 1 if bank defaulted in the previous period, and 1Bailout = 1 if the govern-
ment bailed it out. The above equation simply states that the government will default if and
only if the cost of fully repaying public debt is larger than the maximum achievable amount
of public revenues, which are given by the households’ endowment and bank’s dividends,
net of aggregated losses associated with bank distress.
In the case that sovereign default does not take place, the government’s problem consists
of maximizing its welfare function subject to its budget constraint. Given that the scope of
this paper is to shed light on the implications of bailout policy, I focus on the government’s
choices when it bailed out the bank in the previous period.35 Therefore, the government
maximizes welfare by using two instruments, namely the the tax rate τ and the share of
dividends that bank owners can retain θ. Formally, the problem can be stated as follows:
max
τ,θ
Rd2d2 + (1− τ)(ω2 − φ(1− ψ)) + (η − τ)θΠ2 (1.12)
subject to τ(ω2 − φ(1− ψ)) + (1− θ)Π2 ≥ RB1B1 , (1.13)
where (1.12) represents the welfare function, while (1.13) is the government budget con-
35This represents a broader case, since if a bank bailout does not occur, the government has no control
over bank owners’ dividends, meaning that there is no redistribution in the last period, as said earlier.
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straint. As discussed earlier, the weight attached to households’ utility is normalized to one,
and that on bank owners’ consumption depends on the state of the economy and decisions
by the government itself.
With respect to the budget constraint, (1.13) simply states that tax revenues together
with the bank’s dividends retained by the government must be large enough to repay
sovereign debt. Crucially, the tax base depends on the intermediation process and the
bailout policy because a bank default leads to an output loss, reducing the households’ en-
dowment by φ; however, this loss becomes smaller and equal to φ(1− ψ) if the government
opts for the bail out.
The first order conditions for (1.12) imply that the budget constraint always binds,
meaning that the government finds it optimal to raise just enough taxes to repay its debt.
Taking this result into account and combining the first order conditions with respect to
τ and θ, it is possible to determine the optimal share of dividends that bank owners are
allowed to retained by the government, which is:
θ∗ =
(ω2 − φ(1− ψ))(η − 1) + Π2 −RB2B2
2Π2
. (1.14)
Intuitively, the government finds it optimal to choose τ and θ such the the benefits of lowering
the tax rate are equal to those of increasing the share of dividends that bank owners can
retain in terms of social welfare. As a consequence, the above condition implies that the
larger is the tax base the larger is the share of dividends retained by bank owners. This is
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because a larger tax base allows the government to set a lower tax rate to repay its debt and
thus the weight on bank owners’ utility in the welfare function increases. On the contrary,
the share of dividends that bank owners can retain is decreasing in the dividends themselves,
since the increase in the tax rate necessary to offset a marginal increase in θ is increasing
in Π2. Further, θ is also decreasing in the cost of repaying public debt since a higher level
of debt implies a higher tax rate, which in turn reduces the weight that the government
assigns to bank owners’ welfare. All in all, equation (1.14) states that θ∗ depends on the
state of the economy and in particular on the difference between the tax base and public
expenditure (i.e. the fiscal space of government).
In order to pin down the share of dividends that the bailed-out bank retains, it is crucial
to take into account that the government choice is constrained because θ ∈ [0, 1]. In other
words, the government can neither tax bank owners when they do not make any positive
profits nor tax households to make bank owners consume more than their own dividends.36
Formally, equation (1.14) together with the fact that θ must be between 0 and 1 imply the
following result.
Lemma 1. There exist two realizations of households’ endowment at t = 2, given by
ωL2 =
RB2B2 −Π2
η − 1 + φ(1− ψ) , (1.15)
and
ωH2 =
RB2B2 + Π2
η − 1 + φ(1− ψ) , (1.16)
such that the share of dividends that the government allows the bank owners to retain is
equal to
36The assumption that θ cannot be strictly larger than 1 can be relaxed without affecting the main
theoretical predictions of the model.
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θ∗ =

0 if ω2 ≤ ωL2
θ∗ if ωL2 < ω2 ≤ ωH2
1 if ω2 > ωH2 ,
(1.17)
where θ∗ is given by equation (1.14).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to understand Lemma 1, it is important to note that θ is monotonically increasing
in the tax base. Therefore, if the tax base is sufficiently large, the government is willing
to opt for a complete forbearance towards the bank. As the tax base shrinks, however,
the trade-off between increasing the tax rate and letting the bank owners retain some of
the dividends intensifies to the point that the government prefers a partial forbearance. In
other words, θ falls below 1 when the realization of the households’ endowment is smaller
than ωH2 , as suggested by equation (1.14).
Following the the same reasoning, there also exists a threshold level of the tax base such
that the government chooses to fully nationalize the bank, retaining all of the dividends. If
dividends from the bank are not sufficient to repay public debt, the government has to set
a tax rate equal to one to avoid default when the tax base is small enough. In that case,
the government would optimally choose to obtain additional dividends from the bailed out
bank to reduce the tax rate because the weight on bank owners’ consumption in the welfare
function, (η − τ) is smaller than that of households. Therefore, the optimal θ would be
negative, but it cannot be so since bank owners have no income other that their dividends
at t = 2. To sum up, bank owners will not be able to extract any “bailout rents” if the tax
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base is low enough, that is ω2 ≤ ωL2 .
Decisions at t=1
Moving backwards to t = 1, first of all it is necessary to determine whether a sovereign
default occurs. This event takes place when the government cannot issue bonds that are
attractive to to financial markets, making it impossible to roll over public debt. In other
words, the government is forced to default if domestic and foreign agents believe that the
sovereign will be insolvent in the last period for sure, that is α2 = 1. Taking into account
that the government cannot meet its obligations when the realization of the households’
endowment in the last period (i.e the tax base) is too small, the probability that sovereign
default occurs at t = 2 is given by:
α2 = H (ω˜) , (1.18)
where ω˜ is defined by equation (1.11). The above condition implies that the probability
of sovereign default is equal to the probability that the the households’ endowment in the
last period is smaller than the amount that is necessary for the government to meet its
obligations. Importantly, the size of the tax base that is required to avoid sovereign default
is increasing in the cost of repaying public debt, as implied by equation (1.11). Combining
this with the fact the yield on government bonds depends on the probability of sovereign
default, as clearly shown by equation (1.9), it is possible to argue that the probability of
government default feeds back onto itself. Intuitively, as the probability that the government
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will not meet its obligation increases, the cost of servicing debt goes up as well, making
sovereign default more likely. The following lemma argues that there are multiple solutions
to equation (1.18), under some specific conditions.
Lemma 2. If ω ≥ RB2B2 and the distribution H has a monotonically increasing hazard
rate, then α2 = 0 and α2 = 1 are the only globally stable solutions to equation (1.18).
Proof. See the Appendix.
To provide an intuition for this result, Figure 1.2 illustrates the solutions to the pricing
equation (1.18), assuming that the conditions stated in Lemma 2 are satisfied. In particular,
the solutions are the points of intersection of function H (ω˜) (depicted as the dashed curve)
and the 45-degree line. The assumption that the households’ endowment is at least as
large as the the public debt maturing in the next period (including interest rate payments)
ensures that there exists an equilibrium in which the government is regarded as risk free.
Symmetrically, if the size of sovereign debt becomes larger than ω, then the government will
not be able to meet its obligations and default. The fact the H has an increasing hazard
rate ensures that the function H (ω˜) evaluated over the interval [ω, ω] is always convex and
or goes from convex to concave (i.e. it has one inflection point at most). All in all, there is
another solution equation (1.18) besides α2 = 0 and α2 = 1, which is only locally stable.
Therefore, the sovereign debt market shows only two equilibria that are globally stable,
which in turn means that they are the only solutions that are stable under a dynamic
adjustment of private beliefs. For the rest of the analysis, I only consider globally stable
solutions to the public debt pricing equation at t = 1 by assuming that conditions reported
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Figure 1.2
Government default probability and debt pricing
α2
45 degree line
H(~!)
α2 = 1α2 = 0
1
α2 2 (0; 1)
NOTES: The solid line is the 45 degree line, while the dashed line corresponds to the function H(ω˜). The
latter is zero at low levels of α2 for which ω ≥ RB2B2. The three black dots indicate the three solutions,
corresponding to the intersections between the two lines. At the “intermediate” point, the slope of H(ω˜) is
more than unity implying that the equilibrium would be unstable under a dynamic adjustment of private
beliefs. On the contrary the slope is smaller than 1 (and precisely equal to 0) at α1 = 0, 1.
in Lemma 2 are satisfied. The following assumption is equivalent to arguing that, when
pricing sovereign debt at t = 1, agents believe that the government will either pay back its
debt or default for sure in the last period.
Assumption 1. The distribution H and ω are such that Lemma 2 holds.
In this way, I establish a useful benchmark that is, however, not very restrictive because
multiple globally stable solutions could exist even if there is no default-free solution.37 The
existence of a solution without default simplifies the analysis by implying that the return
on government bonds is independent of outstanding public debt. In this way, if α2 = 0,
37See, for instance, Cooper and Nikolov (2013).
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sovereign debt is considered risk free and the government can roll over its debt, issuing
bonds with a return equal to R∗. If the opposite is true, that is α2 = 1, the public debt
is not marketable, and thus the government cannot roll over its existing debt, leading to
sovereign default at t = 1.
When rolling over the existing debt at t = 1, if allowed to do so, the government might
also be forced to issue additional bonds to cover the shortfall towards depositors through the
deposit insurance scheme or by bailing out the bank. Therefore, I now analyze the decision
of whether to bail out the bank or let it default in the middle period. Given its myopic
behavior, the government chooses the option that leads to a greater level of welfare at t = 1.
Before comparing welfare in the case of bank failure with that in the case of bailout, it
is important to note that the amount of debt issued is independent of the government’s
decision due to the deposit insurance scheme.
Considering the state in which bank revenues are insufficient to repay depositors, the
government can indeed let the the intermediary default, which in turn implies that the
bank’s assets are sold and additional public debt is issued to raise the shortfall to the
depositors. Alternatively, the government can transfer the same amount to bank owners
directly, allowing them to meet their obligations towards depositors and stay in the market.
The shortfall towards depositors is given by the difference between the promised return on
deposits, Rd1d1, and the payments obtained from government bond holdings, RB1b1. Based
on the analysis carried out so far, the bank’s budget constraint always binds and thus the
shortfall S is:
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S = RB1(i1 − d1) , (1.19)
which is equivalent to the additional debt that the government needs to issue in order to
either fund the deposit insurance scheme or prevent the bank from defaulting. Importantly,
there is no difference in terms of repayment to depositors and thus additional public debt is-
sued between the two cases, no matter the size of the shortfall towards depositors. Moreover,
as already discussed, Lemma 2 implies that the return on sovereign bonds is independent
of the size of public debt at t = 1. Combining these two results, the decision of whether
or not to let the bank default is independent of bank owners’ choices at t = 0, and only
depends on the reduction of the households’ endowment due to bank distress and the fixed
cost associated with implementing a bailout. In particular, the government finds it optimal
to bail out the bank if:
ω1 − φ ≤ ω1 − φ(1− ψ)− ν , (1.20)
where the left hand side is the welfare achieved in the middle period when the bank de-
faults and the right side when it does not. The above equation can be easily rearranged to
determine the probability γ of a bailout taking place, since it implies that the government
prevents the bank from defaulting when the households’ endowment in the middle period is
sufficiently high. Formally:
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γ = F (ψφ) , (1.21)
with F being the probability distribution of ν (and f the corresponding probability density).
According to the above condition, the bailout takes place when the gain in terms of output
ψφ is larger than the fixed costs associated with designing and implementing the public
intervention. Importantly, γ increases as φ does, meaning that a higher probability of
bailout is associated with larger damages to output if the bank defaults. This result is
consistent with the methodology used by rating agencies that take into account the banks’
economic relevance for the overall economy when estimating the probability of government
bailout.
If the bank is not shut down, bank owners consume their dividends, if any, and optimally
determine both the amount of deposits to collect and the composition of their portfolio
based on asset prices. According to the analysis shown in the previous section, bank owners
collect as many deposits as possible, which amounts to the sum of the endowments received
by households in the first two periods and their capital income obtained on savings invested
at t = 0. In order to do so, bank owners offer deposit contracts with a promised return given
by equation (1.10). Households optimally choose to lend all their goods to the bank due to
their bias towards deposits and the fact that they are indifferent between consumption at
different dates. With respect to the optimal portfolio, the size of corporate lending by bank
owners is given by equation (1.4), where RB2 = R∗ by Lemma 2 and α2 = 0. Formally,
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expected dividends in the last period are then given by:
E(Π2) = (1− p)
(
(1− p)(Ri2 −R∗)2
2
+R∗d2
)
. (1.22)
The above equation shows there is no uncertainty on the amount of dividends, except for
that associated with the households’ wealth and the return on corporate lending issued at
t = 1. Crucially, this confirms that dividends in the last period are independent of bank
owners’ decisions at t = 0. As a consequence, bank owners treat expected dividends in the
last period as exogenous when making decisions at t = 0.
Decisions at t=0
At t = 0, first households receive their endowment ω0. As soon as financial markets open,
the government issues debt to fund its own expenditure G. At that point, agents form their
expectations about what the price of government bond will be in the next period, assigning
probability α1 to the price being 0 and sovereign default taking place at t = 1. In other
words, α1 corresponds to the probability that α2 = 1 will turn out to be the equilibrium at
t = 1. I abstract from explicitly modeling agents’ beliefs, since Lemma 2 implies that two
stable equilibria exist at t = 1 as long as the government can successfully issue debt at t = 0
(i.e. α1 < 1). When issuing bonds to fund its expenditure G at t = 0, the government must
compensate for default risk, as implied by equation (1.9). As a consequence, the government
offers a promised return on its bonds that is increasing in α1 and larger than the risk-free
rate whenever the probability of default is not zero.
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By affecting the gross interest rate on government bonds, financial markets’ expectations
also influence portfolio choices by bank owners, thus making them contingent on sovereign
risk. This represents a key mechanism in this model. According to equation (1.8), the
optimal size of investment in the private project depends on the gross return on government
bonds, which in turn depends on the probability that agents assign to a sovereign default
occurring in the last period. Therefore, the sustainability of public debt affects the portfolio
composition chosen by bank owners, in contrast to what happens in the middle period when
their investment decisions are independent of fiscal conditions. To be specific, equation (1.8)
can be rewritten plugging in equilibrium asset prices and taking into account the implications
of Lemmas 1 and 2, so as to determine the optimal amount of corporate lending at t = 0,
which is
i1 = (1− α1)
(1− p)(Ri1 − R∗
1− α1
)
− pγ (R
∗)2
2(1− α1)
ωH2∫
ωL2
h(ω)dω
 , (1.23)
where γ is given by (1.21). Therefore, there is a trade-off in increasing the investment in
private projects at t = 0. On the one hand, it increases dividends in the next period if the
investment is successful, as implied by the first term inside the brackets. On the other hand,
more loans imply that the shortfall towards depositors will be larger if the investment is not
successful, forcing the government to issue a larger amount of debt S at t = 1. In turn this
reduces the expected share of dividends that bank owners will be allowed to retain in the
last period in the case of government bailout. The latter effect is captured by the second
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term inside the brackets, which shows that the decrease in expected retained dividends is
proportional to the increase in the shortfall to depositors (R
∗)2
2(1−α1) , given equation (1.19).
The above condition implies that corporate lending decreases as the probability of
sovereign default increases, since the derivative with respect to α1 is strictly negative. This
result holds for two reasons. First, bank owners receive the promised return on loans only if
the government does not default; however, they must pay the non-pecuniary costs associated
with lending to corporates in any case. Therefore, an increase in the probability of sovereign
default reduces the expected return on loans per unit of effort, increasing the opportunity
cost of investing in the private project rather than in government bonds. Second, a higher
interest rate on government bonds issued at t = 0 implies a larger of amount of public debt
to be repaid in the last period. According to (1.14), this means that the share of dividends
that bank owners are allowed to retain in the last period if they are bailed out in the middle
period will be smaller.
The sensitivity of the return on private projects to an increase in the probability of
government default also plays a role in determining the bank’s portfolio at t = 0. As
explained above, corporate lending is increasing in the difference between the return on
loans and that on government bonds. If sovereign risk is not fully priced into the interest
rate on corporate loans, a higher yield on public debt would reduce bank owners’ incentives
to lend to non-financial firms.38 All in all, a higher probability of government default induces
bank owners to change the composition of their portfolio, reducing corporate lending.
38This could be case, for instance, if the return on loans has an upper bound because the return on private
projects is bounded as well.
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1.3.5 Theoretical predictions
In this subsection, I will discuss the model’s predictions regarding the effect of changes in the
bailout probability on bank owners’ investment decisions. As discussed earlier, the bank’s
portfolio composition critically depends on the probability of government default. At the
same time, the model shows that the impact of changes in the bank bailout probability
plays an important role as well. In particular, the model entails some predictions not
only regarding the impact of changes in the probability of bailout on the bank’s portfolio
composition, but also how these effects change according to the state of the economy and
in particular to the level of sovereign risk. Taking the derivative of (1.23) with respect to γ
and using the fact that both ωL2 and ωL2 are linear in φ yields
∂i1
∂γ
= −p(R
∗)2
2
[
H(ωH2 )−H(ωL2 ) + γ(h(ωH2 )− h(ωL2 ))
∂φ
∂γ
(1− ψ)
]
A−1 , (1.24)
where A is given by:
A = 1 +
pγR∗4(h(ωH2 )− h(ωL2 ))
2(1− α1)(η − 1) . (1.25)
According to (1.24), the sign of the term in brackets and A determine whether corporate
lending at t = 0 is increasing or decreasing in the probability of bailout. Since both the
term in brackets and A depend on α1, I need to analyze the impact of the sovereign de-
fault probability on both of these expressions to determine how the optimal bank portfolio
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composition changes with the riskiness of the government.
The sign of the numerator on the right-hand side of (1.24) is positive when that of
the term in brackets is negative, and negative otherwise. It is important to note that the
probability of bailout γ is associated with an increase in the output loss caused by bank
default φ, thus ∂φ∂γ > 0. As α1 increases, ω
H
2 eventually becomes as large as ω, meaning that
bank owners will not extract any “bailout rents” even if the realization of the households’
endowment is equal to its maximum value. In that case, the term in parentheses on the
right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in the hazard function h(ω
L
2 )
1−H(ωL2 )
. Since the hazard
function is monotonically increasing in ωL2 and ωL2 is in turn monotonically increasing in α1,
the numerator must be positive if the probability of sovereign default becomes is large
enough.39
With respect to A, the probability of government default affects its sign both directly and
indirectly through the difference between the two probabilities h(ωH2 ) and h(ωL2 ). Both this
probabilities become equal to 0 as the probability of sovereign default becomes sufficiently
high, while the denominator of the second term in (1.25) is still positive.40 Combining these
two fact, it is possible to argue that A is positive if α1 is large enough. These considerations
lead to the first and most important of the model’s predictions.
Proposition 1. If ω is sufficiently large and ∂i1∂γ < 0 for some αˆ1 ∈ [0, 1), then there exists
a value α1 ∈ (αˆ1, 1) such that ∂i1∂γ > 0 if α1 ≥ α1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
39Numerically, the term in brackets can be shown to be monotonically increasing in the probability of
government default even when the support has not an upper bound (i.e. ω →∞), as long as the distribution
H has a monotonically increasing hazard rate (e.g. a left-truncated normal). See Figure 1.4 in the Appendix.
40Given the assumed properties of the probability distribution H, however, numerical simulations show
that the second term in A tends to 0 as the sovereign risk increases. See Figure 1.5 in the Appendix.
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Therefore, an increase in the probability of bailout might have a different impact on
portfolio choices depending on the state of the economy and specifically on the probability
of government default. This is because a higher γ has two opposite effects on the marginal
return on corporate lending. Considering first the sign of the bracketed term in (1.24), a
higher probability of government bailout raises the probability that bank owners achieve a
positive level of consumption in the last period, even if they cannot meet their obligations
to depositors at t = 1. Given that the share of dividends that bank owners will be allowed
to retain is decreasing in the amount of public debt issued in the middle period, the bank
has an incentive to reduce the potential shortfall towards depositors by decreasing lending
to the private sector at t = 0.
At the same time, a higher probability of bailout also implies that the output loss due
to the bank’s default will be greater, thus lowering the likelihood that the government will
allow bank owners to retain some of the bank’s profits at t = 2. According to Proposition 1,
the “bailout rents” are indeed equal to 0 if the tax base is low enough after servicing public
debt, which is the income of households net of payments to government bond holders.
As the probability of government default increases, the second effect will become stronger
and eventually dominate the first, making the numerator on the right-hand side of (1.24)
turn positive. In other words, the positive impact on the expected retained dividends in
the last period associated with a higher probability of bailout decreases as the probability
of government default increases. To sum up, an increase in the probability of bailout has
two effects: on the one hand it raises the probability for the bank owners to retain part of
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the bank’s charter value, on the other hand it reduces the charter value itself. Which effect
dominates depends on the probability of government default: the latter effect outweighs the
former if sovereign risk is high enough.
Focusing on the denominator on the right-hand side of (1.24), that is A, an increase in
corporate lending associated with a larger probability of bailout determines a reduction in
the size of “bailout rents”. This is because the share of dividends that bank owners will retain
in the case of bailout is decreasing in the shortfall to depositors in the middle period, which
in turn becomes larger as the investment in the private project goes up. However, this effect
lessens when the probability of government default increases, since the latter reduces the
probability that bank owners will extract any “bailout rents”, providing further incentives
to invest in the private project.
The theoretical prediction presented in Proposition 1 has implications for the optimal
amount of government bond holdings by bank owners. Given that the bank’s budget con-
straint is always binding, the size of corporate lending is inversely related to that of govern-
ment bond holdings, conditional on the bank portfolio including both types of assets. The
model thus implies the following prediction.
Corollary 1. If i1 < d1, then ∂b1∂γ ≥ 0 if ∂i1∂γ ≤ 0, and ∂b1∂γ < 0 otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 states that the impact of a change in the probability of bailout on b1 is
the opposite of that on i1. Intuitively, a change in the probability of bailout induces bank
owners to change the composition of their portfolio towards sovereign bonds and away from
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corporate lending, but not the size. This result is the consequence of two facts. First, bank
owners find it optimal to collect as many deposits as possible, meaning that the size of the
portfolio at t = 0 is equal to the households’ endowment at that date, that is d1 = ω0.
Second, the bank budget constraint given by (1.3) is always binding, which in turn implies
that b1 = ω0 − i1.
Combining these two facts suggests that a variation in corporate lending is associated
with a change in government bond holdings, which has the same magnitude but opposite
sign. However, this is only true in the case of an interior portfolio choice. In the case that
the optimal size of investment in private projects exceeds households’ wealth, no government
bonds are included in the bank’s portfolio, meaning that a variation in the probability of
bailout still affects the optimal amount of corporate lending but may not lead to a variation
in the observed bond holdings of bank owners. Specifically, if bank owners find it optimal
not to hold any government bonds, a marginal change in the probability of bailout cannot
have any impact on the bank’s actual portfolio.
As I show in the next section, the empirical evidence suggests that banks do indeed hold
government bonds. This result is also supported by empirical evidence as that found by
Acharya and Steffen (2015). Besides the possibility to pursue a carry trade, there are also
other reasons why banks may hold government bonds. One such reason is that banks need
liquidity when the economy is productive and investment opportunities abound and public
bonds, with their pro-cyclical returns, are good at providing such liquidity (as in Gennaioli,
Martin, and Rossi (2014)). Alternatively, banks hold bonds as a buffer against idiosyncratic
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shocks because these bonds can be used as collateral for interbank lending or repos (Bolton
and Jeanne, 2011). Another reason is that governments may force banks to purchase and
hold their bonds through moral suasion.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
This section aims to test whether the empirical evidence on the Italian banking sector
supports the model’s predictions with respect to banks’ investment decisions, which are
described in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Although it is beyond its scope to formally test
and fully establish causality, the following empirical analysis provides clear evidence on the
link between the probability of bailout and banks’ portfolio choices, and on how the sign of
these relationships change as sovereign risk increases. I start by describing the data, before
showing and interpreting the main results. To conclude, I run several robustness checks on
the empirical findings.
1.4.1 Data Description
The probability of bailout is computed using bank-specific ratings information fromMoody’s.
Since March 2007, the methodology adopted by Moody’s involves the assignment of several
ratings to every bank.41 In particular, the “Baseline credit assessment” (BCA) is a measure
of the probability of standalone failure. In other words, this rating represents Moody’s
opinion of a bank’s intrinsic soundness, excluding potential external support. Given that
banks could benefit from affiliate support, which means that they may be assisted by other
41For more details, see Moody’s Investor Service (2007).
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entities within a group, or occasionally affiliated third parties, Moody’s also provides an
“adjusted BCA”. This rating is obtained by adding the assessed parental and cooperative
support to the BCA. Finally, the inclusion of potential support by public bodies, such as
local, regional or national institutions, results in the “long-term deposit rating” (henceforth
the “deposit rating”). Therefore, the deposit rating reflects the bank’s ability to repay its
deposit obligations punctually, since it incorporates both intrinsic financial strength and
external support.
The bank-specific government support measure is defined as the difference between a
bank’s “adjusted BCA” and its “deposit rating”, also known as government support uplift.
As noted by Moody’s Investors Services (Moody’s Investor Service, 2015), the potential
government support of a bank depends on two factors, namely the national policy with
respect to bank resolutions and the economic importance of the bank within a country. In
the main specifications, I compute the probability of a government bailout following the
approach adopted by Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011). This amounts to assigning a
default probability to each bank according to its adjusted BCA (the default probability in
the absence of a bailout, Pr(adjBCA)) and another according to its deposit rating (the
total default probability, taking into account bailouts, Pr(Deposit)), using the conversion
of ratings into default frequencies provided by Moody’s. The bailout probability γ is then
equal to
γ = 1− Pr(Deposit)
Pr(adjBCA)
. (1.26)
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In order to take into account changes in ratings outlooks, when a rating is on watch for
an upgrade (downgrade), the corresponding probability of default is given by the cut-off
value between the current rating and the one above (below). Such cut-off probabilities of
default are again determined by Moody’s.42 As a robustness check, I will also consider
another measure of government support, which corresponds to the rating uplift (henceforth
the “the government uplift”) expressed in rating notches (i.e. the simple difference between
the numerical value of the deposit rating and that of the adjusted BCA). Consistent with
the procedure used for probabilities, I compute the total numerical value of a rating by
adding the numerical value of the credit outlook (0.5 if positive and -0.5 if negative) to the
numerical value of the alphabetical rating. Table 1.8 in the Appendix reports the mapping
of credit ratings into probabilities and numerical values.43
The building block database is taken from the Bank of Italy Supervisory and Credit
Register records. These data provide full information on Italian banks’ assets, liabilities
and income. Moreover, they include detailed information on sovereign bond holdings and
lending to non-financial firms. In particular, government bond purchases are in notional
terms meaning that they are not affected by market price variations, which could otherwise
introduce a bias in the estimations especially during a sovereign crisis.44 Similarly, net
lending to non-financial corporations reports flows that exclude changes in stocks not due
to actual transactions (e.g. changes due to exchange rate variations, value adjustments
42See Moody’s Investor Service (2007).
43The numerical conversion of credit ratings and outlooks is similar to that reported in several other
papers. See for instance Correa et al. (2014).
44Notional values are calculated from the monthly differences in levels adjusting for reclassifications, other
revaluations, exchange rate variations and any other changes which do not arise from transactions.
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and reclassifications). To account for the fact that portfolio management decisions are
often determined at the banking-group level, I use consolidated balance sheet and income
statement information.
The dataset consists of the 20 Italian banking groups for which Moody’s assigned ratings.
The observations are at monthly frequency with the time span ranging from April 2007 to
December 2014. This choice for the starting date prevents the results from being affected
by the changes in the rating methodology implemented in March 2007, which I discussed
earlier. With respect to the end date, the sample stops before January 2015, when the ECB
announced the launch of a purchase program (the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme)
for government bonds in the euro area, leading to a significant decrease in yields on Italian
government bonds (see Figure 1.3 in the Appendix). More importantly, the announcement
by the ECB was associated with a reduction of the yield spread over similar-maturity bonds
issued by fiscally safer governments (e.g. Germany), making this difference fall to the levels
observed before mid-2011. In other words, the announcement of a QE program by the ECB
can be thought of as the end of the Italian sovereign crisis in the spirit of the model presented
in this paper.
In order to check if the predictions of the model are supported empirically, I split the
sample in two: up to and after June 2011.45 Although it is difficult to say exactly when
the sovereign debt crisis hit the Italian economy and banking sector, there is widespread
agreement that tensions in the sovereign debt markets extended to Italy during the summer
45The behavior of 10-year Italian government bond yields and the corresponding difference with equivalent-
maturity German government bond yields are shown in Figure 1.3 in the Appendix.
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of 2011.46 Importantly, the results are robust to choosing other months as the beginning of
the sovereign debt crisis, as I will discuss in more detail below.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the main variables that I will use for the em-
pirical analysis. Statistics are provided for the two subsamples, to which I will refer as the
pre-crisis and the crisis period. The table indicates a considerable decrease in government
support to banks, both in terms of probability of bailout and rating uplift. In particular,
the level of both measures in the crisis period is less than half of that observed before the
onset of the sovereign debt crisis.
Other relevant variables show ample variation across the two subsamples. Net lending
to non-financial corporations goes from positive to negative, while net purchases of govern-
ment bonds increase significantly. These facts could be the consequence of higher yields
on sovereign bonds, which may have provided incentives for banks to replace lending to
firms with that to the government. As I explained earlier, these facts are consistent with
the model, even if they do not represent the focus of this paper. The change in the com-
position of banks’ portfolios is confirmed by the variation in the ratios of corporate loans
to assets and government bond holding to assets, which are lower and higher, respectively,
during the crisis than before. With respect to banks’ balance sheet items, it is important
to note that total assets are broadly unchanged in the two subsamples, while the share of
non-performing loans and the refinancing from the ECB are the two variables that vary the
46In August 2011, ECB extended the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), starting to directly purchase
Italian (and Spanish) government bonds in secondary markets. These purchases aimed at addressing tensions
in certain government bond market segments that hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
As market conditions improved during early 2012, the ECB stopped purchasing bonds.
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Table 1.1
Summary statistics
Variables
Pre-crisis Crisis
Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev.
Probability of bailout 0.594 0.648 0.232 0.253 0.000 0.284
Government uplift 2.062 2.000 1.087 0.877 0.000 1.154
Net lending to NFCs 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.005
Net purchases of gov’t bonds 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.014
Gov’t bond holdings 0.035 0.027 0.034 0.105 0.087 0.080
Loans to NFCs 0.452 0.452 0.167 0.373 0.374 0.137
Interest rate on new loans to NFCs 0.042 0.035 0.028 0.034 0.032 0.021
Non-performing loans 0.026 0.024 0.015 0.056 0.045 0.038
Equity 0.096 0.098 0.028 0.073 0.070 0.031
Deposits 0.348 0.367 0.162 0.319 0.350 0.138
Refinancing from the ECB 0.008 0.000 0.016 0.080 0.078 0.053
Bonds 0.306 0.293 0.108 0.279 0.266 0.114
Reserves 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002
Total assets 0.094 0.020 0.167 0.098 0.028 0.159
NOTES: Summary statistics on monthly data from April 2007 to December 2014 for 20 Italian banking
groups at consolidated level. The probability of bailout is computed using the default rates implied by
ratings, as discussed in this section. The government uplift is the difference in rating notches between a
bank’s adjusted BCA and its long-term deposit rating. Net lending to NFCs, net purchases of government
bonds, outstanding loans to NFCs, government bond holdings, equity (which includes disclosed reserves),
deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued by each bank) and liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank
reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total assets. Interest rates on new loans to NFCs are shown
in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed as ratio to the total stock of loans. Total assets are in
trillions of euros.
most when comparing the pre-crisis and crisis levels.
1.4.2 Methodology and Main Results
In order to test whether the predictions of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are consistent with
the empirical evidence, I estimate various specifications of the following panel regression for
both the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples:
Yi,t+m = αi0 +Dt + β1 × γit + β2 ×Xit + uit , (1.27)
where i and t index the banking group and time (in months), respectively. The dependent
variable Yi,t+j is either net lending to non-financial corporations (NFCs) or net purchases
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of Italian government bonds cumulated between months t and t + j.47. In both cases, the
dependent variable is expressed as a ratio to total assets at t to allow for comparability across
banks of different size. With respect to the explanatory variables, αi0 andDt are respectively
bank and monthly dummies, which are meant to control for all time-invariant bank-specific
factors and time effects. Consistent with notation used so far, γit is the probability of
bailout for bank i in month t, which is derived from ratings as explained by equation (1.26).
Finally, Xit is a vector of bank-level control variables, which includes the interest rate on
new loans to NFCs and several balance sheet items. The latter are total assets (expressed in
trillions of euros), the share of non-performing corporate loans over the total corresponding
stock and other variables reported in relative terms to total assets, namely total corporate
lending, holdings of government bonds, equity, deposits, refinancing from the central bank
and outstanding bonds issued by banks.
To deal with the remaining sources of endogeneity, all regressors are lagged by at least one
month. Moreover, I compute standard errors using a heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent procedure, allowing for twelve lags of the dependent variable to be serially corre-
lated.48 Therefore, HAC standard errors are reported throughout the entire analysis.
Table 1.2 shows the results from estimating equation (1.27) at different horizons for
both subsamples, using the ratio of cumulated net lending to total assets as the dependent
variable and the probability of bailout computed from ratings as a proxy for γjt. In order to
47Both net lending to NFCs and government purchases are in notional terms, as explained in the previous
section
48Specifically, standard errors are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
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provide a set of benchmark estimates, Table 1.2 reports how variation in the probability of
bailout affects the cumulated net lending to NFCs by banks over the next 1, 3 and 6 months
during the pre-crisis period (first three columns) and during the sovereign debt crisis (last
three columns).
At all of the considered forecast horizons, the coefficient on the probability of bailout is
negative and highly statistically significant in the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with
the prediction of Proposition 1 that banks reduce net lending to firms when they become
more likely to be rescued by the government in the case that they face financial distress.
Moreover, the coefficient on the probability of bailout becomes larger in absolute value as the
forecast horizon increases. In particular, the the cumulated change in net lending to NFCs
after 6 months is almost double that after 3 months, while the variation after 3 months is
about three times larger than that observed after 1 month.
Therefore, the estimates reported in Table 1.2 suggest that banks begin to change the
composition of their portfolio in the month after the change in implicit government guar-
antees is observed and this adjustment continues for at least six months. This empirical
evidence is consistent with the model’s assumption that financial intermediaries may face
some adjustment costs when trying to modify the amount of corporate lending due to the
necessity to carry out tasks such as loan initiation, monitoring, screening, and enforcement.
Besides being costly, these activities may also require some time to be performed, providing
a possible reason why the coefficient on the probability of bailout is significant not only on
the short-run but also over a 6-month horizon.
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Regarding the results for the crisis subsample, the empirical evidence again supports the
model’s prediction stated in Proposition 1. According to the estimates shown in the last
three columns of Table 1.2, the coefficient on the probability of bailout is indeed positive
and statistically significant at all forecast horizons. The fact that the significance of this
coefficient decreases as the forecast horizon becomes longer could be in part due to the
reduction in the number of observations. The size of the coefficient on the probability
of bailout increases at a decreasing rate with the length of the forecast horizon, similarly
to what was observed for the estimates based on the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the
coefficient almost doubles going from the 3-month to 6-month horizon, whereas it triples
when comparing the estimate at the 3-month horizon with that at 1-month.
As a consequence, the fact that the coefficient on the probability of bailout in absolute
terms is increasing and concave in the forecast horizon is true for both subsamples. This
means that the empirical evidence from the crisis sample provides further support to the
claim that is it may be costly and take some time for banks to issue additional corporate
loans, as discussed above. Consistent with these considerations, it is not surprising that
the portfolio adjustment in terms of corporate lending lasts for at least six months. All
in all, Table 1.2 shows that the relationship between the probability of bank bailout and
bank lending to NFCs switches from negative in the pre-crisis period to positive during the
sovereign debt crisis, consistent with the mechanism described in the model.
In terms of economic magnitude, the effects in the near term are considerable when
taking into account that the dependent variables are expressed as share of total assets. To
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Table 1.2
Bank lending to non-financial firms and probability of bailout
Net lending to NFCst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Probability of bailoutt -0.0044*** -0.0121*** -0.0197*** 0.0022*** 0.0067** 0.0111*
(0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0064)
Gov’t bond holdingst 0.0081 0.0252 0.0583* -0.0049 -0.0270 -0.0577
(0.0059) (0.0161) (0.0316) (0.0072) (0.0192) (0.0378)
Loans to NFCst -0.0118 -0.0269 -0.0718* -0.0121** -0.0456** -0.1075**
(0.0098) (0.0269) (0.0376) (0.0054) (0.0202) (0.0433)
Rate on new loans 0.0039 0.0121 0.0167 -0.0007 -0.0500** 0.0152
to NFCst (0.0126) (0.0279) (0.0423) (0.0157) (0.0222) (0.0312)
Non-performing loanst -0.0301 -0.1197 -0.2480 0.0003 -0.0212 -0.0364
(0.0305) (0.0787) (0.1530) (0.0151) (0.0366) (0.0674)
Equityt 0.0202* 0.0559* 0.1287** -0.0109 -0.0374 0.0520
(0.0121) (0.0304) (0.0597) (0.0153) (0.0329) (0.0480)
Depositst 0.0071 0.0208** 0.0448*** -0.0033 -0.0115 -0.0111
(0.0044) (0.0104) (0.0173) (0.0044) (0.0125) (0.0230)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0336*** -0.1085*** -0.2178*** -0.0076 -0.0253* -0.0582**
(0.0093) (0.0237) (0.0471) (0.0061) (0.0135) (0.0266)
Bondst 0.0027 0.0003 -0.0029 0.0006 0.0053 0.0257
(0.0042) (0.0108) (0.0198) (0.0036) (0.0105) (0.0228)
Liquidityt 0.1880 0.6795 2.1695 -0.5747 -0.7299 -0.7841
(0.3479) (0.7894) (1.3952) (0.7089) (1.2898) (2.0718)
Total assetst -0.0109 -0.0229 -0.0232 -0.0204 -0.0324 -0.0906
(0.0066) (0.0196) (0.0353) (0.0141) (0.0325) (0.0700)
No Observations 1020 1020 1020 840 820 760
R2 0.291 0.497 0.631 0.142 0.180 0.287
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
lending to NFCs between month t and month t + j in terms of total assets in month t. With respect to
the explanatory variables, outstanding loans to NFCs, government bond holdings, equity (which includes
disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued by each bank) and liquidity (i.e. the
sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total assets. Interest rate on new loans
to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed as ratio to the total stock of loans.
Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include bank fixed effects and month fixed effects.
Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are
computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag of 12 months. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level.
be more specific, the results for the non-crisis subsample in the third column of Table 1.2
imply that an increase in the probability of bailout of one standard deviation for all banks in
the sample is associated with a cumulated reduction in total lending to non-financial firms
of 1.0 percent after 6 months. Considering the results for the crisis period and in particular
those reported in column 6, a one-standard-deviation increase in the probability of bailout
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is estimated to raise net corporate lending by about 0.8 percent over the following 6 months.
In order to empirically test the predictions of Corollary 1, Table 1.3 shows the results of
regressing equation (1.27) using the ratio of cumulated net purchases of domestic government
bonds to total assets as the dependent variable. Focusing on the estimates for the pre-crisis
period first, the coefficient on the probability of bailout is positive and statistically significant
at the 1- and 3-month horizons. Once again, the sign is consistent with the predictions of
the model and in particular those of Corollary 1. The reason why the coefficient on the
probability of bailout is not statistically significant at the 6-month horizon could be that it
is easier and thus faster for financial intermediaries to adjust their bond holdings compared
with changing the stock of corporate lending. For instance, no screening or monitoring
activities need to be performed when buying or selling bonds as opposed to what happens
in the case of loans to NFCs.
According to the results reported in the last three columns of Table 1.3, an increase
in the probability of bailout is associated with net sales of government bonds during the
pre-crisis period. Although it has the sign predicted by Corollary 1 over all the horizons
considered, the coefficient on the probability of bailout is not statistically significant at the
6-month horizon, as it is the case for the estimates based on the pre-crisis subsample. One
possible explanation, discussed above, is that banks can easily adjust their bond holdings
to the desired level in a short time. In sum, the results shown in Table 1.3 suggest that the
the coefficients on the probability of bailout have opposite signs when using net purchases
of domestic government bonds or net lending to NFCs as the dependent variable, which is
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Table 1.3
Bank purchases of government bonds and probability of bailout
Net purchases of government bondst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Probability of bailoutt 0.0075*** 0.0210*** 0.0457 -0.0122*** -0.0257** -0.0010
(0.0023) (0.0073) (0.0298) (0.0045) (0.0129) (0.0109)
Gov’t bond holdingst -0.0058 -0.0332 -0.1130 -0.1176*** -0.4098*** -0.9981***
(0.0195) (0.0495) (0.0963) (0.0383) (0.0884) (0.1391)
Loans to NFCst -0.0260** -0.0681** -0.1442*** -0.0277 -0.0182 0.0026
(0.0131) (0.0288) (0.0416) (0.0377) (0.0820) (0.0681)
Rate on new loans 0.0000 0.0048 0.0533 -0.0095 0.1032 0.1091
to NFCst (0.0154) (0.0352) (0.0731) (0.0595) (0.1058) (0.1143)
Non-performing loanst -0.0711* -0.1277 -0.1771 0.0284 0.3037 0.3594
(0.0387) (0.0883) (0.2200) (0.1649) (0.3549) (0.3935)
Equityt -0.0254 -0.0800* -0.1419 0.0138 0.0216 -0.1520
(0.0184) (0.0451) (0.0942) (0.0690) (0.1522) (0.1917)
Depositst -0.0039 -0.0145 -0.0089 0.0039 0.0284 0.0053
(0.0045) (0.0133) (0.0237) (0.0364) (0.0599) (0.0920)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0192 -0.0566 -0.0213 -0.0460** -0.0556 -0.0027
(0.0163) (0.0469) (0.0880) (0.0218) (0.0501) (0.0480)
Bondst -0.0068 -0.0068 0.0106 -0.0000 -0.0777 -0.0021
(0.0074) (0.0153) (0.0412) (0.0508) (0.0767) (0.0949)
Liquidityt 0.5486 2.1442 3.8169 0.2606 4.9891 5.1123
(0.4735) (1.3304) (3.0892) (1.8463) (3.3851) (3.4592)
Total assetst -0.0312** -0.0863** -0.1771** -0.2309*** -0.4364*** -0.3762*
(0.0137) (0.0354) (0.0900) (0.0622) (0.1439) (0.1950)
No Observations 1020 1020 1020 840 820 760
R2 0.163 0.280 0.364 0.364 0.618 0.800
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
purchases of Italian government bonds between month t and month t+ j in terms of total assets in month
t. With respect to the explanatory variables, outstanding loans to NFCs, government bond holdings, equity
(which includes disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued by each bank) and
liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total assets. Interest
rate on new loans to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed as ratio to the
total stock of loans. Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include bank fixed effects and
month fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors reported
in parentheses are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag of 12 months. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the
10% level.
exactly what Corollary 1 argues.
In economic terms, the estimates in Table 1.3 imply that changes in the probability of
being rescued by the government are associated with large variation in banks’ purchases
of government bonds. To have a better idea of the economic magnitude of these effects,
consider the case in which the government increases the probability of bailing out the banks
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included in the sample by one standard deviation. According to the estimates obtained
using observations from the pre-crisis period, this change in the bank bailout policy is
associated with net purchases of sovereign bonds over the following 3 months that amounts
to 13.9 percent of the initial holdings. The results for the crisis subsample show that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the probability of bailout is estimated to be accompanied by
net sales of domestic sovereign bonds by the banking sector for an amount corresponding
to around 6.9 percent of the initial government bond holdings. In sum, the effects on bank
behavior when measured as net government bond purchases are very large in magnitude in
both subsamples, and imply increases in bond holdings in the pre-crisis period but decreases
in the crisis period in response to a rise in the probability of bailout.
1.4.3 Robustness
In order to check the robustness of the estimates reported in the previous section, I perform
several exercises. Among these robustness checks, the main two are the following. First, I
use a different measure of implicit government guarantees, which is given by the difference
in rating notches between a bank’s adjusted BCA and its long-term deposit rating. Such a
difference is commonly known as the government uplift. The second main robustness check
consists of replacing the current probability of bailout with its forward value, thus using a
lead variable as the main explanatory variable.
The first robustness test aims at investigating whether the estimation results from the
benchmark regressions are driven by the methodology adopted by Moody’s to map ratings
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into probabilities of default. Specifically, the probability of government intervention obtained
from equation (1.26) tends to become larger as banks’ own ratings (i.e. the adjusted BCA)
decrease. Therefore, I replace the probability of bailout with the government uplift in
equation (1.27) for all the specifications considered so far.49
The estimates are shown in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5, and should be compared with
those reported in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 respectively. Given that government support is
now measured in rating notches, the size of the corresponding coefficients is not directly
comparable to that reported in the tables in the previous section; however, the results are
qualitatively similar to those for the benchmark regressions. In particular, the relevant co-
efficients preserve their sign in all specifications, except for that in the last column of Table
1.3, which is not statistically significant. The statistical significance of the other coefficients
on government support is basically unchanged. To be more specific, the significance of the
coefficients on government support is the same (i.e. high) for the pre-crisis period, while it
slightly decreases for the crisis subsample when using the ratio of cumulated net purchases
of domestic government bonds to total assets as the dependent variable. Overall, the ex-
planations provided in the previous section in terms of the relationship between statistical
significance of the relevant coefficients, choice of the dependent variable and length of the
forecast horizon are valid for the results from this robustness exercise as well.
Regarding the size of coefficients on government uplift that are the statistically sig-
nificant, it is important to note that it increases in absolute value as the forecast horizon
49Several papers use the difference between BCA and deposit ratings as a measure for government support
to banks. See for instance Correa et al. (2014).
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becomes longer. In this respect, the empirical findings are robust to replacing the probability
of bailout with the government uplift. Moreover, although the size of the coefficients on the
probability of bailout cannot be directly compared with that of coefficients on government
uplift, it is possible to determine how the magnitude of the implied economic effects differs
when changing the measure of government support to banks. According to the estimates in
Table 1.4, a one-standard-deviation increase in the government uplift, which is to equal to
about one notch, is associated with a cumulated variation in net lending to NFCs over the
the following semester of -1.1 and 0.7 percent in the pre-crisis and crisis period, respectively.
In economic terms, these estimates are thus very close to those obtained from the benchmark
regressions in economic terms. The same cannot be argued with respect to the estimated
impact on net purchase of government bonds. An increase in the government uplift of one
standard deviation for all banks in the sample is associated with a cumulated change in the
stock of government bonds of around 11.5 and -3.3 percent after 3 months. Therefore, the
difference with the effects implied by the estimates from the benchmark regressions is not
negligible.
One explanation for the estimated portfolio recomposition not to be identical to those
discussed in the previous section could relate to the fact that the government uplift is linear
in the difference between the deposit rating and the adjusted BCA rating. On the contrary,
the probability of bailout is not linear in this difference because it also depends on the
level of the bank rating. This in turn implies that banks with different ratings may be
characterized by an identical government uplift, while benefiting from a different probability
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of bailout.50 Since government support cannot become negative, its overall decrease observed
for Italian banks over the sovereign debt crisis involves less cross-sectional variation across
banks in terms of their government uplift than in their probability of being rescued by public
authorities.
All in all, the results reported in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 show that the empirical evidence
is consistent with the model’s predictions even when using a different proxy for government
support to banks. In other words, this robustness check suggests that the empirical results
are not driven by the methodology used by Moody’s to map ratings into default probabilities,
providing further support in favor of the conclusions drawn from the theoretical framework
I presented in this paper.
As discussed earlier, in the second robustness exercise I replace the probability of bailout
at month t with a forward value, specifically with the probability of bailout at month t+ 3.
In this way, I can control for the possibility that banks may anticipate change in ratings
due to asymmetric information. In other words, banks may gather information about the
willingness and capability of the government to provide support earlier than rating agencies
do. The potential existence of this informational advantage would imply that banks begin to
adjust their portfolio before the change in relevant ratings becomes public knowledge. The
choice of using the 3-month ahead probability of bailout relies on the fact that the banks in
the sample need to disclosure information on their balance sheets every 3 month, and thus it
is unlikely that rating agencies may fall behind more than 3 months with their evaluations
50For example, a government uplift of one notch corresponds to a probability of bailout equal to 1 or 0.28,
if the adjusted BCA rating of the bank is Aa1 or C, respectively.
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Table 1.4
Bank lending to non-financial firms and government uplift
Net lending to NFCst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Gov’t upliftt -0.0012*** -0.0028*** -0.0047*** 0.0004** 0.0013** 0.0024**
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Gov’t bond holdingst 0.0070 0.0205 0.0512* -0.0032 -0.0209 -0.0478
(0.0057) (0.0153) (0.0309) (0.0078) (0.0189) (0.0352)
Loans to NFCst -0.0132 -0.0319 -0.0796** -0.0132** -0.0495** -0.1151***
(0.0098) (0.0265) (0.0378) (0.0058) (0.0211) (0.0444)
Rate on new loans 0.0028 0.0087 0.0111 0.0005 -0.0467** 0.0216
to NFCst (0.0127) (0.0284) (0.0421) (0.0164) (0.0212) (0.0319)
Non-performing loanst -0.0301 -0.1193 -0.2474 0.0038 -0.0133 -0.0224
(0.0305) (0.0787) (0.1529) (0.0171) (0.0384) (0.0703)
Equityt 0.0234* 0.0609** 0.1378** -0.0091 -0.0299 0.0688
(0.0122) (0.0306) (0.0606) (0.0199) (0.0347) (0.0482)
Depositst 0.0094** 0.0263** 0.0538*** -0.0039 -0.0133 -0.0131
(0.0047) (0.0108) (0.0180) (0.0045) (0.0126) (0.0229)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0335*** -0.1105*** -0.2204*** -0.0074 -0.0270** -0.0609**
(0.0092) (0.0228) (0.0462) (0.0063) (0.0137) (0.0272)
Bondst 0.0028 0.0003 -0.0028 0.0020 0.0065 0.0284
(0.0042) (0.0107) (0.0195) (0.0041) (0.0110) (0.0232)
Liquidityt 0.1931 0.6904 2.1880 -0.5341 -0.5741 -0.4912
(0.3529) (0.7979) (1.3978) (0.7289) (1.2602) (2.0045)
Total assetst -0.0080 -0.0162 -0.0119 -0.0224 -0.0605* -0.1366*
(0.0069) (0.0208) (0.0377) (0.0141) (0.0329) (0.0709)
No Observations 1020 1020 1020 840 820 760
R2 0.292 0.495 0.629 0.140 0.176 0.286
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
lending to NFCs between month t and month t+ j in terms of total assets in month t. With respect to the
explanatory variables, the government uplift is given by the difference in rating notches between a bank’s
adjusted BCA and its long-term deposit rating. Outstanding loans to NFCs, government bond holdings,
equity (which includes disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued by each bank)
and liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total assets. Interest
rate on new loans to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed as ratio to the
total stock of loans. Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include bank fixed effects and
month fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors reported
in parentheses are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag of 12 months. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the
10% level.
in terms of bank ratings and probability of bank bailout.
To evaluate the robustness of the results of benchmark regressions, the estimates reported
in Table 1.6 have to be compared with those in Table 1.2, since all the specifications are
the same, except for the probability of bailout, which is now 3 months ahead. From a qual-
itative perspective, the coefficients on the probability of bailout are substantially identical,
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Table 1.5
Bank purchases of government bonds and government uplift
Net purchases of government bondst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Gov’t upliftt 0.0012*** 0.0031*** 0.0060 -0.0020** -0.0030* 0.0012
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0046) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0027)
Gov’t bond holdingst -0.0009 -0.0188 -0.0814 -0.1184*** -0.4106*** -0.9972***
(0.0217) (0.0571) (0.1344) (0.0437) (0.1409) (0.1393)
Loans to NFCst -0.0218 -0.0559* -0.1199*** -0.0283 -0.0219 -0.0002
(0.0133) (0.0299) (0.0395) (0.0343) (0.0438) (0.0667)
Rate on new loans 0.0023 0.0115 0.0675 -0.0002 0.1303 0.1181
to NFCst (0.0152) (0.0350) (0.0643) (0.0706) (0.1072) (0.1134)
Non-performing loanst -0.0720* -0.1303 -0.1762 0.0430 0.3073 0.3299
(0.0389) (0.0886) (0.2207) (0.1573) (0.2135) (0.4042)
Equityt -0.0240 -0.0751 -0.1277 0.0069 -0.0032 -0.1641
(0.0193) (0.0469) (0.0959) (0.0710) (0.1293) (0.1896)
Depositst -0.0063 -0.0210 -0.0214 0.0124 0.0465 0.0061
(0.0054) (0.0158) (0.0335) (0.0349) (0.0436) (0.0894)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0155 -0.0454 -0.0012 -0.0422 -0.0465 -0.0012
(0.0154) (0.0439) (0.0770) (0.0278) (0.0754) (0.0488)
Bondst -0.0063 -0.0053 0.0140 -0.0139 -0.1074 -0.0036
(0.0076) (0.0159) (0.0440) (0.0478) (0.0836) (0.0956)
Liquidityt 0.5455 2.1364 3.7572 -0.0636 4.1251 4.8844
(0.4997) (1.4001) (3.5652) (1.8530) (3.5828) (3.5661)
Total assetst -0.0338** -0.0932** -0.1922* -0.2022*** -0.3785*** -0.3769*
(0.0152) (0.0400) (0.1093) (0.0715) (0.0791) (0.1965)
No Observations 1020 1020 1000 840 820 760
R2 0.140 0.247 0.338 0.353 0.603 0.800
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
purchases of Italian government bonds between month t and month t+ j in terms of total assets in month t.
With respect to the explanatory variables, the government uplift is given by the difference in rating notches
between a bank’s adjusted BCA and its long-term deposit rating. Outstanding loans to NFCs, government
bond holdings, equity (which includes disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued
by each bank) and liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total
assets. Interest rate on new loans to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed
as ratio to the total stock of loans. Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include bank
fixed effects and month fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard
errors reported in parentheses are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag of 12
months. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
maintaining the same sign and marginally losing some statistical significance. Importantly,
the size of those coefficients is basically unchanged. The only exception is represented by
the coefficient on the probability of bailout in the third column, whose size is almost halved
in absolute value. At the same time, the coefficients become larger in absolute terms as the
forecast horizon increases, as it is the case for the benchmark estimates.
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Table 1.6
Bank lending to non-financial firms and lead probability of bailout
Net lending to NFCst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Probability of bailoutt+3 -0.0026** -0.0061** -0.0107* 0.0019** 0.0060** 0.0103*
(0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0064) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0055)
Gov’t bond holdingst 0.0054 0.0166 0.0451 -0.0049 -0.0263 -0.0580
(0.0060) (0.0160) (0.0317) (0.0080) (0.0198) (0.0381)
Loans to NFCst -0.0131 -0.0316 -0.0787** -0.0112** -0.0435** -0.1043***
(0.0101) (0.0268) (0.0385) (0.0052) (0.0186) (0.0396)
Rate on new loans 0.0029 0.0089 0.0116 -0.0009 -0.0511** 0.0133
to NFCst (0.0127) (0.0289) (0.0429) (0.0160) (0.0222) (0.0309)
Non-performing loanst -0.0347 -0.1300 -0.2663* 0.0021 -0.0184 -0.0305
(0.0309) (0.0791) (0.1528) (0.0167) (0.0376) (0.0701)
Equityt 0.0165 0.0446 0.1111* -0.0130 -0.0419 0.0398
(0.0120) (0.0300) (0.0600) (0.0190) (0.0316) (0.0472)
Depositst 0.0075* 0.0219** 0.0465*** -0.0040 -0.0136 -0.0143
(0.0045) (0.0107) (0.0179) (0.0046) (0.0131) (0.0240)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0342*** -0.1122*** -0.2224*** -0.0064 -0.0242* -0.0562**
(0.0091) (0.0228) (0.0458) (0.0063) (0.0130) (0.0252)
Bondst 0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0036 0.0014 0.0049 0.0251
(0.0044) (0.0111) (0.0204) (0.0038) (0.0102) (0.0220)
Liquidityt 0.1686 0.6331 2.0892 -0.5456 -0.6101 -0.5787
(0.3524) (0.7928) (1.3881) (0.7248) (1.2551) (1.9921)
Total assetst -0.0115* -0.0246 -0.0259 -0.0141 -0.0346 -0.0905
(0.0068) (0.0202) (0.0363) (0.0141) (0.0314) (0.0665)
No Observations 1020 1020 1000 820 820 760
R2 0.287 0.488 0.622 0.140 0.176 0.282
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
lending to NFCs between month t and month t+ j in terms of total assets in month t. With respect to the
explanatory variables, the probability of bailout is its value 3 month ahead. Outstanding loans to NFCs,
government bond holdings, equity (which includes disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB,
bonds (issued by each bank) and liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as
ratios to total assets. Interest rate on new loans to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are
expressed as ratio to the total stock of loans. Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include
bank fixed effects and month fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic
standard errors reported in parentheses are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag
of 12 months. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
Different conclusions apply when replacing the probability of bailout in month t with
its 3-month ahead value and using the ratio of cumulated net purchases of government
bonds to total assets as the dependent variable. The corresponding estimates are reported
in Table 1.7. In terms of statistical significance, the coefficients on the (3-month ahead)
probability of bailout are statistically significant at all horizons in both subsamples, while
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the corresponding coefficients in Table 1.3 were not significant at the 6-month horizon. These
results suggest that banks may indeed be able to anticipate variation in the probability of
bailout and begin to modify their government bond holdings 3 months before a change in
ratings. In this case, the adjustment in sovereign bond holdings takes longer than what was
implied by the benchmark regressions.
With respect to their sign, all the coefficients on the 3-month ahead probability of bailout
in Table 1.7 have the same sign as those in Table 1.3, consistent with the model’s predic-
tions once again. Looking at size of the estimates reported in Table 1.7, one can see that
the coefficients on the probability of bailout increase with the length of the forecast horizon,
providing further evidence that the benchmark results are robust to allowing banks to antic-
ipate changes in government support. Comparing the implied economic effects at the longest
horizon at which coefficients are statistically significant (3 and 6 months for the estimates
in tables 1.3 and 1.7, respectively), coefficients imply similar cumulated net purchases of
government bonds, and thus portfolio recomposition.
Therefore, the results obtained from the main specification and reported in Table 1.2
and Table 1.3 are robust to replacing the probability of bailout in month t with its value 3
months ahead. As a consequence, the main empirical findings are broadly unchanged when
allowing for banks to be able to anticipate variation in the probability of bailout by the
government. More generally, both of the robustness checks performed reinforce the claim
that the empirical evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions. A higher probability
of bailout is associated with positive net purchases of government bonds and negative net
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Table 1.7
Bank purchases of government bonds and lead probability of bailout
Net purchases of government bondst+j
Pre-crisis Crisis
j = 1 j = 3 j = 6 j = 1 j = 3 j = 6
Probability of bailoutt+3 0.0066*** 0.0187*** 0.0350*** -0.0058* -0.0115*** -0.0254**
(0.0019) (0.0058) (0.0125) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0126)
Gov’t bond holdingst -0.0034 -0.0266 -0.1285 -0.1426*** -0.4667*** -0.6097***
(0.0198) (0.0516) (0.0915) (0.0398) (0.1000) (0.1505)
Loans to NFCst -0.0259** -0.0680** -0.1471*** -0.0324 0.0468** -0.0687
(0.0130) (0.0286) (0.0497) (0.0305) (0.0187) (0.0589)
Rate on new loans 0.0014 0.0087 0.0612 0.0229 0.0724 -0.0065
to NFCst (0.0151) (0.0343) (0.0611) (0.0535) (0.0868) (0.0993)
Non-performing loanst -0.0585 -0.0918 -0.0314 0.0109 -0.5175** 0.7652***
(0.0386) (0.0888) (0.1758) (0.1526) (0.2478) (0.2116)
Equityt -0.0209 -0.0675 -0.1143 -0.0388 -0.0057 0.2581**
(0.0185) (0.0468) (0.0803) (0.0643) (0.0550) (0.1290)
Depositst -0.0046 -0.0166 -0.0102 0.0054 -0.0276 -0.0351
(0.0047) (0.0136) (0.0244) (0.0347) (0.0287) (0.0424)
Refinancing from ECBt -0.0219 -0.0644 -0.0022 -0.0362* -0.0406 -0.0064
(0.0158) (0.0456) (0.0744) (0.0195) (0.0411) (0.0368)
Bondst -0.0072 -0.0080 0.0141 -0.0290 -0.0306 0.0698
(0.0073) (0.0151) (0.0270) (0.0463) (0.0549) (0.0546)
Liquidityt 0.5955 2.2773* 4.2882 0.0274 7.5436*** 2.1789
(0.4711) (1.3365) (2.6098) (1.6858) (2.6930) (3.8263)
Total assetst -0.0299** -0.0824** -0.1576** -0.2050*** -0.4497*** -0.6515***
(0.0136) (0.0351) (0.0645) (0.0670) (0.0474) (0.1564)
No Observations 1020 1020 1000 820 820 760
R2 0.147 0.263 0.346 0.349 0.523 0.647
NOTES: Monthly data with the pre-crisis and crisis samples range from April 2007 to June 2011 and from
July 2011 to December 2014, respectively. The sample consists of the 20 Italian groups for which ratings
ae provided during the relevant period. In each specification, the dependent variable is the cumulated net
purchases of Italian government bonds between month t and month t+ j in terms of total assets in month t.
With respect to the explanatory variables, the probability of bailout is its value 3 month ahead. Outstanding
loans to NFCs, government bond holdings,net lending to NFCs, net purchases of government bonds, equity
(which includes disclosed reserves), deposits, refinancing from the ECB, bonds (issued by each bank) and
liquidity (i.e. the sum of central bank reserves and cash) are reported as ratios to total assets. Interest
rate on new loans to NFCs are shown in net terms. Non-performing loans are expressed as ratio to the
total stock of loans. Total assets are in trillions of euros. All specifications include bank fixed effects and
month fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors reported
in parentheses are computed according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) with the a lag of 12 months. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the
10% level.
corporate lending when government riskiness is relatively low, while the effects reverse during
a sovereign debt crisis.
I also perform other robustness checks, whose outcomes is not reported here. Among
these, I compute standard errors clustering on banking groups and redefine the subsamples
by ending the pre-crisis period in the summer of 2010. In both exercises, results are very
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similar to those from benchmark regressions. Finally, I also try to remove observations
corresponding to the second half of 2011 from the sample. In this way, I can test whether
the results are affected by the implementation of the Securities Markets Programme, through
which the ECB bought Italian government bonds in those months. The estimates presented
in the previous section are robust to this check too.
1.5 Conclusions
The recent global financial crisis has reignited the policy debate and the research focus on
the effects of government support on banks’ behavior. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro
area has clearly shown that the dramatic deterioration of public finances has a significant
impact on banks’ portfolio and lending decisions. In order to address these issues and
contribute to the relevant economic literature, in this paper I study the connection between
implicit government guarantees and banks’ portfolio composition and investigate how this
relationship is affected by changes in sovereign risk and government borrowing costs.
This paper presents a theoretical model that yields testable predictions on the impact
that variations in the level of government support have on protected banks. The most
important result of the model is the prediction that banks should increase their net purchases
of sovereign bonds and reduce their net lending to non-financial corporations in response
to an increase in the probability of being bailed out. However, this prediction holds only
when debt servicing costs are small enough, otherwise the issuance of additional public
debt in order to fund bank bailouts may force the government to increase the tax rate on
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households’ income to a level that decreases aggregate social welfare. In other words, when
the the government borrowing cost increases as it does in the case of a sovereign debt crisis,
the effects of an increase in the probability of bailout are qualitatively the opposite: it
positively affects net lending to firms, while it has a negative impact on net purchases of
government bonds.
The model’s predictions are then tested empirically using data from several sources. I
construct measures of implicit government guarantees from ratings provided by Moody’s,
while information on banks’ balance sheets are taken from the Bank of Italy’s supervisory
record and Credit register. The empirical evidence suggests that the behavior of Italian
banking groups between 2007 and 2014 is in line with the model’s predictions.
These theoretical and empirical findings shed some light on the impact of bailout policy
on banks’ portfolio decisions, but further work is necessary to fully understand the relation-
ship between governments and domestic banking sectors. In this respect, a natural extension
of this paper would be to enrich the model with the inclusion of a significant feedback loop
between the sovereign and banking sector. In this way, an increase in government guaran-
tees might lead to a worsening of public debt sustainability and in turn to a reduction in
the probability that troubled banks will be bailed out. Although this mechanism has been
studied in a growing literature, which includes both theoretical (Farhi and Tirole, 2014)
and empirical works (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014), the issue of of optimal bank
bailout policy is still on the table. Future research must ultimately address the issue and
provide guidelines for policy makers.
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1.6 Appendix
The bank’s problem
Assuming that  satisfies the condition set by Lemma 3, bank owners solve problem (1.2)
and (1.6) at t = 1 and t = 0, respectively. Letting λ2 be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint (1.3), the first order conditions with respect to i2, b2, and d2 are,
respectively:
(1− α2)(1− p)Ri2 − i2 − λ2 = 0 ; (1.28)
(1− α2)(1− p)RB2 − λ2 = 0 ; (1.29)
−(1− α2)(1− p)Rd2 + λ2 = 0 . (1.30)
The first order conditions at t = 0 are given by:
(1− α1)
(
(1− p)
(
Ri1 + pE(Π2)
∂E(γθ)
∂i1
))
− i1 − λ1 = 0 ; (1.31)
(1− α1)
(
(1− p)
(
RB1 + pE(Π2)
∂E(γθ)
∂b1
))
− λ1 = 0 ; (1.32)
−(1− α1)
(
(1− p)
(
Rd1 + pE(Π2)
∂E(γθ)
∂d1
))
+ λ1 = 0 ; (1.33)
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where λ1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (1.7). These
necessary conditions will be used in some of the subsequent proofs.
Portfolio composition and bank default
In the model, I considered the case in which bank owners find it optimal to hold a government
bond portfolio, whose return is not sufficient to fully reimburse depositors. In other words,
the bank defaults if the private investment return is zero. The condition necessary for this
decision to be optimal in equilibrium is that the negative premium on the deposit return 
is small enough. Formally, this is equivalent to proving the following result.
Lemma 3. There exists  > 0 such that bank owners’ optimal portfolio satisfies:
RBtbt −Rdtdt < 0 for t = 1, 2 , (1.34)
if  ∈ (0, ).
Proof. Focusing on the equilibrium at t = 1 and assuming that condition (1.34) is never
satisfied, the bank can fully reimburse depositors even if the return on corporate lending is
zero. Therefore, the bank’s problem at t = 1 becomes
max
d2,i2,b2
(1− α2)(1− p)Ri2i2 +RB2b2 −Rd2d2− (i2)
2
2
, (1.35)
subject to i2 + b2 ≤ d2 . (1.36)
According to the first order conditions of this problem, the optimal size of the investment
in the private project, i˜2, is given by:
i2 = (1− α2)(1− p)Ri2 −RB2) . (1.37)
By contradiction, let’s assume that bank owners can achieve higher expected utility by
choosing i˜2 instead of i2 given by equation (1.4) independently of the value of . Plugging
the optimal portfolio decisions into (1.2) and (1.35) and rearranging, this assumption leads
to the condition:
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(i2)
2 − (˜i2)2
2
≤ pR∗ ∀ > 0 , (1.38)
where the left-hand side is strictly positive. This is because the bank cannot fully reimburse
depositors when the return on corporate lending is zero by choosing i˜2 ≥ i2. At the same
time the right-hand side of condition (1.38) is monotonically increasing in . Therefore,
by the intermediate value theorem, there exists  such that the above condition holds with
equality if  = . In turn, this implies that condition (1.38) is not satisfied if  ∈ (0, ),
contradicting the assumption that bank owners can achieve higher expected utility by only
holding sovereign bonds ∀ > 0. Similar analysis can be carried out for the equilibrium at
t = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Taking the derivative of θ∗ with respect to ω2, it yields:
∂θ∗
∂ω2
=
(ω2(η − 1)
2Π2
, (1.39)
which is strictly positive. Therefore, θ∗ ≥ 1 if ω2 is large enough. Moreover, θ∗ ≤ 0 if:
RB2B2(η − 2) + Π2 ≤ 0 , (1.40)
which is satisfied when RB2B2 is large enough due to the fact that η < 2. Together with the
monotonicity in ω2, this fact determines that there exists a realization of the households’
endowment at t = 2 such that the share of dividends retained by bailed-out bank owners is
equal to 0, conditional on the public debt maturing t = 2 being sufficiently large.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First of all, I show that there is an equilibrium in which government debt is risk-
free and another in which sovereign bonds are not marketable. With respect to the first
equilibrium, it sufficient to see that α2 = 0 is a solution to equation, since H(ω˜) is equal
to 0 due to the assumption that ω is larger than ω˜. Regarding the case in which the
government cannot issue marketable bonds, it is straightforward to note that both sides of
equation (1.18) are equal to 1 when α2 is.
In order to show that these two solutions are both globally stable, it is sufficient to show
that the derivative H
(
R∗B2
1−α2
)
with respect to α2 is less than 1 at α2 = 0 and α2 → 1. Given
that that h
(
R∗B2
1−α2
)
is equal to 0 in both points, then the two solutions are globally stable.
78
For simplicity, I redefine the amount of public debt that needs to be repaid in the last
period such that as RB2B2 = x. Since the probability distribution H has a monotonically
increasing hazard rate, this implies that the first derivative of the hazard rate is always
strictly positive. Formally:
d
d x
(
h(x)
1−H(x)
)
=
h′(x)
1−H(x) +
(
h(x)
1−H(x)
)2
> 0 ∀x . (1.41)
By contradiction, let’s suppose that the function H(x) is always weakly concave in α2,
meaning that its second derivative is weakly negative. Rearranging, this assumption implies:
h′(x)
1−H(x) ≤ −
h(x)
1−H(x)
2(1− α2)
R∗B2
∀α2 ∈ [0, 1] . (1.42)
Equations (1.41) and (1.42) can be combined to show that:
h(x)
1−H(x) >
2(1− α2)
R∗B2
∀α2 ∈ [0, 1] . (1.43)
This condition, however, is not satisfied for α2 arbitrarily close to 1. In that case, the
left-hand side tends to 0, while the right-hand side tends to 2(R∗B2)−1, which is strictly
positive. Combining this contradiction with the fact the left-hand side and the right-hand
side in equation (1.43) are monotonically increasing and decreasing in α2, it is possible to
argue that there exists α2 ∈ [0, 1 such thatH(x) is convex if α2 ≤ α2, and concave otherwise.
In turn, this implies that H(x) can only have an inflection point at most.
According to the intermediate value theorem, there exist at least another solution such
that α2 ∈ (0, 1). In order to have more than three solutions, H(x) must change concavity at
least twice, but this is impossible because there is only one inflection point. All in all, the
debt pricing equation (1.18) has only one solution besides α2 = 0 and α2 = 1. Moreover,
this intermediate solution is globally unstable, since the slope of H(x) evaluated at that
point is larger than 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Looking at the right-hand side of equation (1.24), the numerator is positive if:
H(ωH2 )−H(ωL2 ) + γ(h(ωH2 )− h(ωL2 ))
∂φ
∂γ
(1− ψ) ≤ 0 , (1.44)
and negative otherwise. Considering the case in which α1 is large enough that ωH2 > ω, the
above condition can be written as:
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h(ωL2 )
1−H(ωL2 )
≥
(
∂φ
∂γ
(1− ψ)
)−1
, (1.45)
since h(ωH2 ) and H(ωL2 ) are equal to 0 and 1, respectively. Given that the left-hand side of
the above condition (i.e. the hazard rate) is monotonically increasing in ωL2 and the latter is
increasing in the government default risk, then the hazard rate is increasing in the sovereign
default risk as well. Therefore, conditional on ω being large enough, there must exist α1 [0, 1]
to which it corresponds ωL2 such that the above condition is satisfied if α1 ≥ α1.
With respect to the denominator, that is A, it must be positive if sovereign risk is
sufficiently high. As before, consider that ωH2 > ω, then A is positive if:
h(ωL2 ) ≤
2(1− α1)(η − 1)
pγR∗4
. (1.46)
As α1 increases, the left-hand side decreases, becoming equal to 0 for α1 ∈ (0, 1) such
that ωL2 = ω˜2. On the contrary, the right-hand side of the above condition is always strictly
positive except for α1 = 1. Therefore, there must exist α1 [0, 1] such that the above condition
is satisfied if α1 ≥ α1.
Combining the two results that I derived above, it is possible to argue that the right-hand
side of equation (1.24) is positive if:
α1 ≥ αˆ1 , (1.47)
with:
αˆ1 = max
{
α1, α1
}
, (1.48)
which proves Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. According the first-order condition to the bank’s problem at t = 0, the budget con-
straint (1.7) always binds, implying that:
i1 = d1 − b1 . (1.49)
Therefore, the amounts of corporate lending and government bonds in the bank’s portfolio
are negatively related. Formally, (1.49) implies that
∂b∗1
∂γ
= −∂i
∗
1
∂γ
, (1.50)
80
which leads to Corollary 1
Theoretically robustness: the case of R∗ < 1
In order for households to be willing to entirely invest their endowment and wealth in bank
deposits, the risk-free rate R∗ must satisfy:
R∗β = 1−  , (1.51)
with β being the intertemporal discount factor in households’ utility. As a consequence, the
discount rate can e set different from 1 and the risk-free rate can also be smaller than 1 as
long as the above condition is satisfied.
Theoretically robustness: allowing the bank to lend and borrow internationally
Consider the case in which bank owners can lend and borrow internationally. First of all, it
is important to note that the bank’s optimal portfolio does not include any lending to foreign
investors unless the government can borrow at the risk-free rate R∗. Given that the bank
defaults whenever the government does, bank owners only care about the return on assets
absent a sovereign default. Together with the fact that government bonds must offer a return
at least as high as the risk-free rate in order to be attractive to investors (i.e. RBt ≥ R∗
for t = 1, 2), this implies that bank owners never strictly prefer lending to the international
financial market over sovereign bonds. Moreover, the shortfall towards depositors in the case
of financial distress depends exclusively on the difference between deposits and corporate
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lending. This allows me to analyze the bank’s problem by considering that its portfolio may
include only corporate lending and government bonds without loss of generality.
With respect to borrowing internationally, the gross interest rate on deposits raised
abroad is RB2. This is because international investors do not have a bias towards deposits
(i.e.  = 0) and thus equation (1.10) implies that the return must be equal to that on
government bonds. Therefore, bank owners find it optimal to borrow internationally only if
households’ wealth is small enough that they cannot invest in the private project as much
as they would like. In other words, the possibility to collect deposits abroad allows bank
owners to relax the budget constraint if the optimal amount of corporate lending given by
equations (1.8) and (1.4) cannot be achieved by only borrowing domestically. Given that I
assumed that the bank owners’ portfolio decisions are never constraint, the analysis is robust
to allowing the bank to borrow internationally.
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Figure 1.3
Yield on 10-year Italian government bonds and
corresponding spread over German government bonds
of the same maturity
0.0
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Net yield on 10-year Italian
government bonds (p.p.)
Yield spread over 10-year German
government bonds (p.p.)
NOTES: Daily observations ranging from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2015. The solid blue line is the
net yield on 10-year Italian government bonds, expressed in percentage points. The dotted red line is the
spread between the yield on 10-year Italian government bonds and that on German government bonds of
the same maturity, expressed in percentage points.
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Table 1.8
Default probabilities and numerical conversion of credit ratings
Rating Implied Default Rate Lower-bound threshold Numerical value
Aaa 0.00% 0.01% 19
Aa1 0.02% 0.03% 18
Aa2 0.05% 0.07% 17
Aa3 0.10% 0.14% 16
A1 0.19% 0.26% 15
A2 0.35% 0.43% 14
A3 0.54% 0.67% 13
Baa1 0.83% 1.00% 12
Baa2 1.20% 1.69% 11
Baa3 2.38% 3.16% 10
Ba1 4.20% 5.34% 9
Ba2 6.80% 8.16% 8
Ba3 9.79% 11.64% 7
B1 13.85% 15.85% 6
B2 18.13% 20.88% 5
B3 24.04% 27.94% 4
Caa1 32.48% 37.75% 3
Caa2 43.88% 53.91% 2
Caa3 66.24% 74.40% 1
C, WR 91.55% n.a. 0
NOTES: Implied default rates and thresholds are computed are based on Moody’s Investor Service (2007).
A “watch positive” and a “watch negative” on a credit rating change the corresponding numerical value by
0.5 and -0.5, respectively.
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Figure 1.4
Numerical simulations of h(ω
H
2 )−h(ωL2 )
H(ωH2 )−H(ωL2 )
NOTES: The figure reports numerical simulation of the term
h(x+ 2Π
η−1 )−h(x)
H(x+ 2Π
η−1 )−H(x)
as a function of x. H is a
left-truncated normal with support [1,+∞), and mean and variance equal to 10. The solid blue, the dashed
red line and the green dotted line correspond to the case in which the difference between ωH2 and ωL2 (i.e
2Π
η−1 ) is equal to 0.1, 10 and 100, respectively. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when changing the
lower bound of the support and the first two moments of the distribution.
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Figure 1.5
Numerical simulations of h(ω
H
2 )−h(ωL2 )
1−α
(a) (h(ωH2 )− h(ωL2 ))/(1− α)
(b) (h(ωH2 )− h(ωL2 ))/(1− α)
NOTES: The figure in panel (a) reports numerical simulation of the term
h( 2ΠB
(1−α)(η−1) )−h( B(1−α)(η−1) )
1−α as a
function of α. H is a left-truncated normal with support [1,+∞), and mean and variance equal to 10. The
term B
η−1 is set equal to 10. The solid blue, the dashed red line and the green dotted line correspond to
the case in which the difference between ωH2 and ωL2 (i.e 2Πη−1 ) is equal to 0.1, 10 and 100, respectively.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained when changing the lower bound of the support and the first two
moments of the distribution.
The figure in panel (b) reports numerical simulation of the term
h( x
1−α+
2Π
η−1 )−h(x)
1−α as a function of α. H(x)
is a left-truncated normal with support [1,+∞), and mean and variance equal to 10. The difference between
ωH2 and ωL2 (i.e 2Πη−1 ) is set equal to 10. The solid blue, the dashed red line and the green dotted line
correspond to the case in which the term B
η−1 is equal to 0.1, 10 and 100, respectively.
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Chapter 2
ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy and the
Italian Economy during the Sovereign Debt Crisis1
2.1 Introduction
Since 2007, most central banks in advanced countries have implemented unconventional
monetary measures to counteract the economic effects of the global financial crisis. However,
the definition of unconventional measures is far from being narrow because the instruments
used and the problems that they were intended to address have differed significantly across
economies. Not surprisingly, the debate on the effectiveness of such measures is still open.
Most of the empirical literature on unconventional measures focuses on the US and the
UK and aims at estimating the impact of asset purchase programs designed to provide
stimulus when short-term rates are close to zero. The general finding is that such inter-
ventions were effective in sustaining the economy. However, the evidence is still scant on
whether unconventional monetary policy also has an impact when it aims at addressing
market disruptions, which could arise because of a crisis of confidence or the coordination
of expectations on a worst-case scenario in a situation of multiple equilibria (Meier, 2009;
Stone, Ishi, and Fujita, 2011).
1Co-authored with Alessandro Secchi, Eugenio Gaiotti, and Lisa Rodano from the DG Economics, Statis-
tics and Research at the Bank of Italy.
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From a theoretical perspective, Curdia and Woodford (2011) argue that targeted as-
set purchases by the central bank can be effective if the financial markets are sufficiently
disrupted and are likely to be ineffective otherwise (see also Gertler and Karadi (2011)).
Similarly, the consensus among European monetary policymakers is that monetary policy
is a powerful tool to address the sovereign crisis, although it cannot overcome it by itself
(Visco, 2013).
According to an opposite view, however, monetary interventions are less effective in
presence of extremely tight credit (Kozicki, Santor, and Suchanek, 2011) and increasing the
liquidity supply may not produce more lending when banks are under stress or the value of
collateral is too low (Stiglitz, 2012). For the the same reasons, both liquidity provision and
outright monetary operations may be ineffective in the euro area because they fail to get at
some of the causes of the crisis, namely the need for structural adjustments in banking and
in public finances.
In this paper we address a specific case: the impact on the Italian economy of the main
non-standard measures adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the most
acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis.
Italy offers an interesting viewpoint. While the focus on a single country clearly allows
us to obtain only a partial assessment of the effectiveness of the measures implemented by
the ECB, that were directed at the entire euro area, the analysis of an economy that was at
the core of the sovereign debt crisis offers important insights. Our results may provide a new
perspective into the effectiveness of non-standard policies aimed at offsetting the impact on
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the real economy of financial market disruptions.
During the summer of 2011, sovereign debt market tensions extended to two large euro-
area countries, Italy and Spain. The strains were widespread in the euro area, but they
affected Italy directly and were rapidly transmitted to the banking sector and other segments
of the domestic financial market. Corporate bond yields and money market spreads soared,
interbank loans dried up, and stock indexes plummeted. The effects were amplified both
by the abrupt interruption of cross-border capital flows in the euro area and by the sudden
funding freeze faced by banks on international markets. The adverse impact on the cost
and availability of credit to the private sector led to a sizeable drop in aggregate demand.2
In the summer of 2012 fears of a possible break-up of the euro area aggravated financial
tensions and further increased the cross-country disparities in monetary conditions.
In response the ECB took several measures, designed to support dysfunctional market
segments, foster bank liquidity, avert a credit crunch and dispel the fears of a euro-area
break-up. It extended the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) to Italian and Spanish
government bonds in August 2011; it granted three-year loans to banks (3-year Longer-Term
Refinancing Operations, LTROs) in December 2011 and in February 2012; it announced the
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in September 2012.
The main features of the operations are reported in Table 2.1. The SMP was set up in
May 2010 and enhanced in August 2011, when purchases were re-activated and extended
2According to estimates by Albertazzi et al. (2014b), in Italy the cost of lending increased by 2 percentage
points in 2011 due to the movements in sovereign spreads. Aggregate and cross-country evidence of the effects
of the sovereign debt crisis on euro-area economies is provided by Neri and Ropele (2015).
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to Italian and Spanish government securities. Over the life of the program, interventions in
the Italian sovereign bond market amounted to around 100 billion euros. In December 2011
the ECB announced two LTROs with an extended maturity of 3 years, tendered at a fixed
rate with full allotment; at the same time collateral eligibility criteria were substantially
broadened to ensure that banks had enough borrowing capacity to satisfy their current and
future liquidity needs.3 Italian banks borrowed a total of close to 250 billion euros. Finally,
in a speech given at the end of July 2012, ECB President Mario Draghi announced that the
ECB would “do whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. In the next two months, the ECB
announced the guidelines and the operational details of the OMTs, i.e. secondary market
purchases of government bonds with a maturity between one and three years, with no ex
ante volume limit.4 To date the OMTs have not been activated for any country.
We assess the impact of these monetary policy actions on the Italian economy using a
two-step approach. First, we estimate their direct effects on financial and credit markets
using a specific econometric methodology for each measure so as to address the issue of
heterogeneity among the policy instruments adopted. In detail, we use an event-study
methodology to estimate the impact of the 3-year LTROs on money market interest rates
and that of the OMTs on government bond yields, and we run several types of regressions to
assess the effect of the SMP on government bond yields and of the 3-year LTROs on credit
availability. In the second step, we map the estimated effects on money market interest
3The availability of collateral was significantly reduced in some banking systems by increased borrowing,
the fall in collateral asset prices and more frequent margin calls.
4OMTs would be considered by the ECB if deemed necessary from a monetary policy perspective and
may be carried out only for the securities of countries that request a financial assistance program and that
comply with its conditions. The liquidity created with the OMTs would be sterilized.
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rates, bond yields and credit availability onto their macroeconomic implications using the
Bank of Italy’s quarterly model of the Italian economy (BIQM). This model provides sound
estimates of the impact of the unconventional measures on the main Italian macroeconomic
variables; it also allows us to identify the transmission channels for each measure and isolate
the specific contribution of changes in interest rates and in credit availability.
Our results suggest that the SMP, the 3-year LTROs and the OMTs have been effective
in offsetting undue increases in government bond yields and easing money market tensions,
with a positive and significant impact on credit supply. Transmitted mainly through the
credit channel, the policy measures induced a cumulative output growth response equal
to 2.7 percentage points in 2012-2013. In considering these findings, however, one should
bear in mind that a full counterfactual scenario is beyond the scope of this paper. The
ECB’s unconventional policies may have avoided a generalized collapse of financial and
credit markets, which cannot be studied using the standard econometric tools as the effects
would have been highly non-linear. Even if it cannot be ruled out, the possibility that
financial tensions would have eased without the ECB intervention seems remote.
The paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we study the most
acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis, which has not yet been covered by research on
the macroeconomic effects of the ECB’s unconventional measures. Second, empirical results
for the so-called “peripheral” countries are almost non-existent; to date the literature has
focused on the euro area as a whole. Yet it is precisely these countries that have been
affected most severely by the market disruptions, and they accordingly constitute the most
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suitable gauge for assessing the effectiveness of the measures. Third, our estimation strategy
overcomes one crucial weakness of the existing literature on the impact of non-standard
policy measures (mainly based on VAR models), namely the use of very rough proxies for
ECB interventions (e.g. the change in the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet), which
fail to capture the peculiarities of the different instruments (in contrast, existing studies of
the local effects of specific measures stop short of evaluating the macroeconomic impact).
On the contrary, our two-step approach combines appropriate estimation methodologies to
evaluate the specific effects of each measure on financial markets and credit availability with
a consistent mapping of these effects to their macroeconomic consequences, through the
BIQM. Finally, the flexibility of the BIQM allows us to fully take into account the impact
of the sovereign debt crisis on the monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, we take
into consideration that the financial tensions impaired the standard transmission channels
and activated new ones that do not normally play a significant role.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section B reviews the evidence
on the effects of the measures adopted by the ECB during the financial and the sovereign
debt crisis. Section C describes the main channels of monetary transmission included in
the structure of the BIQM and discusses how they have been affected by the sovereign debt
crisis and the ECB’s measures adopted in 2011-2012. Section D presents the estimates of
the effects of the SMP, the two 3-year LTROs and the OMTs on market yields and on credit
supply in Italy based on regression analyses and on high-frequency event studies. In Section
E we assess the overall effects of the measures on the main Italian macroeconomic variables
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using the BIQM and, in particular by simulating the response of the economy to a set of
shocks on interest rates and credit availability of the same magnitude as those estimated in
Section D. Section F concludes.
2.2 Existing evidence on the effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional
policy measures
A large part of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of unconventional monetary
policy seeks to gauge the impact of large-scale asset purchases in the US and the UK de-
signed to provide additional monetary stimulus when short-term rates are at the zero lower
bound. The general finding is that the purchases did affect market yields and sustain the
economy, but there is still considerable uncertainty about the effective magnitude of their
contribution.5.
The evidence on the macroeconomic effects of the non-standard measures adopted by
the ECB during the most acute phase of the sovereign crisis (i.e., after 2011), is still scant.
Most of the existing papers focus on ECB interventions in the previous period, i.e. between
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the summer of 2011, therefore not bearing on the
effectiveness of any of the unconventional measures we study.6
5A survey of the impact of large-scale asset purchases on yields in the US and in the UK is provided
by Williams (2014). Surveys of the evidence on the macroeconomic impact of these measures are provided
by Cecioni, Ferrero, and Secchi (2011), Santor and Suchanek (2013), Gagnon and Hinterschweiger (2013)
and IMF (2013). Chung et al. (2012) use stochastic simulations of the Federal Reserve’s macroeconometric
model (FRB/US) and find that QE1 and QE2 increased GDP by around 3 percentage points. Chen, Cúrdia,
and Ferrero (2012) use a DSGE model find a smaller effect of QE2 on US GDP (0.3 percentage points).
For the UK, Kapetanios, George and Mumtaz, Haroon and Stevens, Ibrahim and Theodoridis, Konstantinos
(2012) find a peak effect on GDP of around 1.5 percentage points.
6Eser et al. (2012) provide a detailed description of the non-standard measures implemented by the ECB
since 2009. Evidence on the financial market effects of the measures adopted by the ECB before 2011 is in
Cecioni, Ferrero, and Secchi (2011) and in ECB (2011).
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They mostly rely on VAR models augmented with very general proxies to measure un-
conventional policy shocks. Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) measure the impact of the
liquidity-enhancing measures adopted by the ECB after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
with the reduction of the spread between unsecured and secured money market rates and,
based on VAR-based forecasts, conclude that without the ECB intervention industrial out-
put growth and inflation would have been 3 and 0.5 percentage points lower. Giannone
et al. (2011) interpret their finding of no prediction error in an out-of-sample simulation of
euro-area monetary and credit variables over 2008-2010 as evidence of the success of the
unconventional measures in offsetting the global shocks. Peersman (2011) estimates a pol-
icy shock based on changes in the size and composition of the Eurosystem balance sheet
and finds that over 1999-2009 the effects on output and inflation are similar to those of a
conventional monetary policy shock. Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2014) use a
similar approach in panel VAR for eight advanced economies over the period from January
2008 to June 2011 and obtain similar results. Giannone et al. (2012) construct a gauge of
the policy shock looking at the evolution of commercial banks’ balance sheets and conclude
that unconventional monetary policy increased industrial production by 2 per cent two years
after the Lehman Brothers collapse.Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró (2013) suggest that
the ECB unconventional measures partly mitigated the disruption of the credit channel in
the distressed countries.
As for the sovereign debt crisis, there is an increasing amount of evidence on the ‘local’
impact of the SMP asset purchases, i.e. on the sovereign yield on the specific market
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segment they were addressing, while there is very little evidence so far on the effect on the
economy. De Pooter, Martin, and Pruitt (2013) use an asset pricing model to determine the
liquidity premium implicit in sovereign bond prices and regress this premium on weekly SMP
purchases; they find that each percentage point of outstanding bonds purchased lowered
liquidity premia by around 20 basis points on impact. Eser and Schwaab (2013), using daily
data on five euro-area countries, find that on average 1 billion euros of purchases lowered 5-
year Italian government bond yields by 1-2 basis points both on impact and in the long-run.
Ghysels et al. (2014), regressing yield changes on SMP interventions at high frequencies (15
minutes), find that a 100 million euro intervention has an immediate impact on bond yields
of between 0.1 and 25 basis points, depending on the size of the market.
The overall impact of the SMP, the 3-year LTROs and the OMTs on the interbank
market is studied by Dubecq et al. (2014), who use a quadratic term structure model of
the Euribor-OIS spreads and conclude that the SMP had no effect on interbank premia, the
announcement of 3-year LTROs reduced liquidity premia by around 50 basis points and the
OMTs helped ease liquidity risk.
Darracq Paries and De Santis (2013) are among the few papers that provide some evi-
dence on the macroeconomic impact of the two 3-year LTROs. They define the policy shock
as the innovation in credit conditions as measured in the euro-area Bank Lending Surveys
and, based on a panel-VAR for eight euro-area countries, conclude that the LTROs lifted
the prospects for real GDP, with a peak effect between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage points by
mid-2013.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive country-level evidence on the
macroeconomic effects of the whole range of unconventional measures adopted by the ECB
during the most acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis.
2.3 The sovereign crisis, the ECB measures and the channels of trans-
mission in the Bank of Italy’s quarterly model
In order to estimate the macroeconomic impact of the ECB unconventional measures, we
use the Bank of Italy quarterly model of the Italian economy.7
The BIQM includes several channels that allow greater detail in taking into account how
the ECB unconventional measures affected the Italian economy, as well as the way in which
the sovereign debt crisis impaired the monetary transmission mechanism.
In the monetary transmission mechanism as captured in the BIQM, changes in the key
ECB rates are transmitted to the term structure of interest rates. The BIQM measures this
effect through variations in the 1-year T-bill rate (BOTs) and the long-term yield on Treasury
bonds (BTPs), which proxy for short-term and long-term rates. Changes in the term struc-
ture affect bank lending rates, which directly influence investment in construction, through
different mortgage rates, and inventories accumulation. Bank lending rates and long-term
interest rates jointly affect the cost of capital, which has an impact on business investment;
real long-term rates also affect households’ intertemporal consumption decisions.8
7The BIQM is used to provide short- and medium-term projections, for policy evaluation exercises, for
counterfactual analyses and for the coordination of economic analysis within DG Economics and Research
at the Bank of Italy. Like most traditional macroeconomic models, it is Keynesian in the short run and
akin to the Solow model of exogenous growth in the long run. It contains some 800 equations, nearly 100 of
which are stochastic. See Busetti et al. (2005).
8In the model, a decrease of 50 basis points of both the short- and long-term rates increases the GDP
level by around 0.35 per cent after two years.
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The sovereign debt crisis altered the monetary transmission mechanism, interfering with
the standard channels and activating new ones. There were three main effects. First, the
usual relationship between the ECB-driven short-term interest rates and long-term rates
broke down: an unprecedented increase of the spread between the yield on 10-year BTPs
and the corresponding risk-free rate started in summer 2011 (see Figure 2.1), reflecting
both an increased sensitivity to domestic fundamentals (a “wake-up call” form of contagion;
see Giordano, Pericoli, and Tommasino (2013)) and the upsurge in the perceived risk of a
euro-area break-up (Di Cesare et al., 2012).
Second, the surge in credit and liquidity risk, which was associated with growing seg-
mentation of interbank markets across national lines, resulted in an unprecedented rise in
risk premia on money market interest rates. Italian banks had to pay a large premium on
their secured as well as their unsecured borrowing (see Figure 2.2, top panels and bottom
left panel). The increase in secured money market rates also reflected the lower collateral
value of Italian sovereigns. On top of these country-specific shocks, in late 2011 tensions hit
the whole area-wide interbank market, with a sharp rise in the spread between interest rates
on unsecured 3-month interbank loans and the risk-free rate of that maturity (the spread
between Euribor and Overnight Indexed Swaps, OIS, shown in Figure 2.2, bottom right
panel).
Third, the increase in sovereign yields and the tensions in the interbank market affected
not only the cost but also the availability of funding for Italian banks. There ensued an
unprecedented increase in quantitative constraints on the availability of credit to the private
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Figure 2.1
Evolution of risk premia on Italian 10-year sovereign bonds
SOURCE: Bloomberg. NOTES: Spread between the yield on 10-year BTPs and the corresponding Interest
Rate Swap. Daily data in basis points.
sector, exacerbating the disparity of monetary conditions between Italy and the countries
less affected by the crisis. The index of credit supply restriction derived from the responses
of Italian banks to the Bank Lending Survey peaked at end-2011.
The BIQM can take account of the transmission of these changes. In the model, 90
per cent of a change in government bond yields is transmitted to bank lending rates within
six quarters, a feature that is broadly confirmed by recent studies on the pass-through of
interest rates during the sovereign debt crisis.9 Higher money market spreads also affect
9If anything, the results of Albertazzi et al. (2014b) suggest that the lending rate impact of movements
in sovereign yields tends to be slightly greater during periods of financial turmoil.
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Figure 2.2
Evolution of risk premia on the interbank market
SOURCES: e-MID, RepoFund Rate - ICAP, European Banking Federation and Reuters. NOTES: Daily
data in basis points. (1) Spread between the interest rate on Italian uncollateralized overnight interbank
loans and the Eonia rate. (2) Spread between the interest rate on Italian collateralized overnight interbank
loans and the corresponding French and German interest rates (average, weighted by volume). (3) Spread
between the interest rate on Italian collateralized 3-month interbank loans and the corresponding French
and German interest rates (average, unweighted). (4) Spread between the Euribor 3-month and the rate on
the corresponding Overnight Indexed Swap. Daily data in basis points.
both short- and long-term rates and, in turn, aggregate demand.
Finally, whereas in the BIQM quantitative constraints to credit availability are not a
relevant channel of transmission in normal times, recent research suggests that when they
are binding they may have a significant and non-linear impact on investment.10 We estimate
10The evidence provided in Gaiotti (2013), based on firm-level data, confirms that in recessions an increase
in credit constraints has large effects on investment.
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Table 2.2
Determinants of the 2012 recession in Italy according to the BIQM
2012
GDP growth in a scenario of no sovereign debt crisis 1.1 p.p.
Determinants of the revisions:
Sovereign interest rates and spreads -0.4 p.p.
Firms’ difficulties in obtaining credit -0.6 p.p.
Budgetary measures -1.1 p.p.
Slowdown of the world economy -0.7 p.p.
Uncertainty and confidence -0.6 p.p.
Residual component -0.1 p.p.
Actual GDP growth -2.4 p.p.
SOURCES: BIQM simulation, updated from Bank of Italy (2013). NOTES: Values expressed in percentage
points. The contribution of the factors presented in the table is computed comparing a simulation of the
model where the exogenous variables are set at the profiles expected in the summer 2011 projection exercise,
i.e. before the sovereign debt crisis accelerated, with a simulation using their realized values.
and include these effects in the BIQM using the approach developed by Rodano (2009).
Simulations based on the BIQM confirm that these shocks played a major role in pushing
the Italian economy into recession. Higher interest rates and tighter credit constraints cut
about 1 percentage point from the growth rate in 2012 (see Table 2.2), about one third of
the unexpected economic slowdown that year, an effect that would have been even larger if
interest rates and credit constraints had not gradually receded from their peaks.
The channels through which the ECB measures were intended to counteract the effects
of the sovereign debt crisis and restore proper monetary transmission are also shown in
Figure 2.3. The SMP was designed to counter undue yield volatility and ensure depth and
liquidity in dysfunctional government bond market segments; in the BIQM, the consequent
reduction in risk premia would correspond to lower short- and long-term yields on public
securities (with little impact on money market interest rates because the liquidity effect was
sterilized).11 The LTROs were intended to improve banks’ liquidity conditions in order to
11At the end of 2012 the average maturity of Italian sovereign securities in the SMP portfolio was 4.5
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Figure 2.3
Transmission of unconventional measures in the BIQM
NOTES: Policy measures are reported in solid blue boxes and variables directly affected by the sovereign
debt crisis in dashed red boxes. The variables considered as exogenous in the simulations are indicated with
*.
defuse the threat of an impending funding crisis and avert a credit crunch; they ease credit
availability conditions, which have a direct effect on investment, and decrease interbank
market spreads, which affect the interest rate term structure (the increase in liquidity could
also lower the overnight rate). By eliminating “tail risks” and precluding destructive scenarios
in a context of multiple equilibria, the OMTs would affect mostly the shorter part of the
yield curve, where they would operate, but also long-term rates might also fall due the
attenuation of the perceived redenomination risk.
2.4 Approach and results
The methodology is in two stages. The first uses specific estimation approaches to gauge the
impact of each of the ECB’s measures on financial market conditions and the availability
years
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of credit. We estimate two regressions, based on detailed data on the purchases of Italian
sovereign bonds under the SMP and on the reaction of individual banks’ credit conditions
to 3-year LTROs; we also perform high-frequency event studies on the effects on short- and
long-term interest rates of the announcements related to LTROs and OMTs. In the second
stage, we map the estimated effects onto their macroeconomic implications for Italy using
the Bank of Italy quarterly model of the Italian economy (BIQM).12
There is a general caveat to mention when ‘exogenously’ inserting in a model changes in
variables that arose for different reasons than those in the estimation sample.
A specific issue is mentioned by Stein (2012), who argues that decreases in yields asso-
ciated with large-scale asset purchases may have a different macroeconomic effect than that
built into standard models, since they reflect a compression of term premia due to large-
scale asset purchases, but not necessarily a change in expected future short rates, as it is
instead the case in normal times. However, this particular problem may be less relevant for
our case: unlike the Fed large-scale asset purchases, ECB interventions were not aimed at
decreasing term premia but rather at contrasting market disruptions, which would otherwise
have caused a surge in yields.
Still, it is important to keep in mind that the BIQM is not completely immune to the
Lucas’ critique because the impact of bond yields and credit constraints on other variables
may have changed during the crisis and this may bias the results of our simulations. In this
12Locarno and Secchi (2009) is related to our approach, although much more limited in time horizon and
scope. They estimate the effect of the provision of liquidity after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on the
spread between unsecured and secured interbank rates and on short-term lending rates in Italy, and then
map it on output growth using the Bank of Italy quarterly model.
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respect, however we take comfort from the comparison of the model’s main properties with
micro evidence relative to the sovereign debt crisis, which is more robust to state-dependent
changes in the transmission and seems to broadly confirm the magnitude of the relevant
responses in the BIQM. Albertazzi et al. (2014b), working with a panel of bank-level data
during the crisis, find a full pass-through of movements in sovereign yields to bank lending
rates; the magnitude of the effect of credit constraints on investment during the global crisis
estimated by Gaiotti (2013) on a panel of firm data is also consistent with the effects included
in the BIQM.
2.4.1 SMP interventions
To evaluate the impact of the SMP on Italian government bond yields, we regress daily
changes in bond yields on SMP purchases and a series of additional variables that control
for other factors that affected yields.13 The inclusion of control variables is important to
address endogeneity. Yields and bond purchases under the SMP reacted to common factors,
such as changes in market confidence and in risk appetite for Italian government bonds.
Since valid instruments are not readily available, we include suitable control covariates that
can proxy for the factors affecting yields.14 The econometric specification can be written as:
∆rt = f(SMP purchasest,∆rt−1,∆Xt) , (2.1)
where ∆rt is the daily change in the yield on Italian sovereign bonds at either 2-year or
13The section updates results in Secchi (2012).
14An analogous approach is adopted by Eser and Schwaab (2013).
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10-year maturity; SMP purchasest is the daily volume of purchases of Italian securities,
in billions of euros; ∆Xt is a vector of covariates that control for other factors affecting
Italian yields, which serves as a benchmark, i.e. the yield that would have obtained in
absence of interventions, given actual economic and financial developments. In particular,
these controls include a measure of the “risk-free” interest rate (interest rate swaps, IRS),
which is intended to capture the dynamic of the economic outlook and the expected course
of policy rates. In addition to IRS, we take a series of other variables, which proxy for the
severity of tensions in Italian and other European financial markets (CDS spreads on Italian
bonds, the slope of the Italian yield curve computed as the difference between yields on 10-
and 2-year BTPs, risk premia on private and public European securities as the French OAT-
German Bund spreads, the spread between BBB and AAA European corporate non-financial
bonds, stock market indices, the spread between the IRS and the yield on German Bunds,
volatility indexes and capital outflows measured via Italian Target2 flows). As a robustness
control, we include a SMPpurchasedummy.15 This variable captures the average impact
of unobservable factors (say, a change in confidence) that affected both yield dynamics and
SMP interventions and, by their very nature, cannot be controlled by the other variables
in the regression. A positive coefficient may indicate the presence of unobservable financial
strains on the days when the Eurosystem decided to intervene in the Italian government
bond market.
The estimates of equation (2.1), reported in Table 2.3, show a substantial effect of
15This dummy variable is equal to 1 in those days in which the SMP purchased Italian government bonds
(0 otherwise).
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purchases of Italian securities on daily yield movements: e1 billion in bond purchases lower
both the 2- and the 10-year yields by between 2 and 5 basis points.
Most of the control variables have the expected sign and in many cases are highly sig-
nificant.16 The results are robust to the inclusion of the SMP purchase dummy (columns
2 and 5), to the exclusion of CDS spreads on Italian bonds and the slope of the BTP term
structure, which may have been directly affected by SMP interventions, and of the covariates
that are looser proxies for financial tensions (columns 3 and 6).17
The results are also robust to a range of further controls and specifications. In particular,
the results are not sensitive to variations in the sample period, such as restricting it to the
dates on which the SMP intervened in the Italian government bond market or considering
only the period up to late February 2012 when the SMP made its last purchases; nor are
they sensitive to the inclusion of extra covariates (e.g. a Monday dummy to control for
recurrent patterns of financial market performance).
Overall, the magnitude of the effects is broadly consistent with the range of existing
estimates of the effectiveness of the SMP mentioned in Section 2. According to our most
conservative estimates, the total impact comes to around 200 basis points for both 2- and
10-year BTP yields, since the overall purchases of Italian securities over the whole life of
16As expected, increases in IRS and in Italian and other European risk premia increase BTP yields,
while higher stock market returns and a steeper yield curve (which are inverse measures of financial market
tensions) decrease BTP yields.
17Capital outflows measured via Italian Target2 flows, the spread between the IRS and the yield on German
Bunds, and the Bund volatility index are almost never significant in the first two specifications (columns
1, 2, 4 and 5). A possible explanation is that settlements via Target2 also reflect commercial transactions,
while changes in the other two variables were mainly due to the “flight-to-quality” associated with the high
liquidity and strength of the Bund.
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Table 2.3
Effects of SMP on Italian government bond yields
Dependent variable,
yield change on:
BTP 2-Year BTP 10-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SMP purchases -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.022* -0.024** -0.046*** -0.019**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
SMP intervention 0.051** 0.051**
(0.020) (0.021)
∆yield 2y (10y), lag -0.002 -0.001 0.092 0.043 0.034 ) 0.082
(0.041) (0.042) (0.073) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054)
∆IRS 2y (10y) 0.447** 0.421** 0.613** 0.298** 0.282* 0.182
(0.179) (0.171) (0.291) (0.145) (0.145) (0.154)
∆CDS sov. 2y (10y) 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.189*** 0.195***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.052) (0.051)
∆slope term structure -1.108*** -1.108*** -0.109 -0.107
(0.091) (0.090) (0.082) (0.082)
∆slope term structure,
lag
-0.124 -0.100 -0.366** -0.095 -0.071 -0.139
(0.095) (0.095) (0.162) (0.092) (0.092) (0.087)
∆spread OAT-Bund 2y 0.308 0.284 0.797* 0.182 0.160 0.258
(0.235) (0.233) (0.422) (0.220) (0.219) (0.205)
∆spread OAT-Bund 10y 0.506*** 0.502*** 0.536** 0.707*** 0.699*** 0.762***
(0.129) (0.126) (0.242) (0.136) (0.135) (0.140)
∆spread BBB-AAA 0.158 0.151 0.508** 0.147 0.137 0.231
(0.143) (0.140) (0.233) (0.156) (0.153) (0.156)
∆%stock market -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆volatility bund -0.029 -0.026 -0.030 -0.030
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
∆T2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆spread IRS-Bund 0.036 0.021 -0.536*** -0.542*** -0.480**
(0.292) (0.286) (0.195) (0.190) (0.194)
Constant 0.004 -0.001 -0.010 0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Excluding 8 Aug. 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample start Aug.11 Aug.11 Aug.11 Aug.11 Aug.11 Aug.11
Sample end Sept.12 Sept.12 Sept.12 Sept.12 Sept.12 Sept.12
No obs 283 283 283 283 283 283
R2 0.834 0.838 0.474 0.560 0.570 0.525
NOTES: Daily data. The dependent variable is the daily change in yields on government bonds in percentage
points. SMP intervention is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the case of SMP intervention, and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
the SMP amounted to slightly more than e100 billion. As a comparison, Eser and Schwaab
(2013) conclude that SMP permanently reduced Italian yields by about 190 basis points;
Ghysels et al. (2014) by 100 basis points.
A comparison of our results with the existing evidence on the SMP, as well as with
selected results on the effect of large-scale asset purchases in the US, derived from the
107
Table 2.4
Selected estimates of the effects of purchase programs on long-term rates
Study Sample Method Estimates of
effect
Effect per
purchases of
1% GDP (in
bp)
Casiraghi et al. (2012) Italy SMP time series 200 bp per
e100bn
31
Ghysels et al. (2014) Italy SMP time series 100 bp per e
100bn
16
Eser and Schwaab
(2013)
Italy SMP time series 190 bp per e
100bn
30
Krishnamurthy et al.
(2011, 2012)
postwar U.S.,
LSAP1, and
LSAP2
time series 15 bp per
$600bn
4
Gagnon et al. (2011) LSAP1 event study 30 bp per
$600bn
8
Gagnon et al. (2011) LSAP1 time series 18 bp per
$600bn
5
D’Amico-King (2013) LSAP1
Treasury
purchases
security-
specific event
study
100 bp per
$600bn
27
Hamilton and Wu
(2011)
U.S.,
1990-LSAP2
affine
no-arbitrage
model
17 bp per
$600bn
5
Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012)
LSAP1,
LSAP2
event study,
affine
no-arbitrage
model
10 bp per
$600bn
3
NOTES: Estimates for the US are from the survey in Williams (2014).
survey by Williams (2014), is presented in Table 2.4. The comparison systematically shows
a larger effect on Italian yields, consistently with the conjecture that asset purchases are
more effective when they are designed to fix a particular impairment in financial markets
than when they are intended to provide additional stimulus at the zero lower bound. The
impact of a e100bn of asset purchases on Italian long-term yields is uniformly larger than
the impact of a 600bn dollars of purchases in the US. To properly compare the results, in
the last column the effect of purchases equal to 1% of GDP is shown. The finding of a
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larger effect on Italian yields is confirmed: the range of estimates for the US suggests that
purchases of government bonds equal to 1% of GDP in the US had an impact on 10-year
Treasury yields between 3 and 8 basis points except for D’Amico and King (2013), who
estimate a larger effect, which compares with the estimates for Italy that range between 16
and 30 basis points.
Figure 2.4 compares the actual values of the 2- and 10-year BTP yields with the values
obtained simulating equation (1) under the assumption of no SMP purchases; it confirms
that, according to our estimates, if SMP asset purchases had been held to zero, the yields
on Italian government bonds would have been higher than those actually observed.
As the figure shows, the worsening of sovereign spreads was nonetheless not interrupted
after the start of the SMP program, rather continued to widen throughout the second half
of 2011, peaking in November, due to the deterioration in the covariates in the equation,
which likely suffered from continuing uncertainty on the prospects for the Italian economy
and on European policies.
2.4.2 The 3-year LTROs and credit supply
The effects of the 3-year longer term refinancing operations are estimated by two different
approaches. First we use event studies, discussed in the next section, to evaluate the impact
on Italian interbank interest rate spreads. Second, we exploit the determinants of the Eu-
rosystem Bank Lending Survey (BLS) index of credit supply to estimate the effect on credit
availability. These effects are both “direct”, in that the LTROs relaxed banks’ liquidity con-
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Figure 2.4
Yields on Italian BTP: actual and simulated dynamics
NOTES: Daily data in percentage points. Dashed red lines: simulations based on equation (2.1) under the
assumption of no SMP interventions.
straints, and “indirect” because they also eased individual banks’ access to the interbank
market and lowered their funding costs. To this end, we take advantage of the possibil-
ity to merge bank-specific BLS answers with bank-level information on impaired loans and
interbank market rates.
In our empirical approach, the BLS index of credit supply has a crucial role. In this
respect we borrow from some existing literature (Darracq Paries and De Santis, 2013; Cic-
carelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró, 2013) that exploits the information in the BLS to achieve
identification, but we also go one step further to directly estimate the effects of the LTROs
on credit availability conditions.
We construct an unbalanced panel at quarterly frequency that includes all eleven Ital-
ian banks that have ever participated in the BLS. The dependent variable is the degree
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of tightening of credit supply conditions, as reported by each bank in the BLS. This vari-
able consists of a qualitative index that admits five ordered answers, namely “tightened
considerably”, “tightened somewhat”, “basically unchanged”, “eased somewhat”, and “eased
considerably”. Following the literature, we assign values 1, 0.5, 0, -0.5, -1, respectively, to
those responses. We complement this qualitative information with bank-specific liquidity
measures, represented by the rates paid on the interbank market, and with their credit risk,
proxied by the flow of new impaired loans. We also consider aggregate information on inter-
bank market tensions and economic prospects, such as the Euribor-Eonia swap spread, the
spread between Italian and German government bond yields and the Purchasing Managers’
index (PMI).
To assess the impact of the 3-year LTROs on credit availability, we estimate several
different regression equations linking the bank-level BLS index with the aforementioned set
of aggregate and individual variables, which control for the main factors influencing credit
supply conditions. We include an LTRO dummy to capture the “direct” impact of the
measure on credit availability. Our baseline specification is:
BLSi,t = f(BLSi,t−1, LTRO dummyt, Euribor spreadt, Overnight spreadi,t,
BTP spreadt,∆impaired loansi,t, yt,∆yt) (2.2)
where i denotes the bank and t indicates the quarter. BLS is the quarterly BLS supply
index, LTRO dummy takes value 1 in 2012:q1, Euribor spread is the difference between
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the 3-month Euribor and the corresponding Eonia swap, Overnight spread is the difference
between the overnight rate paid on the Italian interbank market and the Eonia, BTP spread
is the spread between the 10-year Italian government bond yield and the corresponding
German rate, ∆impaired loans is the ratio of the flow of new impaired loans in the previous
4 quarters to total loans, and y and ∆y correspond to the PMI index and its quarter-on-
quarter growth.
We use a fixed-effect estimator that controls for unobserved bank-level effects. The
baseline estimation results are reported in the first two columns of Table 2.5.18 The LTRO
dummy has a significant “direct” impact on credit supply conditions, reducing the BLS
index by around 0.2. Credit conditions respond significantly to changes in the availability
of liquidity, tightening when the aggregate or the bank-specific interbank rate increases.
The coefficients on the Euribor spread and the individual overnight spread are positive
and significant. The BLS index is persistent over time, as shown by the lagged dependent
variable’s coefficient, which is around 0.4. Credit conditions also depend on the economic
outlook, given that the coefficient on the quarterly growth of the PMI index is significant.
By contrast, changes in impaired loans do not appear to be significant.
Columns (3) to (6) in Table 2.5 present a series of robustness tests. Column (3) shows
that our estimate of the impact of the LTROs is robust to the inclusion of dummies for the
Lehman Brothers failure (2008:q3) and the Italian sovereign crisis (2011:q4).19 Column (4)
18It has been shown that in panels with a limited number of periods a fixed-effect estimator may result
in downward-biased estimates, but we consider the time dimension of our panel (36 quarters) to be long
enough.
19The inclusion of the Lehman and the Italian sovereign crisis dummies reduces the impact of the interbank
spreads. This result is hardly surprising, as the two events are very important for measuring the spreads’
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Table 2.5
Effects of LTROs on credit availability
Dependent variable: BLSi,t , bank-level degree of tightening of credit conditions (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLSi,t−1 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.32***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Dummy LTRO -0.15** -0.18*** -0.16** -0.18*** -0.58*** -0.15***
(2012:q1) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04)
Dummy LTRO -0.04
(2012:q2-q4) (0.07)
Euribor-OIS spreadt 0.15*** 0.13** 0.08 0.13** 0.82*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.30) (0.05)
e-Mid-Eonia spreadi,t 0.28** 0.24*** 0.11 0.25*** 0.98*** 0.20*
(0.11) (0.08) (0.16) (0.09) (0.33) (0.10)
BTP-Bund 10y spreadt -0.01
(0.02)
∆bank’s impaired 0.06 0.04 0.05* 0.05 0.37** 0.01
loansi,t+1 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03)
PMIt 0.00
(0.01)
∆%PMIt (q-on-q) -0.74** -0.66** -0.70** -0.71** -5.19*** -0.59***
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.04) (2.14) (0.19)
Dummy Lehmant 0.26***
(0.03)
Dummy Sov. crisist 0.16*
(0.06)
Estimation procedure OLS (a) OLS (a) OLS (a) OLS (a) ordered
probit
OLS (a;
b)
Including banks’ yes yes yes yes no yes
fixed-effects
Sample start 2003:q1 2003:q1 2003:q1 2003:q1 2003:q1 2003:q1
Sample end 2012:q4 2012:q4 2012:q4 2012:q4 2012:q4 2012:q4
No obs 275 275 275 275 285 264
No banks 11 11 11 11 11 11
R2 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.13 0.39
NOTES: Quarterly data. (a) In OLS regressions the dependent variable is an index taking values based
on each bank’s answers on credit conditions: “eased considerably” (-1), “eased somewhat”(-0.5), “basically
unchanged” (0.0), “tightened somewhat” (0.5), and “tightened considerably” (1.0). (b) Regression based on
a slightly restricted sample that includes only “no change” and “tightened somewhat” answers. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by date; ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
shows that the estimate is also robust to the inclusion of an additional LTRO dummy that
takes value 1 from 2012:q2 to 2012:q4 and 0 in the rest of the time sample.
One further econometric issue is the way in which we mapped the qualitative answers
to the BLS survey onto numerical values. In order to control for bias, we consider two
additional econometric specifications, whose outcomes are presented in columns (5) and (6)
effect on credit conditions. Further regressions, not presented here, show that as theory suggests the Lehman
event is more important for the assessment of the impact of Euribor-OIS spreads on credit conditions and
the Italian sovereign debt crisis is essential in gauging the effect of the bank-level Italian overnight spread.
113
of Table 2.5. In detail, column (5) presents the results of an ordered probit estimation,
which is the most appropriate approach for ordered qualitative dependent variables. The
magnitude of the ordered probit and fixed-effects linear regression estimates reported in
the table is not directly comparable, but it can be shown that the results are substantially
equivalent not only in terms of the statistical significance and signs of the coefficients, but
also in their quantitative implications.20 And column (6) shows that the estimates do not
change even when a very few extreme answers to the BLS (7 observations) are excluded so
as to have a binary dependent variable and thus largely circumvent the problems connected
with the ordinal nature of the BLS index.
All in all, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that the LTROs had
a “direct” impact on credit supply and that interbank market spreads are an important
determinant of lending conditions (see Figure 2.5). The next section addresses the conjecture
that the operations may have helped to normalise interbank market conditions and spreads
and thus had a more persistent “indirect” effect on credit supply.
2.4.3 Event study - LTROs
In order to estimate the impact of the 3-year LTROs on financial market yields, we use a
high-frequency event study methodology, evaluating the statistical significance of the effects
of an announcement on a financial asset, based on yield changes in a small temporal window
20The quantitative implications, not shown here, can be easily derived by considering the effect of the
LTROs on the marginal probabilities for each of the admissible answers, implied by columns (5) and (6) in
Table 2.5, and mapping them in the credit conditions indicators by the same metrics used to construct the
BLS supply index.
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Figure 2.5
BLS index of credit conditions: actual and simulated dynamics
NOTES: Simulations based on the estimates presented in table 5, assuming that 3-year LTROs have neither
a “direct” nor an “indirect” effect on credit conditions (see section 2.4.2). The BLS survey admits five ordered
answers, namely “tightened considerably”, “tightened somewhat”, “basically unchanged”, “eased somewhat”,
and “eased considerably”. The index presented in the figure is constructed as the simple mean of the responses
provided by the banks after assigning values 1, 0.5, 0, -0.5, -1, respectively, to the possible responses.
Quarterly data.
surrounding the event.21
We identify three major events: the announcement of the 3-year LTROs and the actual
settlement of the first and second operations. For each we focus on the change in selected
interest rates in the two days around the event and test the null hypothesis of no effect to
21Event studies have been used widely to measure the impact of the unconventional measures adopted
by the major central banks (see, for example, (Gagnon et al., 2011) and (Swanson, Reichlin, and Wright,
2011)).
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determine whether the change is statistically significant. In particular, we consider two sets
of interest rates. The first includes interbank interest rates, namely the spread between the
overnight rate on the Italian interbank market (e-MID, “mercato interbancario dei depositi”)
and the Eonia, and the spread between the yield on 3-month interbank loans collateralised
by Italian sovereign securities and the average yield on those backed by French and German
sovereigns. The second set includes yields on the sovereign bonds, namely medium- and
long-term yields on Italian securities (secondary market Treasury bond yield at the 2-year
and 10-year maturity). We also analyse the changes in the spread between those bond yields
and the corresponding spread vis-à-vis the interest rate swap with the same maturity, which
can be interpreted as a proxy for variations in risk and liquidity premia.
Table 2.6 reports the results. All in all, they indicate that the LTROs affected money
market rates very substantially. The initial announcement of the LTROs on December 8 was
not followed by any significant yield changes, but both the first and the second auctions were
followed by statistically and economically significant reductions in all market spreads.22 As
a reference, the last two rows of the table report the cumulative change in each interest rate
over the three events considered and over the entire period between the announcement of
LTROs and the settlement of the second operation. These figures suggest that the changes
that took place around the event dates were persistent, since they are close to the total
change over the period considered. The interest rates paid by Italian banks on the interbank
22If anything, the effect of the announcement on the overnight rate and on 10-year yields had the wrong
sign. An interpretation is that the market was disappointed by the announcement, because it was expecting
an enhancement of the SMP.
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market dropped by 70 to 100 basis points.
Although the direct effects of the LTROs on long-term sovereign yields also played a
prominent role in the public discussion, our event studies do not find any immediate reac-
tion of government bond yields to the announcements. While this may at first sight seem
surprising, our result does not necessarily contradict the widespread view that the LTROs,
prompting a sovereign debt carry trade, contributed to the subsequent, gradual but steady
and significant, fall in Italian long-term yields that took place in the three months follow-
ing the LTROs. However, over the same period the financial markets were also affected by
other news; this raises a substantial identification problem and prevents from attributing
this particular decline in sovereign spreads to the monetary operations, which therefore we
refrain from doing in this paper.23
The overall effect of the LTROs on credit supply conditions implied by both our regression
analysis and our event study can be estimated by combining the two sets of results. Figure
2.5 reports the outcome of a dynamic simulation of equation (2.2) assuming no LTROs.
That is, LTRO dummy is set to 0 and it is assumed that each bank faced an overnight
rate 90 basis points higher beginning in 2012:q1, consistently with the result of the event
study. The Euribor spread is held constant at the level reached before the LTROs, which
corresponds to a maximum of 60 basis points more at the end of 201224. In this simulation
23The decrease of the yields on Italian sovereign bonds started in the second half of January 2012, after
a series of successful auctions on the primary market for Italian securities. In January and February, there
was positive news on the conclusion of the Greek PSI, on the German contribution to the ESM, on the new
support program for Greece.
24Our assessment of the impact of the 3-year LTROs on Euribor-OIS spreads is in line with the results of
Dubecq et al. (2014) summarized in Section 2.
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Table 2.6
Effects of LTROs announcements on Italian interest rate
Event Money market interest rates Sovereign bond yields
Spread
Italian
overnight
(2)
Spread
Italian
3-month (3)
2-year
BTPs
10-year
BTPs
Spread
2-year
BTPs over
IRS
Spread
10-year
BTPs over
IRS
Announcement
LTROs (8
Dec. 2011)
23** -2 31 37** 29 41*
Settlement 1st
LTRO (22
Dec. 2011)
-76*** -63*** 1 19 3 21
Settlement
2nd LTRO (1
Mar. 2012)
-37*** -5 -39 -28 -33 -27
Memo
Cumulated
change over
the above
events
-90 -70 -8 28 0 35
Cumulated
change from 7
Dec. 2011 to
2 Mar. 2012
-103 -99 -391 -108 -356 -64
NOTES: Cumulative two-day change in basis points around the announcement. (2) Spread between the
overnight interest rates on e-MID and EONIA; overnight interest rate on e-MID computed as a weighted
average (by volume of transactions) of the interest rates observed in the small-size and large-size segments
of the market. (3) Spreads between the Italian collateralized 3-month interest rates and the average collat-
eralized 3-month interest rates observed in France and in Germany. ***,**,* denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level; statistical significance is not provided for cumulative changes.
the BLS credit conditions index would have been persistently higher by 0.4, mainly reflecting
the permanent decrease in the interbank market rates paid by Italian banks. The effect is
economically significant, considering that the range of variation of the BLS index is between
-1 and 1.
2.4.4 Event study - OMTs
We perform a second event study to determine the effect of the ECB’s Outright Monetary
Transactions on interest rates. In this case, we consider three events: the speech by ECB
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President Draghi on 26 July 2012 announcing that the ECB would do “whatever it takes”
to contrast yield movements due to redenomination risk and the ECB Governing Council
meetings of 2 August and 6 September 2012, first making public the broad guidelines of the
OMTs and then communicating the complete operational details for the operations. For
each event, we consider the same set of money market rates and of sovereign yields as in the
previous section.
The results, shown in Table 2.7, are broadly symmetrical to those set out in the previous
section. The estimates suggest that the impact of the OMTs on money market rates was
negligible but that on sovereign yields was sizable and almost entirely frontloaded.25
Concerning the return on government bonds, a large and significant decrease in all the
yields took place around Draghi’s speech (Table 2.7, first row). The effect was concentrated
on the shorter end of the curve, where yields decreased by more than 100 basis points, but it
also affected the longer end. After the August meeting of the Governing Council, long-term
rates did not move but shorter rates fell further (Table 2.7, second row). This result is
likely to be a consequence of the announcement that interventions were to be concentrated
on the short segment. Long-term rates fell again around the Council’s September meeting
(Table 2.7, third row). The last two rows of the table suggest that most of the movements
in government bond yields and risk premia around event dates were persistent.
25It is not surprising that money markets were not significantly affected, since the OMTs did not involve
changes in excess liquidity (at any rate, liquidity was abundant at that time, as a consequence of the LTROs).
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Table 2.7
Effects of OMTs announcements on Italian interest rate
Event Money market interest rates Sovereign bond yields
Spread
Italian
overnight
(2)
Spread
Italian
3-month
(3)
2-year
BTPs
10-year
BTPs
Spread
2-year
BTPs over
IRS
Spread
10-year
BTPs over
IRS
Draghi’s
London speech
(26 Jul. 2012)
-2 -1 -116*** -49*** -112*** -62***
ECB
Governing
Council (2
Aug. 2012)
2 -2 -64** 12 -67** 6
ECB
Governing
Council (6 Sep.
2012)
-3 -1 -21 -46** -23 -55**
Memo
Cumulated
change over the
above events
-3 -3 -201 -83 -202 -112
Cumulated
change from 25
Jul. 2012 to 7
Sep. 2012
-5 4 -270 -139 -255 -145
NOTES: Cumulative two-day change in basis points around the announcement. (2) Spread between the
overnight interest rates on e-MID and the EONIA; overnight interest rate on e-MID computed as a weighted
average (by volume of transactions) of the interest rates observed in the small-size and large-size segments
of the market. (3) Spreads between the Italian collateralized 3-month interest rates and the average collat-
eralized 3-month interest rates observed in France and in Germany. ***,**,* denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10%level; statistical significance is not provided for cumulative changes.
2.5 Macroeconomic assessment
Using the Bank of Italy’s quarterly econometric model, we combine all the estimates obtained
in the previous section to assess the effect that the three measures considered had on the
main Italian macroeconomic variables. Note that our purpose is not to construct a complete
counterfactual macroeconomic scenario, which cannot be done by standard econometric
methodologies in view of the powerful non-linear dynamics that would have marked the
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economic variables in an extreme scenario of complete market collapse, which the ECB’s
measures may well have averted.26
In order to derive the macroeconomic impact, we construct the time series of the overall
effect of the unconventional measures on interbank rates, on the yields on 1- and 10-year
Treasury securities, on the index of credit conditions, over the period 2012-2013. We then
impose these “shocks” on the BIQM and run a simulation.27 By comparing the results
with the (“no-policy”) baseline, we derive a measure of the responses of the main Italian
macroeconomic variables to the unconventional monetary measures.
The set of shocks imposed on the model is set out in Table 2.8. The Italian overnight
unsecured rate and the 3-month collateralized rate are 70 and 90 basis points higher, respec-
tively, from the first quarter of 2012 on. Government bond yields are also higher: the 1-year
and 10-year yields are 120 basis points higher in third quarter 2011 and 200 points higher
starting the next quarter, due to the impact of SMP. The OMTs lowered the short-term and
the long-term rates on sovereign bonds by additional 180 and 95 basis points in the fourth
quarter of 2012.28 Finally, we consider a permanent upward shift of the BLS credit supply
index (by 0.4), starting from the first quarter of 2012.
Figure 2.6 reports the responses of output, investment, consumption, employment, credit
26The possible counterfactual of a larger, non-linear market collapse would imply that our estimates of the
effects of policy interventions may be significantly understated. However, it must be considered the existence
of a different alternate scenario, in which credit and financial markets would have gradually stabilized within
the simulation horizon even without the adoption of unconventional monetary measures. In that case, the
ECB actions would have had a temporary effect that dissipated over time and the estimates would be
overstated, at least in terms of the permanent effect.
27The four variables considered as exogenous in the simulation are indicated with an “*” in Figure 2.3.
28They also have some impact in the third quarter of 2012. 1-year yields are 120 and 10-year yields 50
basis points higher.
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Table 2.8
Summing-up of the main results
Measure Approach Main findings Overall estimated
effects
SMP Time-series
regressions
Interventions by the
Eurosystem significantly
affect the level of Italian
government bond yields
10-year and 2-year BTP:
cumulative decrease by
about 200 b.p. starting
from 2011:q3
3-year LTROs
Time-series
regressions
The Italian BLS credit
supply index was
significantly affected by
the LTROs (both
directly and through
reduction of premia in
interbank market)
BLS supply index:
permanent decrease by
about 0.4 beginning in
2012:q1
Event study When the LTROs were
implemented, premia on
the Italian interbank
market fell (while bond
yield did not react)
Premia on interbank market:
permanent decrease by
70-100 b.p. starting from
2012:q1
OMTs Event study At dates of OMTs
announcements, premia
on Italian medium and
long-term BTPs fell
(while interbank interest
rates did not react)
10-year BTP yields:
cumulative decrease by 95
b.p. starting from 2012:q3.
2-year BTP yields :
cumulative decrease by 180
b.p. starting from 2012:q3
supply, loan rates, prices, the government budget deficit and banks’ new non-performing
loans to the unconventional monetary measures. For each variable, the blue line shows the
percent deviation from the alternative scenario over the period 2011-2013, that is the per
cent deviation from baseline.29 The red line corresponds to the portion of the response due
to the interest rate component of the unconventional instruments.30 The distance between
the blue and the red lines represents the portion of the effect on each variable that is due
to the improved credit availability.
Four considerations stand out. First, the effects of the unconventional measures on
29The responses of interest rates, the deficit-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of bad loans are in terms of
absolute differences.
30This is calculated as the response obtained keeping credit availability in line with actual data.
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Figure 2.6
Response of selected variables to the unconventional monetary measures
NOTES: The difference between the blue solid line and the dashed red line represents the response via
improvement in credit availability.
the real economy are certainly substantial. At the end of 2013, GDP is higher by almost
3 per cent. Most of the positive impact results from an increase in investment, which is
21 per cent higher, due to its large sensitivity to credit conditions. Consumption reacts
comparatively less, being about 2.5 per cent higher at the end of 2013. The more subdued
response of consumption to changes in interest rates and credit availability reflects, among
other factors, the relatively low indebtedness of Italian households. Moreover, a relatively
large share of Italian household wealth consists in housing and is thus associated with a
low propensity to consume out of capital gains. Overall, the effect on the labor market
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Table 2.9
Macroeconomic effects of the unconventional shocks
Total Via interest rates Via credit availability
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
GDP 1.1 1.6 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.6
Exports 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Imports 2.6 3.1 0.5 1.8 2.2 1.6
Household
consumption
0.7 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.2
Investment 5.4 10.3 0.1 4.3 5.4 6.5
- in machinery 12.5 21.7 0.0 6.3 12.7 16.5
- residential 0.4 3.7 0.4 3.3 0.0 0.4
Lending to firms 1.4 4.0 0.6 2.3 1.0 1.8
Consumer credit 0.8 3.0 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.2
Mortgages 1.5 6.5 1.4 6.1 0.0 0.4
Consumption
deflator
0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Unemployment rate -0.2 -1.5 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -0.5
Government deficit
(%GDP)
-1.1 -1.6 -0.4 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6
SOURCE: Bank of Italy quarterly model simulation. NOTES: Growth rate differences, expressed in per-
centage points, with respect to the “no policy” scenario. The effects via interest rates and credit availability
may not add up to the total effect reported in the table due to rounding and non-linearities in the BIQM.
is substantial, with employment almost 1.5 per cent higher at the end of the simulation
horizon. Given these results, we conclude that, while they were unable to prevent recession,
the considered unconventional measures avoided a much deeper depression for the Italian
economy. The average yearly effect of the unconventional policy measures, summarized in
Table 2.9, indicate that the Italian GDP growth rate would have been lower by 1.1 percentage
points in 2012 and 1.6 points in 2013.31
2.6 Conclusions
Second, the cost and quantity of bank loans respond strongly, indicating the relevance of the
credit channel. Lending rates are almost 2.5 percentage points lower than baseline at the end
of 2013, while lending to firms is 8 per cent higher, due to the loosening of credit constraints
31Italian GDP shrank by 2.4 per cent in 2012 and 1.9 in 2013.
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Figure 2.7
Lending to firms: actual and simulated dynamics
NOTES: The simulated profile posits the absence of unconventional policy measures. Both profiles are
expressed as 12-month percent growth rate.
and the decrease in rates. Once again, the credit responses indicate that the unconventional
operations may have averted an even worse situation. Although bank lending continued
to decrease in Italy in 2012, the direct effect on supply conditions measured by the BLS
and the transmission of lower sovereign yields to bank lending rates via the interest rate
structure greatly attenuated the decline in lending to firms, both in 2012 and in 2013 (see
Figure 2.7).32 The former effect is consistent with recent work by Del Giovane, Nobili, and
Signoretti (2013) who, using micro data on bank loans and information from the BLS survey,
32Lending to Italian firms fell by 2.0 per cent year-on-year in 2012.
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estimate the effect of the tightening of credit conditions triggered by the sovereign debt crisis
on credit growth. The latter is consistent with the findings of Albertazzi et al. (2014b) that
sovereign spreads were largely transmitted to bank lending rates.
Third, the improvement in credit availability is an important channel for the transmission
of unconventional measures to the economy. As is shown by the red lines in figure 6, the
loosening of constraints on credit availability accounts for two thirds of the GDP response
at the end of 2012 and for almost half at the end of 2013. For investment in machinery,
the contribution is greater still. The effects of lower interest rates build up more slowly, but
they are economically significant at the end of the simulation horizon.
In order to estimate the impact of the non-standard measures adopted by the ECB in
2011 and 2012 (SMP, 3-year LTROs, OMTs) on the Italian economy, we first adopted specific
estimation approaches to measure the impact on money market interest rates, government
bond yields and credit availability and then mapped the estimated effects onto their macroe-
conomic implications, taking advantage of the Bank of Italy quarterly model of the Italian
economy.
The first conclusion is that the SMP has been effective in contrasting undue increases
in government bond yields. This conclusion is based on a set of regressions linking daily
changes in bond yields with SMP purchases and a series of control variables. The estimates
indicate that the effect of the SMP on Italian government bond yields is around 2 basis
points per billion euros purchased. Once standardized for the different size of the economy,
the impact on yields was much larger than the range of those reported for US large-scale
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asset purchases. This finding is consistent with the view that asset purchases are more
effective when addressing market disruptions than when aimed at addressing a zero lower
bound problem.
Second, the LTROs had a significant impact on credit supply, mainly through a sizable
reduction in money market spreads, associated with the revival of the interbank market.
Although bank lending continued to decrease in Italy in 2012, this result suggests that
the unconventional operations may have avoided a much more severe credit restriction and
helped to counteract the decline in lending to firms both in 2012 and 2013.
Third, the announcement and the design of the OMTs had very large frontloaded effects
on the sovereign bond market. Yields on Italian government bonds decreased sharply after
President Draghi’s speech at the end of July 2012, and the improvement was reinforced by
the ECB Governing Council announcements in early August and September.
From a macroeconomic perspective, our simulations indicate that the unconventional
measures have had a powerful effect on the Italian economy through several channels. Based
on the standard elasticities included in the BIQM, the cumulative GDP growth response
comes to 2.7 percentage points over the period 2012-2013. One of the main channels of
transmission is the improvement in credit availability, in particular through its impact on
investment.
The simulations also show that the set of unconventional operations had a favorable effect
on relevant macroeconomic variables that are usually not emphasized in discussions on the
effectiveness of monetary policy. We find that the deficit-GDP ratio improves greatly thanks
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to the combination of lower interest expenses and higher growth. The flow of new impaired
bank loans decreases, as lower interest rates and higher growth support businesses’ profits
and cash flow. There accordingly appears to be good reason to believe that the unconven-
tional policies helped avoid a further worsening of the adverse spiral between sovereigns,
banks and growth.
The Securities Markets Programme, the 3-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
and the Outright Monetary Transactions, however, did not prevent the Italian economy
from falling into recession. Over the time horizon considered in this paper, interest rates did
not completely regain their pre-crisis levels, credit conditions remained relatively tight, and
business lending continued to contract, although less sharply than would otherwise have been
the case. Partly, this reflects the incomplete institutional framework of the monetary union
that prevented a more intensive use of other tools, like fiscal policy.33 It may also suggest,
however, that more aggressive monetary policy could have been beneficial for countries under
stress, and ultimately for the whole euro area.
All in all, however, the evidence presented in this paper strongly supports the argument
that the unconventional monetary measures implemented by the ECB were far from being
ineffective; they significantly supported economic activity by avoiding a further downward
spiral of the crisis of confidence and a much more severe credit crunch.
33See Draghi (2014) for a more detailed discussion on the role of fiscal of fiscal policy and its interaction
with monetary policy during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.
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Chapter 3
The Financial Crisis and the Choice between Debt
and Credit Lines
3.1 Introduction
The banking panic in the fall of 2008 had a dramatic impact on the supply of funds to the
corporate sector. In particular, recent empirical evidence on the financial crisis emphasized
the importance of debt and credit lines in the provision of liquidity for firms. For example,
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a) report a substantial contraction in the volume of loan
issuance and an increase in drawdowns from lines of credit over 2008. Therefore, in order
to better understand how the crisis affected the financing policy of firms, it is necessary to
answer the following question: what determines the choice between debt and lines of credit?
In other words, how do firms choose the amount of bank loans to take, the size of credit
lines, and the actual drawdowns under revolving lines?
This question is economically interesting since lines of credit currently represent a funda-
mental component of corporate liquidity management. The standard structure of this form
of revolving credit is a contract that allows firms to draw cash up to a pre-specified limit.
The contract also establishes the up-front commitment fee, which is proportional to the line
limit, and the interest rate on the amount drawn, which is usually expressed as a mark-up on
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a money-market rate (e.g. the the 12-month LIBOR). Given the importance and the size of
revolving lines in the economy, understanding how credit line pricing affects credit limit and
drawdowns would shed significant light on the interaction between the financial and the real
side of the economy, especially when a liquidity shock hits financial intermediaries.1 The
question that this paper aims to answer is challenging because corporate financial policy
cannot abstract from real decisions that firms make. In this respect, it is plausible to believe
that the availability of other sources of external financing affects the choice of credit line
limits and drawdowns. This is the reason for studying an environment where firms have ac-
cess to bank loans, besides credit facilities. Moreover, bank lending dramatically decreased
during 2008, and thus the analysis of the interaction between loans and lines of credit could
give new insights to successfully interpret the mechanisms behind the financial crisis.
The goal of this paper is then twofold. The first objective is to develop a dynamic model
in which firms have access to three sources of funding, namely retained profits, bank loans,
and lines of credit. The second objective is to use a calibrated version of this model to
generate quantitative results that match the empirical counterparts, before and during the
crisis. Moreover, the same model is used to examine how firms behave in terms of real and
financial decisions during the transition process from normal to “crisis times”.
A key contribution of my paper is to build a partial equilibrium model with an infinite
horizon, which embeds a dynamic programming problem, to study why the corporate sector
uses credit lines. Despite a growing literature on credit lines, none of the previous works, to
1According to the most recent empirical literature, the ratio of credit lines limit to assets ranges from
0.157 to 0.24.
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the best of my knowledge, have tried to incorporate lines of a credit in a dynamic framework.
Indeed, the existing theoretical literature on credit facilities consists of papers that develop
models with a finite number of periods (e.g. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013)).
Besides introducing contracts that exhibit the main features of actual credit lines, the model
in this paper allows heterogeneous firms to take loans from banks. In particular, firms
can borrow against their expected profits, scaled by a factor that captures tightness in
bank lending conditions. The presence of this parameter that scales the firms’ borrowing
constraint allows me to simulate the cut on bank lending that occurred during the financial
crisis.
Both debt and drawdowns from lines are risk-free, and thus firms have to pay back the
entire amount borrowed in the previous period, in addition to the corresponding interest
payments. Firms can use credit lines only to finance their investment and operational costs,
while there are no limitations on the use of debt. Since interest expenses are deductible from
corporate income, the fiscal advantage induces firms to borrow up to the level that makes
the constraint on debt bind. However, this result does not hold for credit lines because firms
are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and thus they cannot perfectly predict their
future investment at the time of choosing the limit of the line. As a consequence, actual
drawdowns represent only a fraction of the available credit.
I then solve the model numerically under a parametrization that corresponds to the U.S
economy in the first quarter of 2008, using data on corporate financial aggregates and credit
lines pricing from Campello et al. (2011), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b), and Sufi (2009).
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The model successfully generates results that are close to the target moments. Turning to the
state of economy during the crisis, I use a new calibration so as to set the parameters equal to
the value they assume at the beginning of 2009. To better understand the transition implied
by the model from the first to the second steady state, I simulate a representative sample
of 100,000 firms, given their optimal policies computed under the “crisis” parametrization.
Firms’ initial conditions are drawn from the steady state distributions of k and z in the steady
state of the baseline parametrization, and are then followed over time as they dynamically
adjust their portfolios and other variables of interest.
The results show that firms immediately reduce their borrowing from banks, in line with
the empirical evidence. On the contrary, the ratio of the credit line limit to capital remains
broadly constant around the pre-crisis level, as the data suggest. Importantly, drawdowns
from revolving lines increase as a percentage of the limit immediately after the beginning
of the crisis and keep increasing over time. Once again the result matches the empirical
evidence from the financial crisis: firms substituted bank loans by withdrawing from credit
lines. In particular, the decrease in debt counterbalances the increase in drawdowns almost
perfectly, since the ratio of total external financing to assets does not change. Therefore, the
overall effect of a tighter lending policy and more expensive revolving lines is to reduce the
debt-assets ratio and to leave the ratio of credit lines to capital constant, while drawdowns
as percentage of available credit increase.
My paper relates to several strands of the economic literature. The model shares similar
features with the one built by Gourio and Miao (2010), who provide a dynamic general
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equilibrium model with firm heterogeneity to analyze the 2003 dividend tax cut. Similar
frameworks are presented in Gamba and Triantis (2008) and Riddick and Whited (2009),
who focus on the interaction between internal and external financing. However, none of
these papers incorporates credit lines, as I do. As discussed above, Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2013) study the trade-offs that firms face when choosing between holding cash
and securing a credit line. Their model builds on Holmström and Tirole (1998) and has only
three periods, with a liquidity shock hitting firms in the second period. The present paper
instead describes firms’ problem through a tractable dynamic partial equilibrium model.
Finally, there is a growing empirical literature analyzing the interaction between debt and
credit lines, before and during the crisis. In particular, I use data from four very recent
papers: Campello et al. (2011), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a, 2010b), and Sufi (2009).
3.2 The Model
This is a partial equilibrium model in which heterogeneous firms face dynamic investment
and financing decisions. The economy consists of a unit mass of firms that are symmetric
in all aspects, with one important exception: they differ in the realizations of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks occurring over time. The available sources of financing are cash, unde-
faultable debt and drawdowns from credit lines. The model uses discrete time, denoted by
t = 0, 1, 2,..., with infinite horizon. In absence of aggregate uncertainty, the steady-state
values of all the aggregate variables are constant over time. First, I describe technology and
financing. Then, I analyze the optimal financial policies. Finally, I study the aggregation
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problem and the stationary equilibrium.
3.2.1 Firm’s Problem
The economy has a continuum of firms that are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
which in turn represent the only source of uncertainty driving the dynamic policies. Because
all firms are ex-ante identical, I focus on a single firm’s problem and then describe aggregation
at the end of this section.
The firm’s profits y depend on the current stock of capital, k, and an exogenous produc-
tivity shock that is observed by the producer before he makes his current period decisions.
Shocks take values in the interval [z, z] and follow a Markov process with transition probabil-
ity H(z′, z), which satisfies the Feller property.2 I assume that the profit function y = pi(k, z)
is continuous, with pi(0, z) = 0, piz(k, z) > 0, pik(k, z) > 0, pikk(k, z) < 0, and satisfies the
standard Inada conditions. In order to produce, the firm has to pay a fixed cost equal to f ,
implying an equivalent liquidity need to be satisfied each period since firms cannot exit the
market. Moreover, profits, net of fixed costs, are taxed at the constant corporate income
tax rate τ .
The capital stock varies over time as a consequence of investment and disinvestment
decisions. In particular, investment, i, follows:
i = k′ − (1− δ)k (3.1)
2H has the Feller property if its Markov operator T maps C(S); the set of continuous function of Z into
R, into itself, i.e. if the conditional expectations are continuous in today’s state: (Tf)(z) = Rf(z′)H(z; dz′)
is continuous in z for any f continuous.
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where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. The firm can buy and sell capital at the constant
price of one; however, investment incurs adjustment costs C that are given by the functional
form:
C(k, k′) =
ψ
2
(
k′ − (1− δ)k
k
)2
k . (3.2)
I consider the quadratic adjustment cost function (3.2) with a constant ψ, as is commonly
used in the empirical investment literature.3 Besides using internal financing, which is
retained profits, firms have access to external financing sources, namely debt and credit
lines. In order to simplify the model, I rule out all other potential sources of external
finance, and in particular, equity. This simplification, although it might be too strong for
studies focused on capital structure, seems reasonable here, given that this paper aims to
study the interaction between borrowing and credit lines withdrawn and their respective
prices.
First, firm debt is modeled as bank loans. In particular, the firm can borrow from
financial intermediaries that apply the same interest rate r to all firms. Then in each
period, the firm chooses the size of the bank loan, b′, and has to repay its previous debt
back in full, in addition to interest payments, so that debt is risk-free. As a consequence,
I can abstract from bankruptcy and default issues. Moreover, firms cannot lend, but only
borrow, so as to have b ≥ 0 in each period. Given that interest payments are subtracted
from the taxable corporate income and therefore subject to a tax subsidy implicit in the
3See, for example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
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U.S. tax code, the firm’s cash flow in each period becomes:
(1− τ)(pi(k, z)− f)− i− C(k, k′) + b′ − (1 + (1− τ)r)b . (3.3)
The no-lending assumption is not the only constraint imposed on debt. Since interest ex-
penses are deductible from corporate income, the tax shield effect gives an incentive to
borrow with respect to internal financing.4 This fiscal advantage motivates the imposition
of a constraint on debt, in order to set an upper bound. In this respect, a binding collateral
constraint is widely used in the literature and debt is often set equal to a fixed fraction of
capital (e.g., Poterba and Summers (1983)). However, I prefer to let the debt-capital ratio
vary across firms, and hence I impose that expected future profits of the firm must be large
enough to repay the loan and the corresponding interest on it:
0 ≤ (1 + r)b′ ≤ ξE [pi(k′, z′)] , (3.4)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] measures the tightness of bank lending. The constraint above has several
positive implications. First, the firm can borrow up to the level such that its future re-
payment does not exceed a percentage ξ of its expected future profits. The presence of a
parameter that scales borrowing tightness will allow me to simulate the cut on bank lending
that occurred during the financial crisis. Second, the debt capacity of the firm is proportional
to its future cash flow, and thus more productive firms can borrow more, in relative terms,
4I assume that interest expenses are entirely deductible from corporate income, even this is not always
the case in the U.S tax system. This assumption is widely used in the relevant literature.
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than less productive firms, as some empirical evidence suggests. Third, this formulation
significantly simplifies the numerical solution of the dynamic problem.
In this model, firms also have access to lines of credit, that work as follows. In each
period, the firm picks a credit limit q and pays a commitment fee φq to retain the option of
drawing up to q at a pre-specified interest rate in the future. In the next period, the firm
decides the actual level of drawdowns from the credit line, which cannot exceed q. I denote
the credit that is drawn as a percentage of the total credit line by w, where w ∈ [0, 1]. In
the following period, or two periods after the firm chose q and one period after the draw
occurred, the firm has to pay wq back, in addition to interest payments equal to (r+ µ)wq,
where µ is a mark-up on the risk-free rate. It is important to see that the pricing of credit
lines is independent of idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm since they all face the same
φ and µ. Now that credit lines are available, the cash flow of the firm becomes:
(1−τ)(pi(k, z)−f)−i−C(k, k′)+b′−(1+(1−τ)r)b−φq′′+w′q′−(1+(1−τ)(r+µ))wq . (3.5)
Exactly as for debt, the exogenous price of credit lines associated with the fiscal shield
on passive interest expenses leads firms to choose an infinite q and draw the entire credit
available in every period. Therefore, once again I impose a constraint to rule out the corner
solution given by q = +∞ and w = 1. According to related empirical literature (Campello
et al., 2011), firms rely on revolving lines to create a liquidity edge necessary to invest
when internal funds (cash stocks and cash flows) and external financing (bank loans and
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commercial paper) decline. In particular, firms seem to draw from credit lines when an
unexpected investment opportunity arises or they need cash to pay some operational cost.
The empirical research then suggests a constraint of the form:
0 ≤ wq ≤ i+ C(k, k′) + f . (3.6)
Besides the impossibility of lending through credit lines, the above constraint states that
firms can use an existing credit line to finance their investment I, the correspondent ad-
justment costs, C(k, k′), and their liquidity need, which is equal to the operational cost f .
This constraint not only allows for a numerical solution, but also introduces an interesting
feature to the model. When the firm picks the line limit q, it cannot perfectly predict its fu-
ture investment, because the optimal level of capital depends on the exogenous productivity
shock. Consequently, the difference between potential future investment opportunities and
actual optimal investment creates a situation, in which w = 1 is not necessarily the optimal
policy outcome of the firm’s decision problem. Moreover, the imposition of an upper bound
on drawdowns from revolving lines excludes the possibility that firms select an infinite line
limit, since they anticipate that they will never draw more than a limited amount of cash,
given that f is fixed and investment is always finite. Because of (3.6) and the commit-
ment fee that is proportional to q, an infinite credit line limit implies an expense that is
purposeless since the firm will always draw only a finite amount from the same line.
Considering all the sources of cash flow so far described, the firm’s problem is then
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to choose (k′, b′, w′, q′′) each period so as to maximize the expected value of future cash
flows, discounted at 1/(1 + r). The dynamic programming formulation of the problem is
represented by the following Bellman equation:
V (k, z, b, wq, q′) = max
k′,b′,w′,q′′
(1− τ)(ezkα − f)− i− ψ
2
(
i
k
)2
k
+ b′ − (1 + (1− τ)r)b
− φq′′ + w′q′ − (1 + (1− τ)(r + µ))wq
+
1
1 + r
∫
V (k′, z′, b′, w′q′, q′′)dH(z′, z) ,
(3.7)
subject to (3.1) and:
(1− τ)(pi(k, z)− f)− i− C(k, k′)
+b′ − (1 + (1− τ)r)b
−φq′′ + w′q′ − (1 + (1− τ)(r + µ))wq ≥ 0
(3.8)
(1 + r)b′ ≤ ξE [pi(k′, z′)] (3.9)
w′q′ ≤ i+ C(k, k′) + f (3.10)
According to equation (3.7), the flow of funds consists of three positive sources, namely
after-tax net profits, new loans, and drawdowns from credit lines, and four negative items,
which are investment expenditure, debt service, interest expenses on previous drawdowns,
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and commitment fee on future lines. The difference between cash inflows and outflows must
be positive, and this is what constraint (3.8) requires. As regards the other two constraints,
(3.9) and (3.10), they are equivalent to (3.4) and (3.6) respectively, since the firm never finds
it optimal to lend, given the fiscal shield on interest payments. I will develop this intuition
in detail in the next subsection.
Conditions described in Stokey and Lucas (1989) guarantee the existence of a solution
for the Bellman equation (3.7). In particular, Theorem 9.8 ensures a unique optimal policy
function, denoted by:
{k′, b′, w′, q′′} = x(k, z, b, wq, q′) (3.11)
3.2.2 Financial Policies
In this subsection, I study the different financing options that are available to the firm
and present the corresponding optimal policies in two steps. In order to compare marginal
benefits and costs of using debt and credit lines, it proves more convenient to rewrite the
dynamic programming problem (3.7) as the following sequence problem:
max
kt+1,bt+1,wt+1,qt+2
E
[ ∞∑
0
1
1 + r
(1− τ)(ezt kαt − f)− it −
ψ
2
(
it
kt
)2
kt
+ bt+1 − (1 + (1− τ)r)bt
− φqt+2 + wt+1qt+1 − (1 + (1− τ)(r + µ))wtqt] ,
(3.12)
subject to (3.1) and:
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(1 + r)bt+1 ≤ ξE [pi(kt+1, zt+1)] , (3.13)
wt+1qt+1 ≤ i+ C(kt, kt+1) + f , (3.14)
Let λbt ≥ 0 and λqt ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (3.13)
and (3.14), respectively. Using equation (3.1) to eliminate I − t and taking the first order
condition of (3.7) with respect to bt+1, the optimal debt policy satisfies:
τr
1 + r
= λbt(1 + r) . (3.15)
Crucially, the left-hand side of the above equation is always strictly positive, implying that
λbt > 0. In other words, the shadow value of relaxing constraint (3.9) is positive and
thus the firm finds it optimal to borrow from banks as much as possible. This result is a
direct consequence of the tax shield that provides a clear incentive to finance investment by
borrowing from banks.
A similar conclusion holds for drawdowns from credit lines, as one can see in the equation
below, which corresponds to the first-order condition with respect to wt+1:
τr − (1− τ)µ = λqt . (3.16)
According to the above equation, the firms chooses to withdraw the maximum amount from
the credit line, setting wt+1 = 1, if the left-hand side is strictly positive, that is τr > (1−τ)µ.
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Explained in words, when the mark-up on the loan rate rate is too high, the firm prefers not
to withdraw funds from an existing credit line, rather using bank loans and retained profits
as financing sources for its investment. In the case that the mark-up is small enough that
τr > (1 − τ)µ, the constraint (3.14) is binding, implying that the firm finds it optimal to
withdraw as much as possible.
Regarding the optimal choice of the credit line limit qt+2, the corresponding first-order
condition is given by:
−φ+ 1
1 + r
(
1− E(λqt+1)
)
wt+1 +
1
(1 + r)2
(1− τ)(r + µ)wt+1 = 0 . (3.17)
In contrast to the cases of debt and drawdowns, the optimality condition for the credit line
limit involves some uncertainty associated with the term E(λqt+1). Indeed, the choice of the
line limit depends on the expected investment in the following period, which in turn is a
function of the idiosyncratic productivity shock that hits the firm in the same period. As a
consequence, the firms cannot perfectly predict the optimal investment in the next period,
leading to the existence of a potential wedge between the credit line limit and the actual
drawdowns, that is wt+1 ≤ 1.
3.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
In order to compute aggregate quantities in equilibrium, it is necessary to find the stationary
distribution of firms, ϕ∗, over the state (k, z, b, wq, q′). By the law of motion defined in Stokey
and Lucas (1989):
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ϕ′(k′, z′, w′q′, q′′) =
∫
1g(k,z,wq,q′)dH(z′,z)dϕ(k,z,wq,q′) (3.18)
where ϕ is the cross sectional distribution of firms and g(k, z, wq, q′) is the optimal capital
policy. The definition of invariant distribution then requires ϕ∗ = ϕ′ = ϕ. After finding the
stationary distribution, I can compute all the aggregate quantities. For example, aggregate
capital in equilibrium is given by:
K∗(k, z, wq, q′) =
∫
g(k, z, wq, q′)dϕ∗(k, z, b, wq, q′) (3.19)
3.3 Mapping the Model to U.S. Data
With the model intuition in hand, I now explain the methodology implemented in this
paper in detail. Since the model developed in the previous section does not have a closed-
form solution for the stationary equilibrium, I compute a numerical approximation. Before
explaining the method used to solve the model numerically, I turn to the model calibration,
illustrating the values assigned to parameters, and describe the statistics in the data that
the model aims to match.
3.3.1 Calibration
With regards to technology, the profit function pi(k, z) is given by ezkα, while the produc-
tivity shock follows an AR(1) process in logs:
ln(zt) = ρ ln(zt−1) + t (3.20)
where t is i.i.d according to N(0, σ2). The estimates of the parameters come from Moyen
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(2004): α = 0.4, ρ = 0.6, and σ = 0.2. The depreciation rate is set equal to 0.95, a value
that allows the model to match the empirical investment rate. Finally, to find a value for the
adjustment cost parameter ψ, I follow Gourio and Miao (2010) and choose a value of 1.08,
which is higher than the one estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). However, they
use an adjustment cost function that includes both fixed and convex costs, while I consider
only convex costs.
The second set of parameters relates to internal and external financing. According to
the U.S. tax system, the tax rate on corporate income is equal to 0.34. The rate on bank
loans is set equal to the sum of the one-year LIBOR and the average five-year CDS premia
for U.S. banks, both evaluated in the first quarter of 2008, that is 0.047. This is consistent
with the assumption that banks do not charge any risk premia on lending rates, since firms
are risk free. With respect to the discount factor, β is set to 0.946 since β = 1/(1 + r).
Campello et al. (2011) provide data on credit lines pricing for the same quarter and firms
face a commitment fee of 12.668 basis points and a mark-up on the LIBOR, and thus on
bank loan rates, of 127.511 basis points.
Table 3.1 lists all the parameters with the corresponding calibrated values for the base-
line model. Interest rate on debt, credit facilities pricing structure, and the bank lending
tightness will assume different values later, when I study the effect of the financial crisis on
the firms’ financing policies.
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Table 3.1
Baseline Parametrization
Statistic Parameter Value
Technology
Production parameter α 0.45
Shock persistence ρ 0.6
Shock volatility σ 0.2
Depreciation rate δ 0.095
Adjustment cost ψ 1.08
Fixed cost of production f 1.3
Financing
Corporate income tax τ 0.34
Loan rate r 0.047
Markup on loans µ 0.0127511
Commitment fee φ 0.0012668
Bank lending tightness ξ 1.0
3.3.2 Data Targets
The aggregate statistics I want to match are related to the choice between debt and credit
lines as sources of external financing. Therefore, I focus on the ratio of debt to capital,
b/k, the value of credit lines as a percentage of total assets, q/k, and credit that is drawn
as a percentage of total credit, w. While several previous works provide a value for the
debt-capital ratio, it is more difficult to find data on credit line limits and corresponding
drawdowns. In contrast to the literature on debt financing, the empirical and theoretical
literature on lines of credit is indeed scant. Moreover, I need data on credit lines both before
and during the financial crisis, in order to perform experiments and check the robustness of
the model.
To the best of my knowledge, four papers provide recent empirical evidence on credit
facilities. Sufi (2009) presents summary statistics for a sample of 300 non-financial firms.
However, his data do not encompass the financial crisis, since the sample covers the years
from 1996 through 2003. Campello et al. (2011) survey 794 CFOs from 31 countries in North
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America, Europe, and Asia in the second quarter of 2009. Among the descriptive statistics
they show, they present data for the ratio of credit lines to assets, and credit lines pricing,
before and during the crisis (first quarter of 2008 and 2009, respectively).5 Unfortunately,
they collect information on drawdowns only after the credit crunch, but not before. With
regards to q/k, the decline in the ratio of credit lines to capital is statistically insignificant,
except for “financially constrained” firms. Given the assumption that every firm has access
to bank loans, my paper abstracts from the issue of financially constrained firms, and thus
the target for q/k is the same for the pre-crisis and crisis time.
Another source of data I rely on is Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b). Their empirical
analysis is based on data for 544 publicly traded manufacturing firms, presenting figures
for revolving line limits (in million USD) and revolving lines drawn (as percentage of the
limit), taken from SEC quarterly and annual filings. In this case, the sample spans from
the beginning of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. Finally, Gao and Yun (2009) use data
at the firm level to study the interaction between credit lines and commercial paper. They
report information on the use and availability of lines of credit for non-financial firms in the
United States at quarterly frequency. Unfortunately, they focus only on last three quarters
of 2008 and data on credit line pricing for that period are not publicly available.
Table 3.2 lists the target moments and the corresponding empirical values, taken from
the papers cited above. With respect to targets for the pre-crisis period, I set values based on
Sufi (2009). The reason is that the other works do not report values for all the three relevant
5I only use data from the U.S sample, ignoring statistics from Europe and Asia.
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Table 3.2
Target Variables
Statistic Source Before crisis During crisis
b/k
Sufi (2009) 0.205 n.a.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) 0.230 n.a.
Campello et al. (2010) n.a. n.a.
q/k
Sufi (2009) 0.157 n.a.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) n.a n.a
Campello et al. (2010) 0.240 0.240
w
Sufi (2009) 0.329 n.a.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) 0.183 0.236
Campello et al. (2010) n.a. 0.385
variables, and Sufi (2009) is likely to be more consistent from a cross-sectional perspective.
At the same time, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) and Campello et al. (2011) provide data
on w and q/k, respectively, both before and after the crisis occurred. In particular, Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010b) suggest that drawdowns from credit lines became larger during the
crisis, leading to an increase in w of about 29 percent. Applying this growth rate to the
value reported by Sufi (2009), the target value for w during the crisis is given by 0.424. In
the same way, Campello et al. (2011) argue that the value of credit lines, as a percentage of
total assets, did not change over 2009, and thus the target value for q/k during the crisis is
the same as that for the pre-crisis period.
It is straightforward to see that none of the papers cited above provides a value for the
ratio of debt to capital, during the financial crisis. However, I can address this problem by
using results shown in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a, 2010b). These works report that the
volume of bank loans declined by about 40 percent, between the first quarter of 2008 and the
first quarter of 2009. Therefore, I assume that the debt-capital ratio would have fallen by
40 percent, if capital were constant. Although the plausibility of this assumption might be
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disputed, it is consistent with the theoretical framework, since I model debt as bank loans.
Including other forms of debt, such as bonds or commercial papers, whose volume fell less
dramatically during the crisis, might lead to a smaller decrease in b/k.6
3.3.3 Numerical Method
To find a numerical solution of the model, I let the capital stock lie on 100 equally spaced
points in the interval [0.001, k¯], where k¯ is such that:
(1− τ)(pi(k, z)− f)− δk = 0 (3.21)
as in Gomes (2001). The grid for productivity has 10 points of support, obtained by approx-
imating (3.20) into a discrete Markov chain implementing the usual method from Tauchen
(1986).7 I let debt, b, and the credit line limit, q, have 30 points each in the intervals [0, b¯]
and [0, q¯] respectively, where b¯ and q¯ are given by:
b =
ξE
[
ez
′ |z = z
]
k
α − f
1 + r
(3.22)
and
q = (k − 0.001δ) + C(0.001, k) + f . (3.23)
Therefore, debt and associated interest payments cannot exceed the highest possible profits
6For example, Gao and Yun (2009) find that aggregate commercial paper outstanding in the manufac-
turing industry declined by the 15 percent after the default of Lehman Brothers.
7In detail, I use a program that computes the discrete approximation to a standard AR(1) normal process
using the quadrature procedure developed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
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that a firm can generate, since productivity and capital cannot assume values higher than z
and k, respectively. As regards the credit line limit, it must be smaller than the sum of the
largest possible investment expenditure, the corresponding adjustment costs, and the fixed
cost of production. Analytically, the upper bounds for both debt and the credit line limit
come from the constraints (3.9) and (3.10). Finally, I use a grid with 10 points for w, whose
lower and upper bounds are both progressively adjusted to make the grid thinner around
the optimal choice of drawdowns that results from the first simulations.
In order to simplify the firm’s decision problem (3.7), I replace the state variables b and
wq with another one, v, that is equal to the sum of debt and credit lines expenses, and thus
v = (1 + (1 − τ)r)b + (1 + (1 − τ)(r + µ)wq. Due to this simplification, the value function
has seven dimensions instead of the initial eight. I solve the the model via iteration on the
Bellman equation, obtaining the value function V (k, z, v, q′) and the optimal decision rule
{k′, b′, w′, q′′} = x(k, z, v, q′).
The next step is to find the stationary distribution of firms ϕ∗(k, z, v, q′). Following a
standard procedure, I define a transition matrix W that gives the probability of going from
state s to state s′, where the state is a combination of values of k, z, c and q′. I then start
with a guess ϕ0 that corresponds to a uniform distribution, and multiply this guess by the
transition matrix W in order to update the initial guess to ϕ1 = Wϕ0. If ||ϕ1 − ϕ0|| < ,
where  is a small number, then ϕ1 is the stationary distribution ϕ∗, otherwise I keep
updating the guess and repeating until convergence. Given the stationary distribution, it is
possible to compute aggregate quantities, as shown previously in (3.19).
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3.4 Quantitative Results
I now establish that my framework gives a plausible account of the interaction between debt
and credit lines. Besides reporting simulated values of financial variables, I also show figures
relative to the real side of economy, even if I do not have corresponding empirical data for
them. First, I present the results of the baseline model, assigning parameter values that
correspond to empirical data observed before the financial crisis occurred. Then, I report
the corresponding results obtained by changing several parameters at the same time in order
to simulate the impact of the financial crisis on the financing policies of the firms. Finally,
I show and discuss the transition implied by the model from the first to the second steady
state.
3.4.1 Baseline Model Results
After describing the model and the method to solve it, I now turn to numerical results. The
economy is defined by the parameter values in Table 3.1 that come from empirical evidence,
except for the bank lending tightness, ξ, and the operational cost, f . Since the baseline
model aims at simulating an economy without financial distress, ξ is set equal to 1 in order
to let firms borrow up to their expected future profits. On the other hand, I calibrate f so
as to make the model match the moments of the data, listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 reports the target statistics and their counterparts in the baseline economy.
Focusing on the financial side first, the numerical results of the model are very close to
the empirical counterparts. In particular, both the debt-capital ratio and the fraction of
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Table 3.3
Aggregate quantities in the baseline model
Economy side Moment Variable Model Target
Financial
Debt-assets ratio b/k 0.207 0.205
Credit lines-assets ratio q/k 0.192 0.157
Drawdowns (% of the limit) w 0.327 0.329
Drawdowns-external
financing ratio
wq/(b+ wq) 0.233
External financing-capital
ratio
(b+ wq)/k 0.269
Real
Net profits-capital ratio y/k 0.132
Investment-capital ratio i/k 0.095
Adjustment costs-capital
ratio
c/k 0.005
credit lines drawn are almost identical to the their corresponding targets. However, it is
important to note that the credit lines-capital ratio is larger than the corresponding target,
but it is still smaller than the value presented in Campello et al. (2011), which is 0.240. All
in all, my framework gives a plausible account of firms’ financing policies in the steady-state.
The same conclusion also holds for the real side of the economy, given that the values of
aggregate net profits and investment as percentage of assets are similar to the findings in
other papers.8
I now turn to the analysis of the economy during the financial crisis. Data suggest that
four parameters assume a different value in the first quarter of 2009, compared to one year
8For example, see Gourio and Miao (2010).
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before. First, the interest rate on debt increases from 0.047 to 0.051 mainly due to the fact
that banks faced higher CDS premia which more than counterbalanced the quantitative and
qualitative easing implemented by the Federal Reserve. Second, financial intermediaries
raised both the commitment fee, φ, and the mark-up on drawdowns, µ, to 26.408 and
196.789 basis points, respectively. Finally, it became more difficult for firms to take loans,
and I simulate this event by reducing ξ, which is the parameter that measures the bank
lending tightness in the model. In detail, in order to match the new target moments, I set
ξ to 0.92 from the initial value of 1. Table 3.4 illustrates the numerical results of the model
for the new steady state under the new parametrization.
The results show that the model can successfully replicate what happened during the
recent financial crisis in several respects. First, the ratio of debt to capital b/k declines by
about 0.1 percentage points. Given the aggregate stock of capital decreases because of a
higher interest rate r, this implies a fall in the volume of debt of about 17 percent. The
decline in the debt-to-capital ratio also stems from the tighter lending policy. Since the
borrowing constraint on debt always binds, a decrease in ξ consequently indeed implies a
reduction in on the ratio of debt to capital.
Second, the ratio of credit lines to capital q/k, although still larger than the correspond-
ing target, is largely unaffected as the empirical evidence suggests. This means that the
percentage decrease in the credit line limit is basically identical to that of capital. In think-
ing about this result, it is crucial to understand that the unused fraction of a credit line
represents a cost that the firms try to minimize. When the commitment fee and the mark-up
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Table 3.4
Aggregate quantities during the financial crisis
Economy side Moment Variable Model Target
Financial
Debt-assets ratio b/k 0.198 0.192
Credit lines-assets ratio q/k 0.190 0.157
Drawdowns (% of the
limit)
w 0.423 0.424
Drawdowns-external
financing ratio
wq/(b+ wq) 0.288
External financing-capital
ratio
(b+ wq)/k 0.278
Real
Profits-capital ratio y/k 0.135
Investment-capital ratio i/k 0.095
Adjustment costs-capital
ratio
c/k 0.005
increase, the opportunity cost of not drawing the entire credit available goes up, inducing
firm to have smaller revolving lines and better exploit them.
Finally, firms substitute loans with drawdowns from credit lines, whose usage increases
significantly, matching its empirical counterpart. Therefore, the model successfully replicates
what happened during the recent financial crisis, when firms kept the volume of credit
facilities constant and increased their drawdowns. In this respect, it is interesting to see
that the aggregate ratio of external financing to capital is almost the same as in the baseline
model. Given that volume of debt declines, this result implies that the two effects above
counterbalance each other perfectly, so that total amount of borrowing by firms does not
change during the financial crisis.
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It is important to highlight that the values in Table 3.4 reflect the firms’ optimal policies
in an economy for which the financial crisis is the new steady state. However, the recent
financial crisis can be seen as a deviation from the steady state. To better understand the
transition implied by the model from the first to the second steady state, I simulate a large
number of firms over 20 quarters. Specifically, I set the time 0 values of the aggregates
equal to their steady states in the baseline parametrization. Given these initial conditions,
I simulate a representative sample of 100,000 firms, given their optimal policies computed
under the “crisis” parametrization. Firms’ initial conditions are drawn from the steady state
distributions of k and z in the steady state of the baseline parametrization. The paths for
aggregate variables are computed in subsequent quarters as the mean of each variable over
all firms, and used to compute the paths for the ratios reported in Figure 3.1.
According to the simulations, it takes about 12 quarters for the economy to move from
the initial steady state to the new one. However, there are significant differences across
variables in terms of the speed at which they converge to the new equilibrium levels. The
debt-to-capital ratio, b/k, immediately decreases by almost 0.1 percentage points in the
first quarter after the beginning of the crisis and then remains broadly constant. On the
contrary, the ratio of the credit line limit to capital, q/k, initially decreases but recovers
afterwards, basically going back to the level observed before the onset of the financial crisis.
With respect to this result, I want to highlight that the model can successfully replicate a
constant credit line-assets ratio, even assuming that revolving lines last for exactly one year.
In fact, Campello et al. (2011) report an average maturity of credit lines around 30 months
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Figure 3.1
Responses of Aggregate Variables to the Crisis
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NOTES: Solid lines illustrate the responses of aggregate ratios over 20 quarters, measured in absolute
deviations. Aggregate variables are computed as the sample mean of a representative population of 100,000
firms simulated in each quarter. Initial values of k and z for individual firms are drawn from the steady
state distributions under the baseline parametrization and are used to compute the baseline policies of each
individual variable. Optimal policies for each firm are computed in subsequent periods using optimal decision
rules determined in the steady state under the “crisis” parametrization.
before the crisis and around 27 months during the crisis. This evidence implies that the
ratio of revolving lines to capital may not change during the crisis simply because a small
number of firms had to negotiate a new line during 2008.
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With respect to drawdowns in percentage of the credit line limit w, the simulations
reported in Figure 3.1 show that the adjustment towards the new equilibrium level is slower
than that of debt. Drawdowns significantly increase in the first quarter in response to the
decrease in borrowing from banks associated with tighter lending policy. Given that the
credit line limit is predetermined, this implies a more intense usage of revolving lines. In
the following quarters, drawdowns in percentage of the credit line limit continue to increase,
since firms ask for a lower credit line limit due to the higher interest rate and mark-up.
Overall, firms substitute debt with drawdowns from credit lines as the increase in the
drawdowns-external financing ratio suggests. Importantly, the ratio of external financing
to capital marginally goes up mainly due to the fall in aggregate capital, which is the
consequence of the higher interest rate. Controlling for the change in the stock of capital, the
total size of external funds is substantially unaffected by the new parametrization, meaning
that the crisis induces firms to perfectly offset the tighter lending policy by withdrawing
larger amounts from the available credit lines.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I build a partial equilibrium model, in which idiosyncratic firms have access to
two different sources of external financing: bank loans and credit lines. Under a calibration
that reflects the status of the economy in the first quarter of 2008, the dynamic program-
ming problem generates quantitative estimates for aggregate debt, credit lines limits, and
drawdowns that are very close to the empirical data.
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I then vary the parameters which were affected by the financial crisis, namely the bank
lending rates, the pricing of credit facilities, and the tightness in bank lending policy, which I
measure using one specific parameter in the model. Under this new calibration corresponding
to the U.S. economy at the beginning of 2009, I find that the overall effect of the crisis is
to reduce the debt-assets ratio, while the ratio of the credit line limit to capital remains
constant. With respect to the use of revolving lines, drawdowns as percentage of the available
credit limit significantly increase.
Therefore, the model successfully matches the firms’ behavior observed during the finan-
cial crisis. Importantly, the transition implied by the model shows that the firms’ optimal
response to the crisis is to replace bank loans with drawdowns from credit lines almost
one-to-one, as the empirical evidence suggests. All in all, this paper accomplishes its goal
for providing quantitative results that are consistent with the U.S. data, with aggregate
moments that are very close to their empirical counterparts.
There are several ways in which my paper can be extended. A major improvement
would consist of removing the limitations imposed by a partial equilibrium model. Firms
are the only agents whose behavior is explicitly modeled, and hence their decisions are
completely endogenous. On the contrary, the model abstracts from other economic agents,
like households, or considers them as exogenous, like financial intermediaries. A general
equilibrium model would then have many positive and interesting features that the current
one does not display. For example, incorporating households into the current framework
would allow for a production function that also has labor as an input. However, since
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financial intermediaries play a fundamental role in shaping firms’ financing policies, including
banks would be a more relevant extension, for several reasons. First, when banks set the
interest rate and the commitment fee, they would take into account the possibility that a
firm defaults, relaxing the assumption that both loans and credit drawdowns are risk-free.
Second, since the default probability depends on idiosyncratic characteristics of firms, each
producer would face different prices to borrow through loans or revolving lines.9 Third, debt
and credit maturity would represent an additional variable choice for firms, instead of being
fixed and equal to one year, as it is now. Finally, pricing policy of financial intermediaries
would depend on the default probability and become endogenous, allowing me to aim at
matching also the empirical data on LIBOR and fees on credit facilities.
Access to other forms of external financing represents another interesting extension. In
particular, the possibility of issuing bonds and equity would significantly enrich the model
and improve its capability of explaining corporate liquidity management. Firm heterogeneity
would then have a stronger impact on the model’s results, because the volume and the price
of issued bonds, as well as the capital structure, would depend on peculiar characteristic of
each firm. Finally, I could embed a central bank in the model, in order to analyze the effect
of quantitative and qualitative easing, also known as unconventional monetary policy, on
the financial policies of firms.
9Campello et al. (2011) find that firms with more internal liquidity are less likely to pay a commitment
fee, and that, conditional on paying a fee, they pay lower fees.
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